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Drawing on theories about the social construction of knowledge and the 
sociology of the body, this dissertation analyzes the social construction of 
buprenorphine, a medication being used to treat addiction to opioids, to better 
understand the processes of medicalization.  Buprenorphine was central the passage of 
the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, a law which overturned an almost one 
hundred year prohibition preventing physicians from prescribing narcotics for the 
treatment of addiction in an office-based setting.  Buprenorphine is seen by many as 
central to moving addiction treatment into the medical mainstream.  Using documents 
from government regulators, industry, and addiction researchers, I show that there are 
many different ―buprenorphines,‖ each being strategically constructed and deployed to 
serve different political and economic interests.  I also use qualitative interviews with 
individuals taking buprenorphine to examine the ways in which their embodied 
experiences of the medication shape and are shaped by different discourses about 
buprenorphine, addiction, and addiction treatment.  I show how buprenorphine and 
medical theories of addiction act as a new system of constraint, while allowing new 
possibilities for agency and action.  I conclude with a discussion of how the discourses 
about and embodied experiences of those taking buprenorphine challenge but also 
v 
reflect the larger sociopolitical context in which they are contained.  This research builds 
upon and challenges existing theories about the medicalization of social problems. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 
Mr. President, last week the fight against heroin addiction took a major 
leap forward… The new law, the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 
permits, for the first time, such anti-addiction medications to dispensed in 
the private office of qualified physicians. … I believe that the system we 
have finally put in place will effectively put America on the right road to 
fighting and winning the heroin addiction war. 
 
Senator Levin, Congressional Record 2002: S01656 
 
 
In October 2002, in a radical departure from almost a century of U.S. drug policy, 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the use of the pharmaceutical 
buprenorphine (bup) to treat opioid dependence
1
 in office-based settings.  Not since 1914 
have physicians been legally permitted to treat addiction by prescribing a narcotic.  In 
contrast to methadone (the most widely used treatment for opioid dependence), which 
remains mired in restrictive government oversight and requires daily attendance at a 
highly regulated clinic, buprenorphine is available through any certified physician in any 
office–based setting.  A physician-based model of addiction treatment, bup treatment was 
intended to collapse the historical separation between medical care and drug treatment, 
which has been maintained at the level of financing, regulation, professional education 
and credentialing, and discourse.  Bup, delivered by physicians in medical settings, is 
supposed to bridge these chasms and has been heralded by addiction medicine experts as 
the technological breakthrough that will finally move the treatment of addiction into the 
medical mainstream.  As such, it provides a unique opportunity to explore a new effort to 
                                                 
1
 Opioid dependence refers to any physical dependence on an opiate-based substance, whether heroin, 
opium or prescribed narcotics, like Oxycontin, Hydrocodone and Codeine. 
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medicalize addiction – a social problem that has been described as resistant to 
medicalization.  
Although the medical model of addiction has gained in prominence in the U.S. 
over the past thirty years, scholars have noted neither alcoholism (Appleton 1995; 
Valverde 1998) nor drug dependence (Smart 1984) fit easily into the medicalization 
model.  There has been no graceful arc from deviance to medicalization in the case of 
addiction.  Using the guise of science, researchers and medical practitioners generally 
claim to be morally neutral and to base their assertions and practice on objective truths.  
In reality of course, scientific constructions are infused with moral paradigms and 
assumptions (Brandt and Rozin 1997).  This slippage between medicine and morality, a 
characteristic of many medicalized conditions, has been especially pronounced and 
problematic throughout the history of addiction medicine in the United States and has 
created ambiguity in how we understand drug users, the professionals who treat them, 
and drug treatment itself.  
According to the National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(NHSUDH), an estimated 200,000 people used heroin and 5.3 million people used pain 
relievers nonmedically
2
 in the past month (SAMHSA 2010).  The NHSDUH estimated 
that 1.85 million Americans are dependent on or abuse pain relievers and 399,000 are 
dependent on or abuse heroin.
3
 Variations in the rates of illicit drug use overall by race 
are modest (9.6 percent for blacks, 8.8 percent for whites, and 7.9 percent for Hispanics). 
                                                 
2
 Nonmedical use is defined as using a medication in any way other than as it was prescribed. 
3
 The National Household Survey on Drug Use & Health does not separate abuse and dependence. Abuse 
of illicit drugs or alcohol was defined as meeting one or more of the four criteria for abuse included in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association 
1994) and if the definition for dependence was not met for that substance. Dependence on illicit drugs or 
alcohol was defined as meeting three out of seven dependence criteria (for substances that included 
questions to measure a withdrawal criterion) or three out of six dependence criteria (for substances that did 
  3 
The major treatment modalities for addiction in the U.S. have been abstinence-based and 
―drug free‖ programs that rely on behavioral interventions or self-help models like 
Narcotics Anonymous (SAMHSA 2010).  Because medicine has historically had little to 
offer in the way of treatment, May argues that ―the process of medicalisation has, at the 
very most, been only partially successful‖ (2001: 386) and that ―the clinical constructions 
of addiction still engage a set of moral questions‖ (2001: 386).  These moral questions are 
often directly built into treatment programs, many of which have explicit crime control 
functions (Fox 1999) but rely on medical language to describe addiction.  
Along with morality-infused and behaviorally-based treatment programs, 
criminalized approaches to drug use have continued to play a large role in drug control 
policy.  The increasing criminalization of drug use over the past thirty years, as evidenced 
by lengthy mandatory sentences for drug convictions and dramatic increases in federal 
funding for the ―War on Drugs,‖ has had a significant impact on the number of people 
incarcerated in the U.S., now exceeding 2,000,000 (Glaze and Palla 2004).  Although 
Black Americans are no more likely than whites to use illicit drugs, they are for more 
likely to be incarcerated for drug offenses (Rich et al. 2011).  Black men in the U.S. are 
more likely to have been in prison than to have graduated from college or joined the 
military by middle age (Rich et al 2011).  While medical and criminalized views of 
addiction are often considered contradictory approaches, the margins between the two 
have increasingly blurred through criminal justice practices such as drug courts, where 
                                                                                                                                                 
not include withdrawal questions) for that substance, based on criteria included in the 4th edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (APA 1994).  In general, ―dependence‖ 
often refers to physical symptoms, such as withdrawal in the absence of the drug, that have not necessarily 
caused any harm to the individual. ―Abuse‖ is usually seen as a more severe form addiction characterized 
by continued use of the substance despite harm to self or others. There is considerable debate over these 
terms and about whether those who are dependent on drugs require drug treatment. For example, an entire 
issue of the journal Addiction (2010, 106:5) was devoted to these questions. 
  4 
defendants with drug-related offenses are mandated to drug treatment (Tiger 2008).  
Buprenorphine is being framed within this complicated environment and, moral, law 
enforcement and medical perspectives on addiction are all infused throughout the rhetoric 
surrounding its promotion.  
 Bup is an interesting case of medicalization not only because of the historical 
ambiguity between addiction as a moral, criminal and medical problem but also because 
of medicine‘s role in both causing and treating addiction.  Many addictive drugs, for 
example, originated as medicines, and several have been used as medicines to treat 
addiction.  Morphine was once used to treat addiction to opium; heroin was first 
introduced for the treatment of morphine addiction; and methadone, used to treat heroin 
addiction, is also widely bought and sold on the street as an illicit drug.  Articulating a 
coherent rationale for the line between illicit drugs and legal medicines has become 
increasingly difficult.  Marijuana is now a prescription medicine in many states; addiction 
to prescription medications far outstrips the use of any illegal drug, except marijuana 
(SAMHSA 2010); and opioids (like buprenorphine, methadone, and even heroin) have all 
been prescribed to treat opioid dependence.  As this dissertation makes clear, maintaining 
the line between drugs and medicines is a major preoccupation for proponents of bup 
who understand that to succeed at medicalizing addiction, bup must been seen as a 
legitimate medication and not a potential drug to be abused.   
Part of the challenge in maintaining this distinction comes from the fact that 
buprenorphine, like methadone and other opiate replacement therapies, is a synthetic 
opiate that occupies the same receptor in the brain as ―natural opiates,‖ such as heroin.  
The difference between the heroin and opiate replacement therapies, which is used to 
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justify their different legal status, is that synthetic opiates are slow acting and do not 
produce the ―high‖ associated with heroin (Food and Drug Administration u.d.(a)).  By 
slowly acting upon the body, synthetic opiates minimize the cravings that are associated 
with drug dependence.  Opiate replacement therapies are called ―agonists‖ because they 
mimic, rather than block, the effects of the ―natural‖ opiate.  Synthetic opiates can and do 
cause physical dependence, and buprenorphine is used to treat addiction to prescribed 
opiates as well as to heroin.  Buprenorphine is referred to as a ―partial agonist‖ because it 
has a ceiling effect beyond which no additional ―high‖ can be achieved and thus, 
according to its proponents, has less overdose potential than methadone and lower resale 
value (I analyze these claims in detail in Chapter 5).  Despite the fact that buprenorphine 
is similar to methadone in many ways, buprenorphine‘s advocates have successfully 
argued for completely different system of distribution.  In 2009, the last year for which 
data are available, an estimated 640,000 people were treated with bup (Clark 2010).  In 
contrast, methadone, which has been available since the 1970‘s, treats about 250,000 
people per year (Egan et al. 2010). 
Indeed, the discourse surrounding buprenorphine is best understood against the 
backdrop of this country‘s history with methadone, as researchers and regulators alike 
have specifically framed bup as an alternative to methadone.  Dole and Nyswander – two 
physicians in the U.S. – began using methadone to treat opiate addiction, which they 
claimed was a metabolic disorder.  Dole and Nyswander argued that addicts should be 
maintained on methadone much as diabetics maintain their use of insulin to treat their 
illness.  When methadone was introduced as a treatment for addiction, it was subject to 
considerable controversy with opponents, many from competing abstinence-based 
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treatment programs, arguing that it replaced one addiction for another (Nelkin 1973).  
Describing methadone in 1973, sociologist Dorothy Nelkin wrote that ―the controversy 
over methadone maintenance reflects the tangle of often irreconcilable legal, moral, 
political, and medical attitudes toward addiction and its treatment‖ (Nelkin 1973: 66) – an 
observation that remains salient today.   
This amalgam of conflicting attitudes and interests were brought to bear on the 
methadone‘s system of distribution in significant ways.  Initially intended as a medication 
to be distributed by physicians, federal guidelines developed by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and state regulations – influenced heavily by methadone 
opponents – severely restricted the distribution of methadone to specially regulated 
clinics (Attewell 1979).  Methadone clinics, operating in a ―bureaucratic jungle‖ (Nelkin 
1973: 47) of federal and state guidelines, are subject to considerable oversight from 
regulatory agencies that have greatly affected the nature of the setting in which 
methadone is distributed.  Methadone patients must adhere to strict rules for obtaining 
methadone that some have argued are more punitive than therapeutic in nature (see for 
example Bourgois 2000; Rosenbaum 1995).  For instance, methadone patients must go to 
the clinic daily (or several times a week), take methadone while being observed by clinic 
staff, provide urine for random drug screenings, and meet with clinic counselors.  Clients 
have little or no say over their course of treatment.  The result is a setting where punitive 
and medical perspectives come together in an ―unhappy compromise‖ (Bourgois 2000) 
for patients receiving methadone.   
Conrad and Schneider (1992) argue that, because of the large governmental 
involvement in methadone and in its system of distribution, methadone treatment was 
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never justified on a theoretical level by a well-developed disease model.  It is out of this 
context that buprenorphine has emerged.  As I will demonstrate, buprenorphine advocates 
are actively constructing a disease model of addiction in ways that seek to address the 
problems that have plagued methadone.  They use medical justifications – largely about 
the nature of the drug itself – to argue for physician control over its distribution.  
At its core, this dissertation is a case study looking at the processes of 
medicalization through the lens of buprenorphine.  In their widely cited book, Deviance 
and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness, Conrad and Schneider (1992) suggest 
that medicalization occurs at the conceptual, institutional and doctor-patient relationship 
levels.  Recently, Halfmann (2011) has proposed a refinement to that theory and suggests 
that most analyses of medicalization focus too much on the macro level and neglect an 
examination of how medicalization can occur through the identity construction of 
individuals, including ―patients.‖  He argues that to be more effective those interested in 
medicalization need to look at an array of causal factors, different dimensions and levels 
of analysis: ―Scholars of the medicalization of social problems often fail to examine the 
multiple dimensions of medicalization and the multiple levels of analysis at which it 
occurs‖ (2011: 1).  This dissertation takes up multiple dimensions of buprenorphine to 
better understand medicalization. 
Some attention has been paid to the drivers of medicalization, which guide my 
analysis of buprenorphine. Conrad (2005), for example, argues that, while medical 
professionalization drove medicalization in the past, it is now increasingly driven by 
market forces.  Other scholars have demonstrated the central role of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the medicalization of conditions (see for example, Busfield 2006; Healy 2004; 
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Lewis 2003; Moynihan, Heath, & Henry 2002).  For instance, Moynihan et al. (1992) 
document the role that the pharmaceutical industry has played in defining diseases 
specifically to create markets for medications to treat everything from social phobia to 
irritable bowel syndrome.  As Moynihan and his colleagues put it: ―the social 
construction of illness is being replaced by the corporate construction of disease‖ (1992: 
886). 
Since the introduction of theories of medicalization, several authors have noted 
changes in the language and content of how medical problems and solutions are framed.  
Clarke et al. (2003) argued that medicalization should be reframed as biomedicalization, 
which is characterized both by the increasing technologization of medicine and by the 
shift from external control to the transformation of internal biological processes through 
biomedical technologies.  More recently, the role of neuroscientific culture and discourse 
in medicalization has received attention.  Vrecko notes:  ―Over the past few decades, 
neurosciences have expanded dramatically, not only in terms of the resources they 
command and the authority they wield, but also in terms of the scope and range of 
problems and phenomena they territorialize‖ (2010c: 2).  Rose (2010) also notes the 
escalation of efforts to use neuroscience to explain a range of individual behavior from 
―normal‖ to ―pathological.‖  I include the role of pharmaceuticalization, biomedical 
technology and neuroscientific discourse in this analysis. 
Addiction in general and buprenorphine specifically offer a unique opportunity to 
study and better understand processes of medicalization as well as many of the issues 
raised in the medicalization literature. Theories of addiction have kept pace with 
scientific innovation and accompanying changes in rhetoric.  Addiction has been 
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explained by metabolic theories, genetic theories, and, most recently, neuroscientific 
theories.  The introduction of buprenorphine is an opportunity to understand how a new 
biomedical technology is integrated into competing theories of addiction and how it 
contributes (or doesn‘t) to the medicalization of addiction. And as a relatively new 
treatment, buprenorphine does not come freighted with a long history of representation.  
It is in the process of being actively constructed, shaped and understood.   
My aim is to interrogate whether or not and how bup has contributed to the 
medicalization of addiction.  Taking seriously Halfmann‘s critique of medicalization 
studies, I offer an analysis of macro level discourses (via regulatory and government 
documents, marketing materials, and scientific literature) and micro-level discourse 
through interviews with people who have been prescribed bup.  This multi-level analysis 
reveals new insights into the drivers and processes of medicalization and how these are 
resisted and adapted at the level of the individual.  I am interested in medicalization of 
addiction not just for what it tells us about the processes of medicalization but also for 
what it tells us about how medicalized identities are interiorized and shape the 
experiences and subjectivities of individuals.  This attention to the lived experiences of 
those taking bup addresses a gap in the literature about medicalization and in social 
constructionism more broadly by bringing the embodied experiences of individuals into a 
conversation which too often remains at the level of representation. 
One of the key questions that arises through theories of medicalization (whether 
framed in terms of medicine, biomedicine, or neuroscience) is role of personal 
responsibility.  One claim that often arises from proponents of medicalization is that it 
lifts both stigma and moral condemnation from the individual by placing ―the blame‖ for 
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the problem or the condition onto a biological factor.  Both government agencies and 
addiction neuroscientists who advocated for the regulatory change that made the 
prescription of bup possible based their arguments in large part on the claims that 
addiction treatment delivered by physicians would reduce the stigmatization and 
criminalization of drug use by locating the cause of addiction in a medical disorder rather 
than in individual moral failure.  I question these claims relying on the work of Rose, 
Foucault, Lupton and other theorists who suggest that medicalization has led to new 
forms of governmentality that increase, rather than decrease, the responsibility of 
individuals.   
I also suggest that addiction shares some features with other medicalized 
conditions but has its own complexities.  First, the coexistence of and ardent support for 
more punitive responses to addiction (e.g., prison and methadone) haunt discussions of 
addiction as a disease and allow for a continuum of medicalization depending on one‘s 
social location.  Second, the medicalization of addiction medicine is profoundly shaped 
by the strategic intervention of two arms of government – one focused on drug use as a 
crime (the Drug Enforcement Agency) and the other focused on drug use as a disease (the 
Department of Health & Human Services).  Finally, the medicalization of addiction is 
troubled by medicine‘s historical role in fostering or causing addiction through the 
prescription of narcotics, many of which were introduced as treatments for addiction.   
This dissertation is structured into nine chapters.  In Chapter 2, I offer more detail 
about the theoretical and conceptual framework for this dissertation.  I situate my work 
within a social constructionist tradition that recognizes that ―facts,‖ including scientific 
ones, are constructed and produced within a cultural, social and political context.  I also 
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address critiques of social constructionism as being too dismissive of material reality by 
drawing on the sociology of body.  Specifically, I explain how my work foregrounds the 
embodied experiences of those being prescribed bup in order to better understand how 
their lived experiences shape and are shaped by different discourses about addiction and 
bup.  I also explain how my work is informed by theorists, like Foucault and Rose, who 
link knowledge and power to forms of governmentality. I describe the ways in which a 
social constructionist analysis of addiction can inform contemporary theories of 
biopower.  Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of my research methods, including 
background on the larger Buprenorphine and Integrated HIV Evaluation & Support 
(BHIVES) study from which my interview data are drawn.  I also provide a description of 
the qualitative interview sample as well as the methods through which I collected and 
analyzed other sources of data, including regulatory documents, marketing materials, and 
scientific literature. 
In Chapter 3, I begin with a brief history of how addiction treatment has been 
regulated in the U.S. to provide some context for the ways in which the Drug Addiction 
Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) represents a radical new regulatory attempt to 
medicalize addiction.  I then provide an analysis of the discourse used by key government 
agencies in the passage of DATA 2000 as well as the DEA rescheduling and FDA 
approval bup.  I explain how bup is tactically constructed and deployed differently by 
various government actors in ways that reveal and support their wide-ranging interests.  
Some, like NIDA, SAMHSA and their legislative supporters, construct bup as the 
medication that will move addiction treatment into the medical mainstream and expand 
access to drug treatment, especially for a new kind of heroin addict. On the one hand, 
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they acknowledge the shortcomings of the regulatory scheme for methadone and note that 
methadone treatment is highly stigmatizing, but nonetheless appropriate, for ―hard core,‖ 
―urban‖ presumably African American drug users.  They depict bup, on the other hand, 
as an effective treatment for suburban, young new users – despite offering no evidence to 
support such claims. They also represent bup as being less addicting and less 
euphorigenic than methadone.  In contrast, the DEA, which is focused on preventing bup 
from becoming another street drug, emphasizes bup‘s high potential for abuse and 
diversion but argues that its higher safety profile justified it being scheduled differently 
than methadone.  This analysis suggests that constructions of bup are subject to the 
bifurcated and often confused understandings of U.S. drug policy that view addiction as 
both a crime and a disease, bup as both a drug and medicine, and drug users as both 
criminals and patients.  These varied constructions allow both the criminal justice and the 
methadone systems to remain intact as the appropriate response to ―hard-core urban 
users,‖ while laying the groundwork for a more medicalized approach that is seen as the 
appropriate response for ―young, suburban users.‖ 
In Chapter 4, I focus on the ways that the rise of a pharmaceutical culture lays the 
groundwork for the development and marketing of bup.  I offer an analysis of the 
marketing incentives and disincentives for developing bup as way of explaining the 
unusual partnership between NIDA and Reckitt Benckiser, the manufacturer of bup, and 
the particular ways in which bup, addiction and the addict are constructed by Reckitt 
Benckiser.  Unlike the development of many medications that is driven by 
pharmaceutical companies using medicalization to generate profit, I suggest that bup was 
an unusual case where the medication development was driven more by government than 
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corporate interests.  However, once developed, Reckitt Benckiser constructs bup and 
addiction to maximize their profit by focusing on white, suburban users of prescription 
pain medications.  I also argue that this focus reinforces a construction of addiction 
treatment, wherein particular kinds of users are seen as appropriate for treatment with bup 
in a medical setting.  My analysis also suggests the pharmaceutical manufacturer goes to 
great lengths to distinguish bup from other potentially addictive opiates, a move made 
necessary by the history of addiction treatments becoming abused drugs and their interest 
in differentiating bup from the prescription pain medications that are the main driver of 
their target market.  I conclude that manufacturer presents a hybrid notion of addiction 
that contains both medical and behavioral elements and constructs the ―bup patient‖ as 
someone who responsible for both controlling the physical symptoms of their addiction 
and returning to a ―normal life‖ marked by responsible, productive citizenship.   
Chapter 5 offers an analysis of the ways in which addiction neuroscience 
constructs our understandings of the addict, addiction, and addiction treatments, like bup.  
Although the discovery of bup predates much addiction neuroscience, advocates of bup 
recast it in neuroscientific terms as a way to bolster its legitimacy and currency.  Through 
an analysis of the scientific literature, I argue that researchers use neuroscience to explain 
issues they believe are central to addiction, including the regulation of pleasure, the loss 
of control and rationality, the role of environmental factors, and erosion of volition. They 
construct addiction as a chronic relapsing brain disease that is beyond the control of the 
individual and explicitly state that they hope this understanding will medicalize addiction 
in ways that lead to the end of drug-related stigma and criminalization.  Despite these 
claims, they also construct addiction in ways that permanently mark addicts and make 
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them perpetually ―risky‖ and susceptible to relapse.  The neuroscientific construction of 
addiction also largely erases social and environmental factors, such as racism and 
poverty, and creates an understanding of addiction that is radically individualizing.  
Consistent with neoliberal and new public health emphases on individual responsibility 
for achieving health and wellness, the brain disease model of addiction works to make 
addiction and recovery from it the responsibility of the affected individual, while 
promoting a particular vision of what means to be ―healthy‖ or ―normal.‖ 
In Chapter 6, I use an analysis of interviews with people with HIV who are also 
taking bup to explain how their lived experiences enfold, adapt and resist different 
constructions of addiction and of bup.  I argue that individuals have complicated views of 
addiction as hybrid entity that includes physiological, psychological, environmental and 
social, spiritual, and moral elements.  I also argue that most people in the sample 
understand bup in relation to methadone, a substance which many view as another drug 
that prevents them from living a ―normal‖ life because of the way it makes them feel, the 
stigma that surrounds it, and a restrictive regulatory framework that disrupts their ability 
to work or take care of themselves and their families.  Their embodied experiences of 
bup, in contrast, suggest that bup remains in a liminal state somewhere between a 
legitimate medication and drug.  In general, people say that, compared to methadone, bup 
makes them feel more ―normal‖ and, because they can take it at home, they are better 
able to engage in ―normal‖ everyday activities (i.e., because they do not have to endure 
withdrawal, ―score‖ heroin, obtain money for drugs, or attend a daily methadone clinic).  
However, both because bup creates physical dependence and because some people feel 
that it is ―crutch‖ that prevents them from overcoming their addiction ―on their own‖ 
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without the help of medication, bup‘s status remains ambiguous.  Despite the importance 
placed on the role doctors and the medical setting by government regulators and the 
manufacturer, these factors are not a primary driver of individuals‘ perceptions of 
addiction as a medical condition. 
Having offered an analysis of the ways individuals taking bup construct addiction 
as hybrid entity, in Chapter 7, I turn to an in-depth examination of how these 
understandings of addiction and of bup affect issues of agency and constraint.  I suggest 
that the premise that medicalization fosters autonomy and reduces blame is false.  Rather, 
I analyze the ways in which drug treatment generally and bup particularly create systems 
of constraint, particularly for individuals, like those in my sample, who are already at the 
margins of society.  Threats of expulsion, close monitoring through urine toxicology 
screens, and requirements of frequent clinic visits all restrict the ability of individuals 
taking bup to act autonomously.  However, I also show how people find ways of 
subverting these systems of constraint, such as taking ―medication holidays,‖ changing 
their doses, and fluidly moving between prescribed and street drugs.  Just as they resist 
and adapt discursive constructions of addiction and bup, so too individuals resist and 
adapt the medical systems they enter into.  I conclude Chapter 7 with a critique of the 
dichotomy found in many addiction studies between the ―free addict‖ and the 
―constrained drug treatment patient‖ suggesting that we are all always operating within a 
system of constraints.  My analysis suggests that bup operates as a ―productive 
constraint‖ that allows individuals new possibilities for the exercise of agency at the same 
time it places limits on them. 
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In Chapter 8, I examine how the discourses about and embodied experiences of 
those taking bup reflect and challenge the larger sociopolitical context in which they are 
contained.  Specifically, I argue that through the control of pleasure, the restoration of 
rationality, and the redirection of consumption, bup provides the conditions for neoliberal 
citizenship.  The commonly expressed desire of individuals in my sample to ―be normal‖ 
is one imbued with a specific notion of responsible, productive citizenship.  Being normal 
means not experiencing too much pleasure, returning to work or school, and reentering 
the system of consumer capitalism.  I argue that bup, in ways consistent with 
neoliberalism, increases the responsibility (and blame) of individuals, by reducing social 
problems to individual ones.  While a medicalized notion of addiction treatment 
encourages the production of a neoliberal subject, it cannot and does not overcome the 
stigma, racism, and poverty that characterizes the lives of most of the people in my study.  
I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how our hybrid notions of addiction (as both a 
disease and a moral failing) resting within a neoliberal framework can result in 
segmented governance, where some drug users (white, affluent abusers of prescription 
drugs) are more likely to receive a medical intervention and others (Black, poor users of 
heroin) are more likely to receive either highly stigmatized methadone treatment or 
prison.  
I conclude with a discussion of what the social construction of bup reveals about 
our relationship to drugs, medicines, addicts and addiction and what it reveals about U.S. 
drug policy.  I suggest that bup is strategically deployed by a range of different actors to 
achieve particular political and economic ends.  I examine what the differences between 
the differently constructed ―buprenorphines‖ tell us about the processes of medicalization 
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and how addiction draws upon but also differs from other medicalized conditions.  I also 
discuss the role of bup in shaping the self and what possibilities for agency and systems 
of constraint it generates.  I end by examining the implications of this work for drug 







Conceptual Framework & Methods: Vantage Points on the Social 
Construction of Buprenorphine 
 
Conceptual Framework 
This project is informed by theories about the social construction of knowledge.  
As Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue in their landmark book, The Social Construction 
of Reality, all knowledge is socially situated and is created out of social interactions.  The 
sociology of knowledge is concerned with analyzing the processes through which facts 
are produced.   This dissertation is particularly concerned with the production of 
scientific and medical knowledge, a powerful force shaping our understandings.  In fact, 
David (2005) argues that contemporary society is a knowledge society based on the 
penetration of scientific knowledge into all spheres of life.  With increasing 
medicalization of society, medical knowledge is among the most influential forms of 
scientific knowledge (Zola 2005).  One feature of scientific and medical knowledge is its 
claim to ―objectivity,‖ that it is by design free from influence by social and cultural 
factors  -- a stance antithetical to social constructionism.  Weinberg and Turner argue 
that: ―At the epistemological level, psychological approaches…  suffer for their total lack 
of reflexive regard for the conditions of their own production‖ (2005: 200).   My goal is 
not to prove that scientific facts are true or untrue; it is not their veracity which interests 
me.  Rather, it is to expose the contexts in which facts about addiction and addiction 
treatment arise and how those contexts shape the ways that buprenorphine specifically 
and a medical model of addiction more generally are understood and acted upon.  
Several scholars have done detailed analyses to explicate how specific medical 
conditions and the bodies of knowledge surrounding them have been social constructed 
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(see for example, Epstein 1996; Lewis 2003; Katz Rothman 1982; Timmermans 1999).  
For example, Katz Rothman (1982) demonstrates that obstetrical knowledge is socially 
situated and has a clear political, historical and social context that has led to the 
increasing medicalization of birth.  These kinds of studies illustrate both how much is at 
stake in shaping knowledge and how knowledge is shaped by contests over meaning or as 
Conrad and Schneider (1992) call it, ―the politics of designation.‖  Epstein (1996), 
writing about AIDS, asserts that knowledge is a collective product that emerges out of 
credibility struggles.  Credibility struggles about bup and how it is collectively 
constructed are the subject of this dissertation. 
Related to Epstein‘s notions that knowledge is a collective product is David‘s 
(2005) assertion that those things we call ―empirical facts‖ are influenced by a range of 
social factors and actors.  For this dissertation, I am adopting David‘s theoretical 
framework of reflexive epistemological diversity, which acknowledges that no singular 
community of knowledge can claim to capture the whole truth from within their own 
realm of expertise.  To understand a fact, we must adopt a skeptical questioning of all 
standpoints and seek understanding by looking at a thing from multiple perspectives.  In 
her book, The Body Multiple, Mol (2002) examined the ways in which atherosclerosis 
was enacted by several different departments in a hospital.  She concluded that there was 
no one True atherosclerosis but rather an assemblage of coordinated understandings -- 
each enacted differently but connected.  My goal is to similarly expose different 
understandings of bup and the relationships between them. 
In the case of addiction, the boundaries between medicine, government, and 
industry have always been porous, and it is within these fields that I will seek to 
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understand the many meanings of bup.  I will explore how key claims-makers are 
enacting and constructing bup, in particular, and addiction and addiction treatment more 
broadly.  Specifically, I will look at the perspectives of government regulators, the 
pharmaceutical industry, researchers, and people taking bup.   For example, I will 
examine literature on the neuroscience of addiction to uncover how its contours, 
arguments, inconsistencies, and gaps construct a particular understanding of addiction 
and how that understanding reflects larger moral and political projects.  In the words of 
Kushner, I hope to reveal ―dominant social values in the guise of science‖ (2006: 127). 
Science is never alone in making meaning, and increasingly science and the state 
work hand in hand to establish regulations and set policy.  Rosenberg has argued that 
medicalization: 
… remains complex, inconsistent, and contingent, even if 
expansive and increasingly pervasive.  The relationship among 
disease concepts and painful or socially problematic behaviors 
have been and are being contested and recontested... in countless 
clinical, bureaucratic and administrative contexts (2006: 409). 
 
This is especially true in the arena of drug policy, which has long drawn upon seemingly 
contradictory medical and regulatory frameworks, including a vast and complex system 
of criminal justice interventions that rely heavily on medical knowledge (see Tiger 2008; 
Tiger 2011).  In the case of bup, significant legal and regulatory change was required to 
bring it to market, and the scientific community worked closely with government 
agencies to produce a set of regulations that reflect the interests of both.  Through close 
examination of the regulatory documents and the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, 
I hope to show both the historical genealogy of how bup came to be the only medication 
that can prescribed by physicians to treat addiction to opioids and how government 
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agencies and actors have framed bup and addiction in very particular ways to meet their 
professional and political interests. 
I also build upon the work of scholars who have illustrated that pharmaceutical 
knowledge is an especially rich area in which to explore social constructionism.  Busfield 
(2006), for example, investigates how the economic and political power of the 
pharmaceutical industry has led to their almost complete control over the production of 
pharmaceutical data and pharmaceutical ―facts.‖  This control over knowledge about 
medications, their efficacy, and their safety is directly linked to the culture of pill-taking 
that permeates contemporary society (Busfield 2006).  Parrish (2003) extends Busfield‘s 
argument to suggest that the government serves an integral role in validating and 
enforcing the knowledge being produced by the pharmaceutical industry.   In the case of 
bup, I will examine the role that its manufacturer played in changing U.S. drug policy to 
promote its product, the complex relationships between industry and the scientific 
community, and how bup is framed and constructed through the strategies used to market 
it. 
I am interested, not just in pharmaceutical knowledge, but also in the social 
construction of pharmaceutical objects – medications.  Closely aligned with theories 
about the social construction of knowledge are those involving the social construction of 
objects.  Simply put, objects are socially and historically situated and reflect larger social, 
cultural and political forces.  For example, Cohen et al. (2001) argue that medications are 
socially embedded objects with biographies and multiple meanings depending on 
standpoint.  They suggest that to understand the ideological and cultural dimensions of a 
medication we must take into account subjective experiences of those who use the 
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medication as well as representations, the power relations, and interests among the actors 
involved in its production and use.  Similarly, Lewis (2003) argues that we must 
articulate the social, cultural, and political dimensions of medical technologies, like 
Prozac.  While pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and advertisers seek to lay claim 
to objective scientific Truth about Prozac, Lewis suggests that there are many different 
situated truths about the drug and that the discourse that surrounds Prozac is never 
neutral.  My project will attempt to uncover the situated truths about buprenorphine and 
to uncover their social, political, and economic dimensions. 
While I rely heavily on the tradition of social constructionism, it is not without its 
weaknesses or critics.  Shilling (2003), in tracing the history of social theory, notes a 
dualism between naturalism (which he says overstates the importance the material body 
and leads to dangerous forms of essentialism) and social constructionism (which he says 
reduces the body to discourse or purely social forces).  Weinberg and Turner (2005) and 
Gootenberg (2005) argue that addiction studies specifically are bifurcated between social 
constructionist studies that reduce addiction to representation and biomedical studies that 
rely on naturalism or biological essentialism.  Weinberg and Turner further argue that a 
key limitation of social constructionism is its failure to account for the very real 
embodied experiences of many of those labeled as addicted or insane: 
Given the pervasive evidence that people treated their own and each 
other‘s insanities and addictions as causally influential things-in-the-
world, I have not felt entitled to trade on sociological theories that 
systematically debunk such notions by reducing insanities and addictions 
to myths, discursive categories, narrative accounts, or social roles (2005: 
127). 
 
Others, like Rothman (1990), have critiqued approaches that focus on the production of 
knowledge as being more concerned with rhetoric than reality.  Similarly, Barad criticizes 
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the assumption she feels is inherent in social constructionism, ―the asymmetrical faith in 
our access to representation over things... a Cartesian habit of mind‖ (2003: 806-807).  
She rejects the ontological distinction being made by social constructionism that there are 
two kinds of entities --  representations and those things (presumed to be more real) that 
are being represented.  She suggests we need to look more critically at the relationship 
between the social and the scientific as the relation of the ―exteriority within‖ (2003: 
803).   
To overcome some of these concerns, I draw on the sociology of body in order to 
foreground the embodied and subjective experiences of individuals and the ways those 
embodied experiences are both shaped by and help shape discourse and representation.  A 
focus on embodiment is also important because the body is seen as increasingly 
constitutive of the self (Shilling 2003).  In addition, the body is what makes human 
agency possible – it is the place from which individuals can seek to transform themselves 
and their social worlds.  In both of her books, Pitts-Taylor (2003, 2007) bridges the gap 
between representation and embodied experiences by exploring the ways in which 
specific discourses (e.g., those about body modification and cosmetic surgery) reach the 
psyche and identity of the subject and are used to define the self.  She also explores how 
the embodied experiences of the subject in turn reshape those discourses.  It is this kind 
of analysis that I do using interviews with individuals taking bup.  I am especially 
interested in how different claims about bup are understood, interiorized, adapted, and/or 
resisted by people who take bup and how their embodied experiences of the medication 
reshape their understandings. 
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How understandings about addiction and bup are interiorized is especially 
interesting because it helps inform theories about biopower and governmentality, which 
are also the subject of this dissertation.  In Birth of the Clinic, Foucault (1973/1994) 
elucidates the relationship between medical discourse and the structure of power in 
society.  He notes that knowledge-power is organized around the body (individuals) and 
bodies (populations).  These systems of language and knowledge structure what we can 
know and how we can know ourselves.  We may be able to modify our bodies and 
remake our selves, but we are both produced and constrained by existing categories and 
forms of knowledge.  Scholars also argue that knowledge-power increasingly operates 
through exercise of liberal autonomy.  In Governing the Soul, Rose (1990) traces the 
history of what he calls the ―psy sciences‖ to show that the power-knowledge regime that 
operates today is a hermeneutics of the self.  That is, selves are constructed in 
psychological terms and subject to self-inspection, examination, and actualization.  This 
form of knowledge makes it possible to govern people in ways compatible with 
principles of liberalism and democracy.  Citizenship is manifested through the exercise of 
free choice among marketed options, which are experienced as personal desires.   
The work of Rose builds upon the Foucauldian ideas of biopower and 
governmentality.  Biopower refers to strategies for intervening upon collective existence 
in the name of life and health (Rabinow and Rose 2006).  Compared to more traditional 
forms of top-down power, power today is more diffuse and operates in ways that 
encourage individuals to govern themselves through the internalization of certain 
discourses.  Rabinow and Rose (2006) argue that the psy sciences have produced modes 
of subjectification in which individuals are brought to work on themselves in the name of 
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individual or collective life or health.  Lupton (1995) makes a similar argument, 
suggesting that it is public health discourse (along with public health‘s considerable 
power of enforcement) that encourages governmentality by uniting the public in a quest 
for self-improvement.  Public health plays a key role in rationalization, normalization, 
and social ordering.  And by appealing to widely held norms, like ―better health,‖ it 
encourages individuals to continually police themselves and their own health.  These 
kinds of theories are especially interesting to explore in the context of addiction, which 
relies on ideologies of self-improvement and health, on the one hand, and more 
repressive forms of power, like incarceration, on the other. 
Several scholars have applied the work of Foucault, particularly his notions of 
biopower and governmentality, to the study of methadone (see, Bergschmidt 2004; Bjerg 
2008; Bourgois 2000; Gomart 2002, 2004; and O‘Malley and Valverde 2004), though to 
date none have explored it in relation to bup.  Using this theoretical frame to analyze 
interviews with individuals taking bup, I explore how constructions of bup and addiction 
support and challenge these theories, how they constrain agency, and how they also offer 
new opportunities for freedom and action.  In particular, I expand the work of Rose and 
Foucault to understand the drive of drug users to become ―normal‖ and what kinds of 
agency are possible for the ―normal‖ self in contemporary neoliberal society. 
 
Methodological Approach   
In the Craft of Inquiry, Alford  (1998) argues that using a broad range of 
theoretical and methodological choices and integrating different paradigms in a 
dialectical manner produces the richest research.  My project integrates different 
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approaches, while relying heavily on an interpretative framework.  Based in symbolic-
interactionism, an interpretative approach foregrounds empirical observations about 
human interactions with theoretical concerns about their symbolic meaning.  I rely on 
several data sources, but one key source of data are in-depth qualitative interviews which 
are the focus for the second of half of this dissertation.  According to Rubin and Rubin 
(2005), qualitative interviewing as a methodological approach emphasizes the relativism 
of culture and an interpretative approach to social knowledge.  The goal is to understand 
how people understand their world and create shared meanings.  As such, this method is 
well suited both to my research questions and my epistemological stance.  My 
methodological approach is also informed by Becker (1998), who urges researchers to 
maintain a dynamic dialect between theory and data.  As I describe in more detail below, 
I approached the data with some preconceived ideas but also allowed for new themes and 
contradictions to emerge from the data.  My methods are also shaped by a commitment to 
placing the voices of drug users at the center of this research.  Drug users are a highly 
stigmatized and often stereotyped group.  While theirs is just one perspective and one 
construction of reality, it is one too often left out of research about addiction (Neale, 
Allen and Coombes 2005).   
Data Collection Strategies 
My data collection strategies include: 
 Review of regulatory documents including the Federal Register and the 
Congressional Record as well as materials produced by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the American Society of Addiction 
Medicine (ASAM) and supporting documents that resulted in the 
reclassification of bup as a schedule III medication and the passage of the 
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000.  
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 Review of websites and materials about bup produced by the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer of bup, Reckitt Benckiser. 
 
 Review of NIDA‘s website, NIDA publications, and articles from the 
scientific and medical literature about bup and neuroscientific approaches to 
addiction treatment.  
 
 Qualitative interviews with individuals being treated with bup. 
 
The Buprenorphine & Integrated HIV Evaluation and Support (BHIVES) Program  
Data for the qualitative interviews with people taking bup were collected by The 
New York Academy of Medicine (NYAM), a research institution where I am employed.  
Under the auspices of the NYAM Institutional Review Board (IRB), staff there 
conducted a five-year, national multi-site evaluation of ten programs that were integrating 
bup treatment into HIV care settings (known as the BHIVES study).  I served as the 
study‘s project director for the first half of the study and was integrally involved in the 
development of all study protocols and instruments as well as the data collection.   
BHIVES, which completed data collection in September of 2009, was a mixed 
methods study that collected qualitative and quantitative data from HIV-infected 
individuals receiving bup and the healthcare providers who were treating them.  The 
BHIVES study consisted of ten different evaluation sites and one Evaluation and Support 
Center based at NYAM that ran the multi-site evaluation and offered technical assistance 
and training to the local sites.  At the time the study was initiated, bup treatment was very 
new, and only one of the sites had experience in delivering bup care, though all were 
longstanding and experienced HIV care providers.  The sites were located throughout the 
U.S. and included academic medical centers (n=7), community based clinics (n=2), and a 
public hospital.  The sites were allowed significant autonomy in the design of their 
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programs as long as they offered integrated HIV medical care and bup treatment for 
opioid dependence, and this resulted in considerable variation in how bup treatment 
services were delivered.  Of the ten sites, 7 participated in the qualitative study of 
individuals taking bup from which data for this dissertation are drawn (see Table 1). 
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Source: Adapted from Weiss, Egan et al., 2011 
The objective of the larger BHIVES study was to develop and evaluate programs 
that integrated bup treatment into HIV care, since there is a high prevalence of opioid use 
among people living with HIV.  While there are no definitive numbers of people living 
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) currently addicted to heroin and other opioids, data suggest 
that problems of drug use and addiction are widespread among PLWH/A.  Overall, the 
CDC estimates that injection drug use (IDU) accounts for approximately 36% of 
cumulative AIDS cases in the U.S. (CDC 2001).  A nationally representative sample of 
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PLWH/A in care found that close to 40% reported using an illicit drug other than 
marijuana and 12% were drug dependent (Bing et al. 2001).  Given the prevalence of 
opioid dependence among people with HIV, integrating bup treatment into HIV care was 
seen as a promising way to increase access to drug treatment for a group likely to need it.  
The main focus of the study was a quantitative evaluation (based on patient surveys and 
medical chart abstractions) about the feasibility of using bup within HIV care settings and 
whether integrated bup treatment and HIV care reduced drug use, increased retention in 
both bup treatment and HIV care, and improved health outcomes.   The primary 
outcomes of the quantitative study have been published elsewhere (Altice et al. 2011; 
Fiellen et al. 2011; Weiss et al., 2011). 
Qualitative Interviews 
In addition to the quantitative study, investigators received supplemental funding 
to conduct a smaller, qualitative study about individual‘s perceptions and experiences of 
integrated bup treatment and HIV care.  The analysis for this dissertation is centered on 
qualitative data collected from this sub-study.  I received permission from the study‘s 
Principal Investigator to use these data for my dissertation, and the CUNY IRB has 
determined that, as a secondary data analysis, this project was exempt from further IRB 
review.  Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 37 HIV-infected 
individuals who had been successfully started on bup treatment at one of the participating 
BHIVES study sites. The interview protocol included questions on the participants‘ 
background and drug use history; attitudes and motivations regarding cessation of drug 
use; perceptions of bup and bup treatment; experience with other treatment modalities, 
including methadone; advantages and disadvantages of integrating substance abuse 
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treatment into HIV care; opinions on ancillary services including counseling and groups; 
and perceptions of their HIV, physical, mental health and overall quality of life before 
and after initiating bup treatment.  This protocol was designed to guide but not limit the 
discussion; interviewers had freedom to explore additional emergent themes.  Interviews 
were conducted in private rooms at the study site.  Participants received a $25 gift card as 
reimbursement for their travel and in recognition of the efforts made to attend the 
interviews.  Interviews lasted approximately one hour, were audio recorded, and 
professionally transcribed. 
Overview of the Qualitative Interview Sample 
Study participants were recruited by, and at the discretion of, local project staff.  
Participation was voluntary, and all participants signed an informed consent form.  Any 
person who was part of the larger study (N=340) and had been prescribed bup was 
eligible to participate as long as they spoke English.  Eligibility criteria for the larger 
quantitative study included being HIV-positive, being diagnosed with opioid dependence, 
able to speak either English or Spanish, and able to consent (i.e., not mentally or 
cognitively impaired).  Because of the medication being prescribed to some participants, 
pregnant women were excluded from participation as were individuals on high doses of 
benzodiazepines or with poor liver function.  See Table 2 for a full list of inclusion and 
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Table 2: Participant Eligibility & Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion 
 Willing and able to consent to study procedures 
 Speak either English or Spanish 
 Age 18 or over 
 HIV infected 
 Meets DSM IV criteria for opioid dependence 
Exclusion 
 Pregnant 
 Liver function tests 5 times normal level  or great 
 Benzodiazepine dependence or abuse in the prior six months  
 Alcohol dependence 
 High doses of methadone 
 Suicidal or severe psychiatric impairment 
 Inappropriate according to provider‘s clinical judgment 
Source:  Weiss, Egan et al. 2011 
The sample for the qualitative study was geographically diverse and includes 
individuals located in the South, West, Northwest, Northeast, and Midwest of the United 
States.  Sixty-six percent of the sample was male.  Over half of the participants were 
African American (58%); 19% were white; and 17% were Latino.  Participants had an 
average age of 47 years and reported using heroin for an average of 22 years.  Eighty-one 
percent were unemployed and 25% were homeless at the beginning of study.  
Demographically, there were no significant differences between the people who 
participated in the qualitative study compared to the larger BHIVES study who had also 
started bup (see Table 3).  However, those in the qualitative study were 3 times less likely 
to report opioid use while in treatment (p<.01) (Egan et al., 2011).  The better drug use 
outcomes are likely due to a sampling bias, since those most likely to participate in the 
qualitative interviews were individuals who were connected to care (i.e., they had not 
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dropped out of treatment).  Furthermore, it is possible that site staff responsible for 
recruitment selected the most successful clients. 
Table 3 






(n = 37) (n = 303) 
 ρ 
n % n % 
 
Gender 




   -Female 13 35.1 98 32.3 
 
Ethnicity/Race 




   -Black 21 58.3 154 51.5 
   -Latino 6 16.7 67 22.4 
   -Asian 0 0.0 3 1.0 
   -Other 2 5.6 7 2.3 
 
Age at Study Enrollment 





SD 7.9 8.1 
 
Education 






   -HS Grad/GED 11 29.7 104 34.4 
   -College  9 24.3 70 23.2 
 
Employment Status 




   -Employed 7 18.9 78 25.7 
 
Self-reported Homelessness 




   -Homeless 10 25.1 76 25.1 
Note: Tests of significance compared qualitative sample to non-
qualitative sample of participants taking bup at baseline sample.   
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This sample is not representative of all people taking bup, but the goal of this 
dissertation is not to generalize but rather to explore the interpretative meanings and ways 
in which individuals understand addiction and psychopharmaceutical treatment for 
addiction in the context of a medical setting.  As such, this sample is particularly well 
suited to my research questions because of their intensive exposure to both drug 
treatment and medical systems.  Their older age and length of time using with heroin, 
their HIV status, and their relative success with bup treatment all suggest that they are 
inculcated into medical paradigms, have exposure to traditional drug treatment (i.e., 
behavioral approaches and methadone), and have at least some experience with bup 
treatment.  These are precisely my issues of interest. 
Document Analysis 
In addition to my analysis of qualitative interviews with people taking bup, I also 
conducted an analysis of regulatory, scientific, and marketing documents about bup.  To 
elucidate how bup is both being framed by and framing contemporary notions of 
addiction and addiction treatment, I looked at documents generated by three key 
constituents influential in shaping the discourse surrounding the prescription of bup by 
doctors for addiction treatment: 1) governmental agencies, 2) the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer of bup, and 3) addiction researchers.  I focused on the period prior to and 
several years following the passage of DATA 2000, when the legislative changes and 
implementation of bup treatment were being intensively discussed and written about by 
government and addiction medicine specialists.  I collected many of these documents in 
the course of my work at NYAM and conducted additional reviews of the websites of the 
following government agencies and sources:  1) Food and Drug Administration; 2) Drug 
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Enforcement Agency; 3) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Authority; 4) the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy; and 5) the Federal Register and Congressional 
Record.  To ensure that I capture all discussions in the Federal Register and 
Congressional Record, I performed searches of www.gpoaccess.gov using the search 
terms: ―DATA 2000,‖  ―Drug Addiction Treatment Act,‖ ―Reckitt Benckiser‖ and 
―Reckitt and Coleman‖ (the two names of the pharmaceutical manufacturer of bup), and 
―buprenorphine‖ between 1995-2010.  I also closely reviewed materials produced by the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which dictates much of the direction of 
addiction research in this country.  To identify scientific documents, I conducted searches 
of PubMed, using the search terms ―buprenorphine‖ and ―addiction‖ and ―neuroscience.‖  
Documents produced by the maker of bup, Reckitt-Benckiser, were collected by 
searching the world wide web, paying particularly close attention to two of the websites 
they sponsor: 1) www.suboxone.com (a patient- and provider-focused site they maintain); 
and 2) their corporate website www.rb.com (which provides financial data about their 
pharmaceutical division).  While other forces clearly shape social constructions of 
addiction (e.g., media, political groups, patient advocacy organizations), bup is relatively 
new in the U.S., and few people beyond government agencies, researchers and those 
marketing it are currently writing about this drug.  The social construction of bup is, at 
the moment, being controlled primarily by these government agencies and industry 
groups, and, therefore, these are the subject of this analysis.   
It should be noted that physicians who prescribe bup are another interesting 
source of data.  In fact, the BHIVES study did collect both quantitative and qualitative 
data from physicians about their experiences prescribing bup.  Some of these data have 
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been published elsewhere (Netherland et al. 2009; Weiss et al. 2011), and it is beyond the 
scope of this project to do a more in-depth examination.  Instead, I analyze the role of 
physicians from the perspective of the individuals they treat (see Chapter 6). 
Data Analysis 
I was given de-identified transcripts from BHIVES staff that were prepared by a 
professional transcriber.  I imported these into Hyper Research, a software program for 
analyzing qualitative data.  Using a grounded theory framework (Glaser & Strauss 1967; 
Strauss 1997), I developed a preliminary coding scheme incorporating themes from my 
knowledge of the field, my research questions, and a review of the first five transcripts.  
Using these preliminary codes, I coded five transcripts to see how well the codes fit and 
then added additional codes to account for themes that emerged but were missing from 
my original code list.  I subsequently added a few additional codes when new themes 
emerged.  My approach was not to test hypotheses but rather to build theory from data, 
looking for underlying themes and then linking these together to form a theory (Rubin & 
Rubin 2005).  At several points during the analysis, I returned to the data to seek out 
inconsistencies or counter-examples that did not fit my conceptual schema.  This allowed 
me to expand and refine my theories (Becker 1998; Rubin & Rubin 2005). 
In reviewing documents about bup, I was primarily concerned with interpreting 
the meaning of discourse -  what were the images and analogies used, what were the 
recurrent themes, and what was the content and techniques of the arguments being made.  
My approach is not a quantitative content analysis that focuses on the frequencies of 
words in order to test hypotheses.  Rather my approach is a qualitative content analysis 
that emphasizes textual analysis to generate theories (Daniels 1993).  I noted words, 
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images and recurring themes (e.g., the use of ―brain disease‖ or analogies between 
addiction and other chronic conditions, like diabetes).  From these themes I developed 
theories, which, like the interview data, were tested by specifically seeking out counter 
examples. 
Limitations 
This project has some limitations.  The data for this work were collected with a 
different purpose in mind and, as qualitative data based on a convenience sample, they 
are not generalizable.  In addition, the interviews with people taking bup are drawn from 
a population of individuals who are also HIV-infected.  Although these data were 
collected for a purpose other than this dissertation, I was involved in the development of 
all the instruments and particularly the qualitative interview guide.  This allowed me to 
include questions relevant to my research interests.  While the sample is a convenience 
sample and was never meant to be generalizable, almost all of the participants compare 
their experiences on bup to methadone and other forms of drug treatment.  This allowed 
me to look at how their understandings and experiences of bup differed from those of 
other drug treatment.  As noted above, the fact that participants were living with 
HIV/AIDS makes this sample unique but also serves my research interests well.  This is a 
group of individuals who for the most part had long been involved in medical systems, 
which allowed me to explore more in depth if and how they understood this new form of 
treatment and addiction more generally in medical terms.  This project is primarily 
interested in the processes of medicalization; therefore, data from the BHIVES study, 
which was interested in how addiction treatment could be integrated into medical 
settings, is well suited to my research questions. 
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Conclusion 
Using the data sources described above, this project examines bup as a new 
attempt to medicalize addiction.  Specifically, I explore the following questions: 
1) How does buprenorphine affect attempts to medicalize addiction? 
2) What does an analysis of the social construction of buprenorphine reveal about 
the processes and conditions of the medicalization of addiction?  
3) How do people being medically treated for addiction understand medical and 
neuroscientific frameworks?  In what ways to they resist or adapt these 
frameworks? 
4) What kinds of new constraints and possibilities for agency and resistance are 
possible for those taking bup? 
 
To answer these questions, I approach bup as a case study in the medicalization (or re-
medicalization) of a social problem.  As the conceptual framework above suggests, 
knowledge is produced and phenomena are enacted by multiple actors.  Therefore, I 
examine bup from different perspectives (government agencies, the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, and addiction researchers), paying close attention to how bup ―patients‖ 
themselves understand, assimilate, resist or change these varied perspectives and 
constructions. 
My analysis focuses on key drivers of medicalization.  Institutions, like the 
government or industry, operate through and in conjunction with the prevailing logics 
that under-gird our understanding of addiction.  Therefore, I look at the influence of the 
state in shaping bup by examining the role that specific agencies (e.g., the Drug 
Enforcement Agency and the National Institutes of Drug Abuse) played in the 
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classification and FDA approval of bup (which allowed it to be treated differently then 
methadone).   
As indicated above, the pharmaceutical industry is an ever more important force 
for medicalization.  Until late 2009 when a generic form was developed, bup was 
manufactured solely by Reckitt Benckiser, a multi-national company that primarily 
produces household cleaning products.  They played an instrumental role in lobbying the 
U.S. government to reclassify bup from a schedule V to a schedule III medication, 
insuring that it would not be subject to the same constraints and regulations as 
methadone.  However, in many ways, Reckitt-Benckiser is not a typical pharmaceutical 
company.  Through an exploration of Reckitt-Benckiser‘s role in the scheduling and 
marketing of bup, I uncover their particular ―pharmaceutical reason‖ (Lakoff 2005) as 
well as their role in the social construction of bup.  Through this analysis, I also examine 
how these discourses reinscribe or subvert existing ideologies of race and class. 
Science is another powerful force of medicalization.  By laying claim to 
objectivity, science also lays claim to a power and authority to define and control reality 
(Wilkerson 1998).  Epstein (1996), building on the work of Latour and Woolgar (1986), 
demystifies the biomedical research process by uncovering the subjective decision-
making, uncertainty, and murkiness that is inevitable in the production of scientific facts.  
Although bup was first examined as an addiction treatment in the late 1970‘s long before 
the ascendancy of addiction neuroscience, in recent years it has been recast in 
neuroscientific terms.  I look at the ways that bup and addiction more generally are 
reframed in the scientific literature, explore what kinds ideologies that literature reflects 
and produces, and discuss the implications of those ideologies.  
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Within the literature on addiction, there is a great deal of well-placed critique on 
our systems of treatment and punishment, but comparatively less attention paid to the 
embodied and subjective experiences of addicts. By exploring the subjective experiences 
of people taking bup, I reveal how the medication shapes their senses of self and/or how 
they use the experiences of bup to shape new identities.  Medicalization is not generally 
done to people but more and more is something in which people actively participate.  
However, this does not mean that individuals fail to resist or adapt medical models.  The 
final chapters of this dissertation are concerned with exploring the relationship between 
medical frameworks and individual agency. 
Taken together, this analysis of regulatory, marketing, scientific and individual 
constructions of bup provide rich insight into the processes of medicalization as well as 
forces that undermine or resists medical frameworks.  There is not One True 
Buprenorphine.  In the chapters that follow, I reveal many different buprenorphines and 
in doing so add to our understanding of medicalization and the role of individuals in 





Regulating Addiction: The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, 
Buprenorphine and Contests Over Meaning  
 
Introduction 
In 2000, the Drug Addiction Treatment Act (DATA 2000) was signed into law 
ending an 80-year prohibition against doctors prescribing narcotics for the treatment of 
drug addiction in office-based settings.  Prior to DATA 2000, the only way to be 
medically treated for opioid dependence was through the highly regulated and 
stigmatized methadone clinics – a system intentionally and almost completely cut off 
from mainstream medicine.  In contrast, under DATA 2000, anyone can go to any 
certified doctor to get a prescription for bup and treat their own addiction in the privacy 
of their own home.  This extraordinary change in drug policy and treatment practice was 
possible only through the cooperation and coordination of three powerful forces: 
government agencies, addiction medicine professionals, and the manufacturer of 
buprenorphine, Reckitt Benckiser.  The overlapping relationships, interests, and logics 
shared by these three groups -- along with the wider ascendancy of neuroscience, 
acceptance of pharmaceutical treatments for behavioral problems, and understandings of 
addiction as a disease – made possible one of the most remarkable changes in U.S. drug 
policy in decades.  I argue that this change in drug policy was propelled by the promise of 
a new treatment medication, buprenorphine.  Though only modestly different from 
methadone, buprenorphine was constructed strategically and differentially by a range of 
stakeholders in an effort to launch a new system drug treatment and a new medical 
understanding of addiction.   
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However, to suggest that these stakeholders hold a uniform or even an internally 
consistent understanding of addiction is misleading.  Rather, while powerful interests did 
align to make its passage possible, the story of DATA 2000 reveals the contradictory and 
ambivalent drug policies of the U.S. in which medical, criminal and moral 
understandings of addiction continue to coexist, often uneasily. For bup to become the 
first office-based addiction treatment in 80 years, four federal agencies and the U.S. 
Congress had to wrestle with what a shift towards a more medically-based approach to 
addiction treatment would mean and how it could be justified given the coexistence of a 
vast system of criminal sanctions to address drug use. 
In this chapter, I will look at the influence of the state in shaping bup by 
examining the role that specific agencies (e.g., Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, Food and Drug Administration, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
and the National Institutes on Drug Abuse) played in the classification and FDA approval 
of bup (which allowed it to be treated differently than methadone).  I will also offer a 
detailed analysis of the congressional record surrounding the passage of DATA 2000.  
Because of their close relationship with government agencies and their part in 
implementing key elements of DATA 2000, I will also briefly discuss the role of the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM).   
The construction and regulation of bup as a medicine by state actors rests on 
defining opioid addiction as a disease amenable to pharmacological intervention and 
shifting the responsibility for treatment to physicians.   As I will discuss later, the brain 
disease model of addiction has grown in prominence in recent years along with the 
ascendancy of neuroscience and pharmacological treatments for psychiatric disorders.   
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This trend has both been shaped by and shapes government agencies charged with 
dealing with addiction, addiction treatment, and the regulation of drugs and medicines. 
For instance, in a 1980 NIH publication, Research Monograph on Theories of Addiction, 
biomedical models were given little attention compared to behavioral and psychological 
theories (Lettieri et al. 1980).  In contrast, in 1997, NIH issued a consensus statement on 
the treatment of opioid addiction that claimed:  
Through careful study of its natural history and through research at 
genetic, molecular, neuronal and epidemiological levels, it has been 
proven that opiate addiction is a medical disease characterized by 
predictable signs and symptoms (NIH 1997: 10). [emphasis added] 
As I discuss in Chapter 5, NIDA was intimately involved in promoting a brain 
disease model of addiction through both its research and educational agendas.  In the 
1990‘s when lobbying for DATA 2000 began, addiction neuroscience was still relatively 
new, but NIDA‘s commitment to bringing addiction treatment under the purview of 
physicians is longstanding.  NIH clearly states its intention to ―invigorate the medical 
profession to become more involved with drug abuse issues‖ (Volkow u.d.).  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that they also played an active role – in fact, a central role --  in the 
passage of DATA 2000 and bringing bup to market. 
The passage of DATA 2000 and subsequent rescheduling of bup that allowed it to 
be used for office-based treatment is marked by several key events and documents that I 
will discuss in turn.  These include:  1) the publication of the National Institute of 
Health‘s (NIH) Consensus Statement on the Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate 
Addiction; 2)  the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment‘s National Advisory Council 
statement; 3) the congressional debates and testimony that led to the passage of DATA 
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2000; 5) the DEA‘s rescheduling of bup; 6) the FDA‘s approval of bup for the treatment 
of opioid dependence; and 7) the American Society of Addiction Medicine‘s (ASAM) 
implementation of one of the first training for physicians required under DATA 2000.  
While they differ in important ways, an analysis of these events and the documents that 
surround them shows that each of these actors wrestles with the same key issues, such 
whether addiction is a disease or a crime and whether bup is a medication that can be 
distinguished from methadone and heroin.  They also reveal the ways in which the 
disease model of addiction and the pharmacology of bup are used differently by different 
actors to advance their agendas.  These dynamics are best understood in the context of a 
brief overview of the history of opiate regulation in the U.S. 
History of Addiction Treatment Regulation in the U.S. 
The distinction between legal medicines and illicit drugs is relatively recent and 
changes over time.  Indeed, the history of opiates is one of new formulations brought to 
market to treat addiction to older formulations.  Substances that start out as therapeutic 
medicines become drugs of abuse.  How these distinctions between medicines and drug 
are made, maintained and challenged has everything to do with the prevailing logic about 
addiction as well as the professional, political and economic forces of a given era.  And 
while these distinctions are largely historical and artificial (heroin has been both a 
medicine and a drug), they become enormously significant because of the social, cultural 
and legal meanings and actualities we attached to them. 
In the 1800‘s, any adult could buy any medicinal product made by any 
manufacturer for any reason (Parrish 2003).  Our current system of regulating, 
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prescribing, and controlling medication evolved in the early 1900‘s beginning with the 
passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914.  Designed in part to raise revenue and in 
part in response to efforts to professionalize medical practice, the Harrison Act required 
the registration and licensing of pharmacists, physicians and manufacturers; levied taxes 
on the sale of medicines; and restricted the sale and use of narcotics to those prescribed 
by a physician for a medical reason (Parrish 2003).  For the first time, narcotic use was 
divided into legal use for a medical purpose and criminal use.   
Having restricted the sale of opiates to medical use, the Harrison Act created a 
controversy over whether using opium or morphine to maintain an ―addict‘s‖ supply was 
a legitimate medical use (Weinberg & Turner 2005).  It raised a question that remains in 
play today -- is addiction a medical condition that should be ―treated‖ by prescribing 
either the substance to which the person is addicted or a substitute/treatment medication?  
Are ―substitution‖ therapies a legitimate treatment for a medical disorder or is it just 
another way of dealing drugs?  The Treasury Department,
4
 then charged with the 
enforcement of the Harrison Act, argued that prescribing opiates to addicts did not 
constitute medical treatment and that doctors who made such prescriptions could be 
arrested for narcotics trafficking.  In 1919, just months before alcohol prohibition took 
effect, the U.S. Supreme court concurred with the Treasury Department, and in 1920, the 
American Medical Association condemned the prescribing of opiates to addicts (Jaffe & 
O‘Keefe 2003).  Physicians could then, as now, prescribe narcotics for medical reasons 
other than treating addiction, and the prescription of opiates for pain remains a 
                                                 
4
 Early efforts to control substances focused on taxation strategies.  Therefore, the regulation of narcotics 
began as a function of the Treasury Department.  The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was created in 1930 but 
still operated under the Treasury Department. As drug control efforts focused more on law enforcement 
strategies, new administrative structures were created at the federal level, including the U.S. 
Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics in 1954 and the Drug Enforcement Agency in 1973. 
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widespread practice.  Heroin, for example, though it could not be legally manufactured in 
the U.S. after 1924 (DeGrandpre 2006), could still be legally prescribed for conditions 
other than addiction until the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 (Carnwath & Smith 2002).  
Even today, opiates like methadone, can be prescribed by a physician for pain but not to 
treat addiction (unless through the highly regulated methadone clinic system). With these 
regulatory changes and without the support of the American Medical Association, 
physicians quickly withdrew from having any formal role in addiction treatment.  Rather 
than being seen as a medical condition that could be treated by doctors using prescribed 
narcotics, overcoming addiction came to be seen largely as a matter of transforming 
people‘s will and behavior (Carnwath and Smith 2002; White 1998). 
Following the passage of the Harrison Act, U.S. drug policies generally became 
more punitive and oriented towards a criminal justice rather than a medical approach.  In 
the 1950‘s, minimum mandatory sentences were imposed for selling opium, coca, 
cannabis and their derivatives.  And in 1970, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act (also known as the Controlled Substances Act) established a 5-tier 
scheduling of drugs by the Drug Enforcement Agency purportedly based on the 
substance‘s potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and accepted safety under medical 
supervision.   For example, heroin is classified as a schedule I substance because it is 
seen as having a high abuse potential and no legitimate medical use.  Methadone, in 
contrast, is a schedule II narcotic because, although it is seen as having a high abuse 
potential, it also has purported medical value (both for the treatment of opioid 
dependence and pain).  However, as a schedule II substance, it remains highly regulated.  
See Table 4 for examples of narcotic scheduling.   
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Table 4: Examples of Narcotic Scheduling Under the Controlled Substances Act 
Most restrictive ------------------------------------------------------------- Least restrictive 
Schedule I Schedule II Schedule III Schedule IV Schedule V 









with naloxone   
 Morphine 
Hydrocodone 
(Vicodin)   
 Fentanyl    
 
Oxycodone 




formulations)    
     
NOTE: Scheduling based on purported abuse potential and currently accepted medical 
uses 
 
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which plays a central role in the social 
construction of bup, was considered an unhappy compromise even when it was passed 
because it embodied all of the tensions and ambivalence in our relationships to 
substances and to drug policy more generally.  Courtwright (2004: 11-12) argues that the 
CSA framework was intentionally flexible to ―give experts the authority and the 
resources to continuously fine-tune the nation‘s medico-legal response to the drug 
problem.‖  In the case of bup, the CSA meant both that bup proponents had to win over 
DEA officials and that the DEA had to so some creative interpretation of the science 
behind bup to justify its classification as a schedule III narcotic.   
Following the CSA, the trend in drug policy was towards increasingly harsher and 
more punitive laws to lock up those who either possessed or sold drugs.  Beginning with 
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New York‘s Rockefeller Drug Laws passed in 1973,
5
 both states and the federal 
government established an increasingly draconian set of penalties that resulted in the 
mass incarceration of those who used or sold drugs, particularly among people of color.  
Incarceration rates have sky-rocketed (see Figure 1), largely as a result of increasingly 
punitive drug laws (Shiraldi & Ziedenberg 2000).  These drug laws have resulted in wide 
racial disparities in rates of incarceration even though illicit drug use does not vary 
significantly between Blacks and whites (Alexander, 2010; Rich et al. 2011).    
 
Figure 1:  Trends in Incarceration Rates (per 100,000) 
 
While the general trend after the 1900‘s was to treat the non-medical use of 
narcotics as a crime, there was always some recognition that addiction might be more 
amenable to treatment than incarceration.  In 1919, forty carefully regulated narcotic 
                                                 
5
 When passed, the Rockefeller Drug Laws were toughest drug possession and sales laws in the country, 
establishing mandatory minimum sentences for relatively low-level offenses and greatly curtailing the 
discretion of judges to offer alternative penalties or sentences.  Despite the fact that these laws were 
criticized for treating non-violent offenses as harshly as violent ones, they quickly become the model for 
other drug laws across the country. In 2009, more than 35 years after their passage, some of these laws 
were reformed to limit the use of mandatory sentencing and restore judicial discretion over some drug 
offenses. 
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clinics were opened in the U.S. with the goal of providing morphine to opiate addicts 
until they could be ―cured.‖  However, by 1923 these clinics were closed, in part due to 
the urging of the American Medical Association (AMA) which was trying to distance the 
medical profession from having any perceived role in supporting or fostering addiction 
(Conrad 2002).   According to White (1998: 119), ―[i]t was universally understood that 
physicians had a played a significant role in the development of this problem through 
their excessive administration of narcotics to their patients.‖  Ever since this strategic 
move by the AMA, the role of physicians in the treatment of addiction has been minimal 
--  that is, until the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 and the FDA approval of bup 
in 2002. 
Following the passage of the Harrison Act and the subsequent court decision 
barring physician treatment of addiction through prescription medications, addicts were 
either locked up or sent to ―narcotic farms‖ where they were ―rehabilitated‖ through 
behavioral therapies, isolated to prevent the spread of addiction, and removed from the 
temptations thought to encourage their drug use (White 1998).  During this same period, 
individuals who classified themselves as ―addicts‖ developed Alcoholics Anonymous and 
the 12-step method of treatment, which favored ―self-help‖ over professional 
interventions.  For the next several decades, addiction treatment relied on a variety of 
self-help or behavioral models, all of which held abstinence from all drugs (and many 
medications) as their ultimate goal (White 1998).  These kinds of treatments reinforced 
the notion that changes in environment or behavior could overcome addiction, which was 
understood primarily as a failure of will or morality (White 1998). 
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The return to using a drug/medication substitute to address the problem of 
addiction did not re-occur until the advent of methadone in early 1970‘s.  Methadone 
marked a profound shift in U.S. drug policy but also revealed the deep ambivalence of 
policymakers and the public over drugs and drug treatment.  Indeed, methadone was not 
originally billed so much as a medical treatment but as a solution to the problem of urban 
crime (White 1998).  Early research on methadone showed that methadone reduced crime 
and the consumption of heroin while allowing individuals to return to ―productive 
citizenship‖ (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 2003).  The first studies focused on, not only how 
methadone reduced heroin use, but how it increased people‘s ability to get and hold a job 
and reduced their need to obtain money for heroin through illegal activities (Nelkin 
1973).  The Nixon Administration, elected on a law-and-order platform, faced enormous 
pressure to solve the ―drug problem,‖ including rising rates of urban crime, and became 
champions of methadone treatment.  Drawing on the work of a small group of pioneering 
scholars who lobbied for a medical approach to addiction, Nixon create a national 
network of methadone programs that was serving 80,000 by 1973 (White 1998).  
However, many people – then, as now -- viewed methadone treatment as simply 
substituting one drug for another (White 1998), and the regulatory apparatus that grew 
around it reflects methadone‘s ambivalent status as both a legitimate medication and a 
problematic drug.  As methadone treatment became institutionalization in the 1970s, it 
became mired in a maze of bureaucratic and regulatory restrictions meant to prevent 
people from using it to get ―high‖ and to stop methadone from being bought and sold on 
the street as an illicit drug.  The Department of Justice and Treasury opposed methadone, 
and in the early 1970‘s, the FDA imposed strict rules on how it was to be dispensed 
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essentially creating a special, closed system for methadone treatment (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 
2003).   Rather than being distributed like other medications, methadone was (and still is) 
dispensed through a highly regulated system of clinics. Daily attendance is generally 
required, and patients must consume their doses on site in front of staff.  The amount of 
the dose is also carefully regulated, and unlike other medications, methadone cannot be 
taken home or self-administered without special permission and privileges.  Even the 
form of the medication – a thick syrup --  is designed to guard against the diversion of the 
drug and to insure that it can not be illegally injected.  In short, from a regulatory point of 
view, methadone (when prescribed for addiction treatment) is like no other medication in 
the U.S.   As Jaffe and O‘Keefe (2003: 55) put it, methadone represents a ―substantial 
departure from the usual practice of allowing licensed physicians to use their own 
professional judgment, guided by the drug‘s labeling to determine how to prescribe a 
medication.‖  Because of their historical role in fostering narcotic addiction, the general 
prohibition on prescribing narcotics for treating addiction, and methadone‘s excessive 
regulation, very few physicians are involved in methadone treatment.  Rather, methadone 
clinics generally have a medical director who oversees the prescriptions, but they are 
largely staffed by counselors and other mental health professionals. 
This ambivalence over using medications to treat addiction was codified in 1974 
through the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act.  The Act gave the newly created Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) control over the storage and security of drugs used in the 
treatment of addiction and required the DEA registration of practitioners, but it gave the 
Department of Health and Human Services responsibility over setting treatment standards 
(Jaffe 2003).  While there was some limited success in the 1990‘s to ease methadone 
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regulations, the dual system of oversight that includes both the criminal justice (in the 
form of the DEA) and the medical (in the form of Health & Human Services) approach to 
dealing with addiction medications remains in place.  It is into this confusing and 
contradictory regulatory world that bup entered. 
Buprenorphine as an Opportunity for Change 
The efficacy of bup in reducing the consumption of heroin was established in the 
early 1990‘s, and it has been used for the treatment of opioid dependence in Europe since 
1996.  The National Institutes of Health alone funded more than 50 studies about bup in 
the U.S., many of which focused on the effectiveness of providing bup to patients in 
office-based (i.e., not methadone clinic) settings.  Interestingly, some of these same 
researchers also tested the effectiveness of providing methadone through physicians in 
office-based settings and found that it too was as or more effective than treatment in 
methadone clinics (Fiellin et al. 2001).  However, methadone was already under a highly 
regulated system, and previous efforts to change the regulation of methadone were both 
slow and modest (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 2003).  While some experts advocated for trying to 
change the way all addiction medication therapies were regulated (NIH 1997), others saw 
bup as an opportunity to establish a new structure for addiction treatment while leaving 
the methadone system intact (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 2003).    
As the discussion below suggests, the decision to separate bup regulation from 
methadone was a largely political one, but one that required a medical or 
pharmacological justification.  The key pharmacological differences between bup and 
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methadone are the subject of some debate, and these arguments rest, not on the relative 
efficacy of bup or methadone, but rather on the medications‘ safety and abuse potential.   
Whatever the purported pharmacological properties of bup, it offered an 
opportunity for addiction medicine proponents to argue for a new way of treating 
addiction.  According to Jerome Jaffe, who was Nixon‘s ―drug czar‖ and remained 
involved in government drug policy for decades, addiction medicine specialists had 
explicit conversations about how bup could overcome the two obstacles it faced in 
circumventing the regulatory morass of methadone --  first, it needed to be exempted 
from the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act that made it illegal to prescribe a 
narcotic for the treatment of addiction; and second, it needed to be approved by the FDA 
for the treatment of opioid dependence (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 2003).   These interests aligned 
with those of bup‘s manufacturer, Reckitt Benckiser, who believed that bringing the drug 
to market in the U.S would be profitable only if physicians could use it to treat opioid 
dependence in the course of their normal practice; that is, it would not profitable if it 
were to be dispensed only through the highly regulated system that governed methadone.  
In a remarkable article in the Journal of Drug and Alcohol Dependence, Jerome Jaffe and 
Charles O‘Keefe (2003), detail how Reckitt Benckiser, working closely with addiction 
medicine and government allies, undertook a multi-year strategy to bring bup into the 
medical mainstream. 
Reckitt Benckiser‘s first attempt to get bup into the hands of physicians was to 
propose a legislative change that would end the exemption that prohibited physicians 
from using opioids to treat addiction (Jaffe & O‘Keefe, 2003).  The proposed legislation 
simply stated the Controlled Substances Act did not apply when a physician was treating 
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addiction with a Schedule V narcotic (which was the schedule bup was under at the time).  
This proposal died in 1998 in large part because Reckitt failed to include a number of key 
parties and agencies in the process (Jaffe & O‘Keefe, 2003), including the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Drug Enforcement Agency.  The company began new efforts that 
solicited input from the DEA, SAMHSA, FDA, NIDA, HHS and leaders in addiction 
medicine.   Mainstream medical associations, like the American Medical Association, 
remained silent in these debates.  The analysis below focuses on how these key entities 
perceived bup and the role they played in its journey from an experimental drug to the 
first medication for office-based treatment of opioid dependence in 80 years. 
NIH Consensus Panel 
In the late 1990‘s there were two government panels that laid much of the 
groundwork for the passage of DATA 2000 – a consensus panel convened by National 
Institutes of Health and a subcommittee that made recommendations about bup to the 
National Advisory Committee of SAMHSA‘s Center for Substance Abuse Treatment 
(CSAT).  In 1997, a prominent group of addiction medicine specialists convened by NIH 
published a consensus statement on opioid addiction in which they emphasized the 
genetic, neurobiological, metabolic and physiological aspects of addiction.  The very 
need for a consensus panel suggests the array of different attitudes and practices even 
among researchers and practitioners.  While acknowledging that the cause of addiction 
was unclear, they agreed on a number of issues and asserted: ―There is no question that… 
[drug] dependence constitutes a medical disorder‖ (NIH 1997: 8).  They advocated that 
public and private insurance programs cover addiction treatment ―with parity of coverage 
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for all medical disorders‖ (NIH 1997: 24).   In addition, the panel urged the government 
to provide ―vigorous effective leadership‖ to inform the public that substance abuse 
dependence is a medical disorder than can be treated (NIH 1997: 18).  Their overarching 
goal was to reclaim addiction treatment as the appropriate purview of medicine and to 
free it from government regulation and control.  Referring to the current system of 
methadone regulation, the Panel (NIH 1997: 19) said: ―We know of no other area where 
the federal government intrudes so deeply and coercively into the practice of medicine.‖  
Indeed, NIDA had been arguing for some time that this system of regulation, as well as 
the stigmatization and criminalization of addiction, had kept medical professionals from 
being more engaged in addiction treatment.  NIDA Director Volkow (u.d.: 1) set a clear 
goal for her Institute ―to invigorate the medical profession to become more involved with 
drug abuse issues.‖  Medications, like buprenorphine, provide one avenue for doing just 
that and doing it in ways that could potentially circumvent many of the difficulties that 
had plague the methadone treatment system. 
CSAT National Advisory Council Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 
Following the publication of this consensus statement, SAMHSA, through its 
Center on Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) brought together its own advisory panel 
of experts that had enormous influence is shaping the statutory changes codified in 
DATA 2000.  The recommendations of the Buprenorphine Subcommittee of CSAT‘s 
National Advisory Council (NAC) published in 1999 represent another clear attempt to 
shift control of addiction treatment from government regulators to medical professionals.  
The subcommittee asks, ―Doctors treat all kinds of illness; why is addiction different‖ 
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(National Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999: 12)?  The 
advisory board also condemned the methadone clinic model for being ―over-regulated… 
and allow[ing] little room for clinical judgment‖ (National Advisory Committee's 
Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999: 14).  They suggest that clinical practice 
guidelines, not federal regulations, should govern addiction treatment and that the 
management of buprenorphine should be controlled through established systems for 
physician licensing and credentialing rather than government regulators, like the FDA 
and DEA (National Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999).  In 
their final report they say: 
The federal regulations [for bup] should be made as close as possible to 
other medical models, which help destigmatize pharmacotherapy for 
opioid addiction treatment.  The Subcommittee supported the use of 
minimum federal regulations combined with medical credentialing 
standards and… standards of clinical practice (National Advisory 
Committee's Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999: 9). 
 
By arguing that clinical judgment and standards should be reinserted into the 
treatment of addiction, they are attempting to move ownership of the problem from the 
DEA to the medical community.  The Subcommittee concludes that ―office-based 
buprenorphine treatment is desirable, since it can help to promote the shifting of opioid 
treatment into mainstream medicine and expand access to opioid treatment services‖ 
(National Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999: 1).  While the 
earlier NIH Consensus Statement suggested that both methadone and bup needed less 
regulation, the CSAT Subcommittee focused specifically on bup, saying that it was less 
addictive and less likely to be diverted than methadone (claims which other research 
suggests are questionable). 
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Despite these efforts to construct addiction as any other disease and 
buprenorphine as any other medication, there is ample evidence that law enforcement and 
punishment constructions linger, particularly in government documents surrounding the 
passage of DATA 2000.  SAMHSA published its final rule about DATA 2000 in the 
Federal Register following a required period of public comment.  Despite suggestions 
from some medical commentators that the definition of ―addiction‖ be revised to ―remove 
behaviorally-oriented concepts and rely on medical constructs only‖ (SAMHSA 2001: 
4080), SAMHSA defined opioid addiction as ―a cluster of cognitive, behavioral and 
physiological symptoms‖ (SAMHSA 2001: 4091).  Retaining a behavioral component 
leaves open the possibility of non-medical responses to addiction, including 
incarceration.  Current drug policy makes both drug use itself (possession) and drug-
related crime (e.g., robbery or prostitution to support drug use) illegal.  A purely 
biomedical definition of addiction makes treatment, not prison, the logical response to 
drug use, if not drug-related crime.  The congressional record surrounding the passage of 
DATA 2000 draws heavily on the science and medical model put forth by NIDA but 
reveals that these medical constructions are used strategically to argue for an adjunct to, 
not a replacement of, criminal justice responses.   
Absent the American Medical Association 
 Addiction medicine experts involved with both NIH and SAMHSA tried to use 
bup to reframe addiction as a medical problem that was the appropriate purview of 
medicine.  Given this, the absence of any formal statements from the American Medical 
Association (AMA) surrounding the regulation of bup is notable and merits brief 
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comment.  In fact, more than 10 years since the passage of DATA 2000, the AMA 
remains largely silent on the issue of bup even though they are one of only five 
professional organizations allowed to train doctors on how to treat individuals using bup 
(discussed further below).  Their absence from this debate is less surprising when one 
considers both their deliberate distancing from addiction treatment following the Harrison 
Act and the history of addiction of medicine. 
 In his recent dissertation on the history of addiction medicine, Chris Freed (2008) 
details the struggle of addiction medicine to gain legitimacy within the AMA.  Although 
the AMA first refers to alcoholism as an illness in 1956, addiction medicine has faced a 
number of challenges in being taken seriously by mainstream medicine.  According to 
Freed (2008), attempts to professionalize addiction medicine have suffered from: a lack 
of consensus over terminology, competition between addiction medicine and addiction 
psychiatry to ―own‖ the problem of addiction, stigma associated with addiction generally 
and with addiction medicine doctors (many of whom identify as recovering addicts 
themselves), a dearth of effective treatment options besides self-help and behavioral 
interventions, and the absence of a strong research and scientific base.  Although the 
AMA recognized the American Society of Addiction Medicine as a ―self-designated‖ 
medical specialty in 1990 (Freed 2008), to date they have not been able to obtain official 
status as an AMA specialty or sub-specialty.  Addiction medicine‘s marginal status 
within the AMA and mainstream medicine‘s continued ambivalence about their role in 
addiction help explain the AMA‘s absence in the debates over DATA 2000.  This history 
also helps explain how much was at stake for addiction medicine advocates in enshrining 
bup as the first office-based medical treatment for addiction. 
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Congressional Debates about DATA 2000 
The congressional record surrounding the passage of DATA 2000 shows just 
what an important role bup played in transforming U.S. drug policy.  Politicians rely 
heavily (though selectively) on scientific and pharmacological arguments about bup, 
emphasizing, in particular, its low potential for diversion and abuse.  They hold out 
visions for the way the legislation will transform the lives of addicts and ―effectively put 
America on the right road to fighting and winning the heroin addiction war‖ 
(Congressional Record 2002: S00156).  Most remarkably this transformation rests on a 
medication that at the time was two years away from even being approved for use by the 
FDA. 
In the congressional hearings about DATA 2000, the committee acknowledges 
that they are working to pass legislation that would not apply to any existing medication: 
S324 would not apply at this time to any approved product.  It would 
apply to buprenorphine and buprenorphine/nx [nx = naloxone], if 
approved, and to any other narcotic drugs in schedule IV or V which are 
approved for use in the maintenance of detox treatment, if certain 
conditions are met (Congressional Record 1999b: 12). 
 
This is one of the only times in the entire congressional record that the unavailability of 
bup is acknowledged.  Much more commonly, bup is the centerpiece of arguments for the 
passage of legislation as if its approval by the FDA is a foregone conclusion.  Senator 
Daschle asserts: ―this is one way in which we can fight and win the war on drugs – by 
blocking the craving for illegal substances‖ (Congressional Record 1999b: S144472).  
Here, the problem of drug use is to be solved – not by the international and multi-billion 
dollar law enforcement effort to reduce supply – but by intervening at the level of the 
individual brain to stop craving.  Senator Levin remarks: 
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This legislation…will allow us to effectively utilize a new medical 
discovery of a substance called Buprenorphine, which has proven to be an 
extraordinarily effective means for combating heroin addiction by 
blocking the craving for heroin (Congressional Record 2000: S9111). 
 
In fact, bup was not a ―new medical discovery‖ but had first been evaluated as an 
addiction treatment by NIDA in the late 1970‘s (see Chapters 3 and 5).  But it did offer a 
new opportunity to reframe addiction treatment and with it U.S. drug policy. 
As the quote above suggests, it is not just bup‘s existence that is used to justify 
this legislative change, it is also its particular pharmacological properties --  even though 
DATA 2000 could theoretically apply to a medication with completely different 
pharmacology than bup.  Craving – the uncontrollable desire for a drug – is seen here as 
the root cause of addiction and the problem that bup can solve through its 
pharmacological action.  Equally important, however, are the pharmacological properties 
that can help distinguish bup from illicit drugs.  In fact, the pharmacological property that 
is referenced most often, almost exclusively, in the congressional record surrounding 
DATA 2000 is bup‘s low potential for diversion and abuse.  Senator Levin asserts: ―Of 
critical importance is the fact that Buprenorphine is not addictive like methadone so the 
likelihood of diversion is small‖ (Congressional Record 2000: S9112).  A letter from 
Donna Shalala, then Secretary of Health and Human Services, notes:  
Published studies suggest that it [bup] has very limited euphorigenic 
effects and has the ability to precipitate withdrawal in individuals who are 
highly dependent on other opioids.  Thus, buprenorphine and 
buprenorphine/nx products are expected to have low diversion potential 
(Congressional Record 1999b: 10).  
 
This emphasis on low abuse and diversion potential is important not only to 
address concerns that bup will become another street drug but also to justify 
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circumventing the restrictive regulations that govern the dispensing of methadone.  Alan 
Leshner of NIDA tells the committee considering DATA 2000 that: 
The current regulations for administration and delivery of narcotic 
medication in the treatment of narcotic dependence was written for the use 
of full agonist medications such as methadone with demonstrated potential 
for abuse and do not take into account the unique pharmacological 
properties of these drugs [like bup] (Congressional Record 1999a: S1092). 
 
In addition to the pharmacological properties, advocates of the legislation also point out a 
number of key provisions within the legislation designed to prevent diversion.  Levin 
notes, ―the legislation includes protections against abuse‖ (Congressional Record 1999a: 
S1092).  (The specific provisions are analyzed in more detail below). 
Bup is not simply heralded because it has low potential for diversion.  It is also 
constructed as the substance that can ―help those who abuse drugs to change their lives 
and become productive members of society‖ (Congressional Record 1999b: 2).  The 
ability to rehabilitate drug users into ―productive members of society‖ is central to a 
political strategy that seeks an alternative to drug policies centered on incarceration.  
Senator Moynihan makes an impassioned plea to include a public health approach in drug 
policy relying entirely on a disease model of addiction:  
Congress and the public continue to fixate on supply interdiction and 
harsher sentences (without treatment) as the ‗solution‘ to our drug 
problems, and adamantly refuse to acknowledge what various experts now 
know and are telling us: that addiction is a chronic relapsing disease; that 
is, the brain undergoes molecular cellular and physiological changes 
which may not be reversible.  What we are talking about is not simply a 
law enforcement problem… it is a public health problem and we need to 
treat it as such (Congressional Record 1999c: S144473). 
 
What is interesting about this quote is that Moynihan moves quickly from the 
molecular level to the level of public health.  Biden makes a similar move when he 
invokes medical science to solve a social problem.  He says: ―it only makes sense to 
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unleash the full powers of medical science to find a ‗cure‘ for this social and human ill‖ 
(Congressional Record 1999b: 22).  On the one hand, comments like these seem to 
epitomize medicalization --  a social problem is recast in medical or public health terms.  
On the other hand, it is important to note that even those who rely on a scientific 
paradigm do not propose doing away with law enforcement approaches to drugs.  Biden, 
for example, introduced DATA 2000 in conjunction with a bill aimed at harsher 
enforcement against methamphetamine labs.  In fact, the only person on record arguing 
that DATA 2000 should completely transform our approach to addiction is a scientist 
from Columbia University who says:  ―The major innovation of the FDA approval and 
the Drug Addiction Treatment Act, however goes well beyond the particular medication 
and instead to how we think about addiction‖ (Congressional Record 2002: S10658).  
The politicians use the scientific language strategically to advance their goal of 
expanding medical approaches to addiction, but they do not use it to replace more 
punitive approaches.   
Throughout the congressional record, proponents of DATA 2000 suggest that bup 
specifically and office-based treatment more generally have the potential to increased 
treatment capacity and reach a different kind of drug user.  When discussing DATA 
2000, legislators focus on the increase in first-time heroin use among suburban teens in 
the 1990‘s as the driver of need for treatment expansion. The implicit idea of segmented 
treatment begins to appear in the congressional record -- some kinds of addicts ―need‖ 
methadone and others ―need‖ bup delivered in the privacy of their local doctor‘s office. 
Wesson, then President of the American Society of Addiction Medicine, tells the 
Senators considering the legislation: 
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Some [opioid abusers] need the highly-structured, behavioral modification 
services and maintenance with methadone or LAAM.  Others require less 
intensive drug abuse treatment… such as buprenorphine, provided within 
the context of physicians‘ offices (Congressional Record 1999a: S1092). 
 
Exactly what kind of patients need more structure becomes clearer as one reads on.  
Leshner from NIDA testifies at length about how bup is uniquely appropriate for a new 
kind of heroin user: 
Narcotic addiction is spreading from urban to suburban areas.  The current 
system, which tends to concentrated in urban areas, is a poor fit for the 
suburban spread of narcotic addiction…  [There is] an increase in the 
number of younger Americans experimenting with and becoming addicted 
to heroin. …  Treatment for adolescents should be accessible, and 
graduated to the level of dependence exhibited in the patient.  
Buprenorphine products will likely be the initial medications for most 
opioid-dependent adolescents (Congressional Record 1999a: S1092). 
 
Leshner, like several others in the congressional record, draw on a culture of fear 
about the threat of heroin reaching young children in the suburbs to give a sense of 
urgency to the legislation.  But he does much more.  The urban/suburban divide can be 
read as code for race and class (Anderson 1990; Davis 2007) as can the ―graduated levels 
of dependence,‖ which is a more refined way of distinguishing the long-term, ―hard core‖ 
user from the neophyte.  Importantly, Leshner cites no studies here that demonstrate 
bup‘s higher efficacy among those with ―graduated levels of dependence‖ or among 
adolescent users because no such studies had been done at that time.  Despite its lack of 
empirical basis, this notion that bup is better for newer, less severely addicted people 
became a fact that was repeatedly cited throughout the policy debates.   
By arguing that bup is better for some kinds of addicts, legislators are also able to 
suggest that certain people will be able to avoid the methadone system.  The implication 
is that white, suburban adolescents in particular will no longer have to go to urban 
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methadone clinics to receive treatment alongside ―real‖ addicts.  In the congressional 
committee report on DATA 2000, the hard core addicts (those being treated with 
methadone and living in urban areas) are basically banished to the methadone system and 
portrayed as beyond redemption: 
Methadone treatment is largely reserved for those who have been addicted 
to relatively high levels of opioids (generally heroin) for a relatively long 
period of time. Typically, an addict cannot be enrolled in a methadone 
program until he or she has been addicted for a year, by which time the 
drug has done its damage and the addict can no longer work productively  
(Congressional Record 1999b:13). 
 
Congress admits that the current system of methadone is largely restricted to the most 
severely addicted individuals and sets people up for failure.  At the congressional 
hearings about DATA 2000, we learn another reason why the methadone system is not 
suitable for all addicts – the stigma associated with methadone: 
The stigma and prejudice against patients in methadone treatment comes 
not only from the fear that they may be denied access to certain jobs, child 
custody or even medical treatment, but also from prejudice within the 
greater community, where they are likely to be labeled as weak and as 
‗trading one drug for another‘ (Congressional Record 1999b: 12). 
 
This is the most forthright admission in the congressional record about methadone‘s 
failure as a system and as a medication.  Those associated with methadone are depicted as 
hard-core, urban heroin users burdened by stigma and discrimination and perceived as 
substituting one drug for another.  The issue of drug substitution is an important and 
recurring one.  Methadone, like morphine and heroin before it, has slipped from being 
perceived as a medication to being perceived as a just another drug.   
Missing from debates about different types of addiction and treatment is any 
mention of prescription drug abuse.  Prescription drug abuse far exceeds the abuse heroin 
and was then, as now, rapidly escalating and causing huge numbers of overdose deaths 
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(see Chapter 4).  Nonetheless, the only allusion to an opioid addiction other than heroin is 
this reference in a letter from Secretary Shalala: 
It [bup] would be available not just to heroin addicts, but to anyone with 
an opiate problem, including citizens who would not normally be 
associated with the term addiction (Congressional Record 2000: S9113). 
 
What is clear from this quote is that bup is seen as an opportunity to reclaim at 
least some ―addicts‖ and ―addiction‖ from the stigma that surrounds them and that 
surrounds methadone.  However, it was certainly not lost on everyone that the proposed 
legislation could essentially result in a two-tiered system of addiction treatment.  The 
only opposition to DATA 2000 in the entire congressional record was from a group of 
legislators who felt that the law was too narrow and should be accompanied by a massive 
new investment in all drug treatment systems.  They summarized their opposition this 
way: 
Bup is expected to be an effective treatment of mild to moderate heroin 
addiction.  A majority of heroin addicts are severely addicted.  Thus, many 
persons who are in the treatment gap will not benefit from the bill for 
pharmacological reasons. … The bill may help some heroin addicts…  
These will be mild to moderately addicted persons with the financial 
resources to obtain access to a physician or other healthcare provider who 
will either dispense or prescribe the medication.  The bill does not address 
the need of most heroin addicts; namely, those who are severely addicted 
or who lack the financial resources to see a doctor (Congressional Record 
1999b: 29). 
 
Those with resources will receive bup; those without are consigned to methadone, 
prison, or no treatment at all.  This assumption of segmented treatment helps explain why 
the methadone clinic lobby did not oppose DATA 2000 and, in fact, was on record 
supporting the rescheduling of bup to make it available in doctors‘ offices.  While there is 
no evidence to support the claims that bup is better for those with mild to moderate 
addiction, it is true that methadone is more widely supported through publicly-funded 
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programs (both Medicaid and state funds) than bup (see next chapter).   This argument 
about different kinds of addicts not only helps construct the bup patient as someone who 
is less addicted, suburban and likely white; it also preserves a clientele for the methadone 
clinics.  As long as bup is targeted to a different population and is not replacing 
methadone, then it poses no real threat to the core business of methadone clinics.  Despite 
some fairly harsh critiques of methadone as stigmatizing and impeding the advancement 
of other medical treatments for addiction, there are repeated assurances throughout the 
record that the methadone system is needed and that bup will not replace the role of 
methadone clinics.  According to Secretary Shalala: 
Buprenorphine and buprenorphine/nx would not replace methadone.  
Methadone and LAAM clinics would remain an important part of the 
treatment continuum. (Congressional Record 1999b:10). 
 
It should be noted that despite, or perhaps because of, efforts to assure the 
methadone clinics that they would not be losing any business, DATA 2000 does not seem 
to have faced much opposition.  As mentioned above, the original efforts failed largely 
because of opposition from the FDA and DEA, which were subsequently consulted and 
ultimately convinced to support DATA 2000 through the inclusion of safeguards against 
diversion discussed below.   The only opposition on record for the 1999-2000 effort came 
from those who wanted a more comprehensive bill granting a significant increase in 
funding to SAMHSA.  Like much legislation, DATA 2000 was bundled with several 
other bills that also improved its chances of passing.  In addition to ecstasy and 
methamphetamine anti-proliferation bills (based on traditional law enforcement 
approaches of interdiction and criminal sanctions), DATA 2000 was attached to the 
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popular reauthorization of the children‘s health program.  On October 17, 2000, President 
Bush signed DATA 2000 into law. 
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 
The final version of DATA 2000 that was passed in October of 2000 reflects both 
the influence of the disease model and the ongoing concerns that addiction is a crime and 
medications to treat it can become abused street drugs.  The legislation reveals a series of 
compromises between the older, punitive framework and a medical approach.  Several 
provisions in DATA 2000 indicate acceptance of the construction of addiction as a 
disease requiring medical treatment.  The law permits doctors to prescribe any Schedule 
III-V drugs for ―the medical treatment of opioid addiction‖ (35 USC 3502).  In order to 
prescribe bup, physicians must obtain special certification granted through existing 
addiction medicine credentials or through completion of an 8-hour training conducted by 
addiction medicine specialists.  This emphasis on training and education, which is 
conducted by medical professional organizations, has the effect of privileging medical 
knowledge above government regulation – something the NIH Consensus Panel 
explicitly sought.  The ascendancy of medical expertise is also seen in the DATA 2000 
stipulation that no regulations developed to implement the law ―shall authorize any 
Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or control of the practice of medicine 
or the manner in which medical services are provided‖ (35 USC 3502).   This stands in 
stark contrast to methadone where the extensive regulations had been characterized as the 
most intrusive and restrictive guidelines in any practice of medicine. 
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Despite these concessions to the medical model, law enforcement/crime and 
punishment constructions of addiction are also codified in DATA 2000 itself and in the 
DEA and FDA regulations controlling bup.  Doctors, like patients, are not to be entirely 
trusted around this new ―medicine.‖  For instance, originally under DATA 2000, doctors 
could only have 30 patients on bup in their practice at any given time.  This provision 
was put in place to prevent doctors from become ―narcotics peddlers‖ or ―pill mills‖ 
where ―addicts‖ could easily obtain their supply of drugs.  The law was later amended to 
allow 30 patients per doctor rather than per practice and again to allow up to 100 patients 
per doctor.  Responsibility for monitoring violations of this rule rest not with the nation‘s 
drug treatment agency, CSAT, but with the nation‘s law chief law enforcement officer, 
the U.S. Attorney General (21 USC 114).  DEA and FDA also retain important roles 
under DATA 2000.  Physicians must submit a waiver to DEA that affords them a narrow 
exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the purposes of treating opioid 
addiction with a schedule III or higher medication.  DEA makes clear that diversion of 
bup remains a serious concern; they intend ―to conduct regular investigations of 
practitioners‖ (Federal Register 2003: 37431).  In addition, the FDA reports that it will 
monitor ―drug distribution channels‖ and set up ―active and passive surveillance, 
[including] monitoring local drug markets and interviews with active users‖ (Food and 
Drug Administration u.d.(a): 2).  Despite claims that bup is like any other medication for 
chronic medical conditions, these provisions suggest it is also viewed as an illicit drug. 
Government ambivalence about bup is also evident in the provisional nature of 
DATA 2000.  Although the government permits office-based treatment of opioid 
addiction, this endeavor is framed both as an experiment and as an exception to existing 
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legislation.  For example, the law requires that data be collected and analyzed to 
determine both the effectiveness of and harm caused by office-based pharmaceutical 
treatment (i.e., adverse medical events, misuse and diversion); these data will be used, in 
part, to evaluate whether or not such treatment will continue. Furthermore, DATA 2000 
includes a sunset clause that gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the 
U.S. Attorney General the power to disallow or extend office-base treatment depending 
on their assessment of whether or not prescribed medication is increasing drug treatment 
capacity, resulting in adverse consequences and/or being diverted and misused.  
Interestingly, both the country‘s highest law enforcement and health official are given 
this power, symbolic embodiments of the crime and disease models of addiction.   
DEA Rescheduling of Buprenorphine 
As noted above, DATA 2000 itself did not legalize the prescription of bup.  The 
law is carefully crafted so that final authority for whether or not a drug can be prescribed 
in an office-based setting rests with the FDA and the DEA.  The DEA must classify a 
medication as a schedule III-IV drug, and the FDA must approve it for use in addiction 
treatment.  Methadone is a schedule II drug, excluding it from DATA 2000.  Bup, in 
contrast, has been classified as a schedule III drug, making it the first (and to date the 
only) medication that can be prescribed under DATA 2000.   
The history of how bup was rescheduled provides another interesting example of 
how scientific facts are used strategically for political ends.  The DEA must publish its 
rationale for rescheduling a medication and any public comments it received in support or 
opposition to the proposed rescheduling in the Federal Register.  A great deal was riding 
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on having bup appropriately rescheduled, since it had been the foundation for the passage 
of DATA 2000.  Despite being portrayed as a revolutionary new scientific innovation, 
bup has been known to the DEA since 1970.  It was originally classified as a schedule II 
narcotic with the same abuse potential as methadone and morphine.  Then in 1985, when 
it became available as an injectable analgesic, it was reclassified as a schedule V 
medication, indicating the lowest possibility of abuse (Robitussin AC is another schedule 
V drug).  According to the DEA, bup as an injectable analgesic warranted this scheduling 
because ―the product has limited use outside hospital and clinic settings‖ (Federal 
Register 2002: 62354).  Technically, bup in this form met the scheduling requirements of 
DATA 2000; however, it could not be used because it had not been approved in this form 
for the treatment of opioid addiction by the FDA.   
When the manufacturer wanted to bring two new forms to market in 2002 
explicitly to treat opioid dependence --  a sublingual tablet that was a bup-only 
formulation and one that was a bup-naloxone
6
 combination --  the DEA had the 
opportunity to reschedule it once again.  Nine different organizations commented on the 
DEA‘s proposed rescheduling of bup and bup/naloxone as a schedule III medication.  
These included all of the major addiction medicine professional organizations, the 
industry lobby for methadone, Reckitt Benckiser (the manufacturer of bup), and Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals, the maker of several prescription pain opioids, including Oxycodone.  
Reckitt Benckiser and Purdue argued that bup should receive a higher (i.e., less restrictive 
scheduling), while the addiction medicine professionals argued that the bup-only 
                                                 
6
 Described further in subsequent chapters, naloxone is added to bup because it is thought to decrease the 
potential for diversion and misuse.  If the combination form is injected, the naloxone causes someone 
already using other opioids (like heroin or oxycontin) to experiences unpleasant withdrawal symptoms.  
Almost all formulations of bup on the market in the U.S. contain naloxone.  
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formulation (subutex) should be scheduled as to exclude it from DATA 2000, while 
bup/naloxone formulation (suboxone) should be a schedule III to encourage physicians to 
prescribe the less ―abusable‖ form.  In each of the public comments, the commentators 
relied on scientific studies to argue their (often conflicting) positions and assert either that 
bup has no potential for abuse or that it has a high potential of abuse. 
The DEA had to address several conflicting claims and competing interests in 
issuing their ruling, and they had to do it in a way that appeared objective and factually 
based.  One commentator said: 
The DEA has not been consistent in its final decision making process and 
has failed to meet the non-arbitrary agency action requirements.  The 
finding that buprenorphine has a potential for abuse less than Schedule I or 
II substances is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by the 
underlying administrative record (Federal Register 2002: 62356). 
 
In response, the DEA offers one of the most thorough reviews of the literature on 
bup available and accuses commentators in both sides of misinterpreting the data: ―in 
several cases, the same medical, scientific and other data cited by the FDA and/or the 
DEA in scheduling review documents are interpreted differently by the commentators‖ 
(Federal Register 2002: 62356).  They then go on to provide the ―correct‖ interpretation 
of data --  one that leads to the conclusion that both bup and bup/naloxone should be 
receive a schedule III designation.  Because they are rescheduling bup from a less 
restrictive category (V) to a more restrictive one (III), the DEA spends an enormous 
amount of time detailing bup‘s potential for diversion and abuse as the rationale for 
controlling it more tightly.  The pharmacological profile of bup that the DEA describes 
bears almost no relation to the one described by politicians that downplayed bup‘s 
potential for diversion and misuse. 
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According to the DEA, bup ―may produce significant dose-related euphoria, drug-
liking, respiratory depression and sedation‖ (Federal Register 2002: 62357).  We also 
learn that ―in opioid dependent patients, buprenorphine can substitute for heroin‖ 
(Federal Register 2002: 62358).  The DEA is most emphatic in recognizing that bup does, 
after all, have a high potential for abuse and diversion.  To make its case, it turns to data 
from New Zealand and France where bup has been widely available for years.  They 
conclude:  
Buprenorphine has been diverted, trafficked and abused in many countries 
throughout the world…  [B]uprenorphine‘s low cost, easy accessibility, 
high purity and substantial morphine-like effects have contributed to its 
popularity on the illicit market (Federal Register 2002: 62359). 
 
Given this profile of the drug, the DEA is able to argue that it should be rescheduled to a 
more restrictive schedule III (not coincidentally the most restrictive category allowed 
under DATA 2000).  To explain why it should not be classified with methadone as a 
schedule II, they assert that compared to schedule II drugs bup is safer because it is less 
likely to lead to purposeful or accidental overdose.  They argue: 
This [lower overdose potential] is an advantage over drugs like morphine, 
oxycodone and methadone and a relevant factor that carries considerable 
significance when weighing public health risks and the need for regulatory 
scrutiny (Federal Register 2002: 62362). 
 
The rationale by which bup is distinguished from its chemical cousins is not that will not 
be abused but that such abuse is less likely to result in death.  Safety is the reason bup can 
be less tightly regulated than methadone.  This reasoning is suspect given that marijuana 
– one of the safest illicit substances available – has never alone caused an overdose death 
but remains in the most restrictive class of substances, Schedule I. 
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The DEA must retain its position of objectivity and neutrality and does so by a 
careful and argument based on ―science‖ that cites dozens of journal articles.  However, 
they have clearly been put in a compromising position by the pressure to reschedule bup 
created by the passage of DATA 2000, and their critics accused them of being swayed by 
legislative rather than scientific interests.  In fact, one critic noted that, when they first 
proposed the rule for the rescheduling of bup, the DEA said: ―The DEA recognizes the 
need to expand narcotic treatment and this factor was a consideration in proposing 
Schedule III placement for buprenorphine‖ (Federal Register 2002: 62364).  In the final 
rule they seem to realize their mistake in acknowledging the role of anything other than 
drug safety and efficacy and say the complete opposite: ―The DEA did not consider the 
need to expand to narcotic treatment as a specific factor in determining the placement of 
buprenorphine under the CSA‖ (Federal Register 2002: 62363).  One factor they do admit 
considering was the impact on methadone clinics.  They provide an analysis of why they 
believe that the availability of bup will have no economic impact on the methadone 
clinics.  Unlike the politicians who argued that the segmented system would protect 
methadone clinics, the DEA argues that methadone clinics will also be allowed to 
prescribe bup and thereby attract new patients. 
The rescheduling of bup provides another instance of the strategic use of science 
and framing the pharmacology of bup in support of yet a different set of interests.  For the 
DEA, whose primary mission is stop the ―misuse‖ of drugs, bup is clearly a drug that can 
cause euphoria and has a high potential for diversion.  Ultimately, the DEA relies on 
arguments about bup‘s greater safety in terms of overdose risk to distinguish it from 
methadone or heroin.  Because it based its arguments on safety, the DEA did not 
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distinguish between bup  and bup/naloxone (which is thought to prevent diversion) and 
classified both as Schedule III narcotics, the most restrictive classification possible that 
still allowed for their use under DATA 2000. 
FDA Approval of Buprenorphine 
In October of 2002, one day after the DEA rescheduled buprenorphine and two 
years after the passage of DATA 2000, the FDA approved it for treating opioid 
dependence.  In announcing its decision, the FDA relied heavily on the same scientists 
that had testified before Congress on behalf of DATA 2000.  Other scholars have found 
that organized interests shape the FDA‘s drug review process, like the one described 
here.   Carpenter (2004: 54) argues ―the FDA is very responsive to what I would call 
‗opinion leaders‘ in the scientific and medical communities. … Another critical audience 
lies in Congress.‖  Indeed, the FDA literature largely mirrors the language of the 
scientists and politicians who supported DATA 2000, focusing on bup‘s potential ―to 
provide patients greater access to needed to treatment‖ (Food and Drug Administration 
2002: 2) and trying to alleviate concerns about its diversion. 
The FDA claims that bup ―is considered to have less risk for causing 
psychological and/or physical dependence than drugs in Schedule II such 
as…methadone‖ (Food and Drug Administration 2002: 1).  But in its Q&A for 
consumers of bup, the FDA answers the question, ―How are Subutex and Suboxone 
[brand names for two bup medications] different from current treatment options like 
methadone?‖ by saying: ―They are the first drugs available under DATA 2000 that can be 
prescribed in a doctor‘s office‖ (Food and Drug Administration u.d.(a)): 1).  The 
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difference is largely an artifact of law.  By relying on where the medication is dispensed 
to explain differences between methadone and bup, the FDA is acknowledging these 
differences are merely legal constructions. 
Despite claims that bup has less diversion and abuse potential than methadone, 
the FDA appears quite concerned that it will be used illicitly without medical supervision.  
Over half of the FDA Q&A on bup is devoted to describing its ―risk management 
program designed to deter abuse and diversion from its legitimate use‖ (Food and Drug 
Administration u.d.(b): 2).  The FDA suggests:  1) doctors limit prescriptions of Subutex 
(the pure bup formulation considered to have greater abuse potential than Suboxone, the 
bup/naloxone combination) to supervised use (i.e., directly observe the doses taken); 2) 
―keep tight control of … prescription pad[s];‖ and 3) adhere to all controlled substance 
storage and record keeping laws (Food and Drug Administration u.d. (b): 6).  These 
include careful inventories of drugs dispensed, locked storage cabinets, and multiple 
copies of each prescription.  They also recommend that doctors keep patient photographs 
and social security numbers in the patient record to avoid being deceived by patients 
(Food and Drug Administration u.d.(b): 7).   Implicit here is not only that bup is a drug 
that can be used for ―non-medical‖ purposes, but also that those being treated with bup 
likely have criminal intent.  
American Society of Addiction Medicine & The Implementation of DATA 2000 
The American Society of Addiction Medicine, despite their tenuous status within 
the AMA, played a pivotal role in the passage and implementation of DATA 2000.  As 
the above discussion suggested, addiction medicine experts working with NIDA and 
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SAMHSA strongly promoted the idea that addiction treatment should be governed by 
clinical expertise and practice guidelines rather than regulations, like methadone.  With 
the passage of DATA 2000, they got their wish, and the role of addiction medicine in 
treating addiction was codified in the law. 
When bill was reintroduced, addiction medicine organizations added provisions 
which both served their financial interests and enhanced their prestige.  Specifically, at 
the behest of these organizations, the legislators added a provision that doctors must 
receive eight hours of training on opioid addiction in order to prescribe bup.  
Furthermore, DATA 2000 lists five specific addiction medicine organizations that have 
the exclusive right to conduct these trainings.  The trainings generate revenue
7
 and 
strengthen the credibility of addiction medicine, which has long struggled for legitimacy 
within the medical profession (Freed 2008).  These organizations (the American Society 
of Addiction Medicine, the American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, the American 
Medical Association, the American Osteopathic Association, and the American 
Psychiatric Association) have come to be known as ―the DATA 2000 societies.‖  For the 
first time, doctors from other specialties had to turn to the addiction medicine specialists 
for credentialing and expertise. 
Following the passage of DATA 2000, ASAM received funding from SAMHSA 
to develop and deliver the 8-hour training that physicians needed to complete before they 
could register with the DEA and obtain a waiver to prescribe bup.  The ―waiver‖ refers to 
a waiver of the restriction under the Controlled Substances Act that prohibits physicians 
from treating addiction by prescribing a narcotic.  The ASAM training reveals the 
                                                 
7
 In my role as project director of the BHIVES study, I had to arrange a ‗DATA 2000‘ training for 
physicians involved in the study.  Quotes given for the training of about 25 physicians averaged $16,000. 
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Society‘s strong interest in constructing addiction as a disease and medical doctors‘ right 
to treat it but also belies the troubled and ongoing history of doctors being implicated in 
causing addiction (see for example, Weinberg & Turner 2005).  Addiction medicine, like 
other fields of medicine that deal with ―mental health‖ or ―psychological‖ problems, 
faces additional challenges as well.  First, despite recent advances in neuroscience that 
attempt to somatize addiction, the diagnosis and treatment of addiction still remains 
elusive and largely intangible undermining its credibility as a ―real‖ disease (see also 
Lakoff 2005).  The second struggle facing addiction medicine is the murky relationship 
between its therapeutic and social control functions.  While much medicine can be 
viewed as a form a social control, the line between the treatment and control of the addict 
is particularly blurred since the goal of treatment is almost always the control of deviant 
behavior (that is, using drugs).  As Lakoff (2005: 5) explains, these fields of practice 
struggle ―to separate [themselves] from its association with the custodial administration 
of deviances.‖  As their resistance to the methadone system suggests, doctors do want to 
view themselves or be viewed as agents of the regulatory apparatus of the state.  Rather, 
they want to maintain autonomy to exercise ―clinical judgment.‖  The ASAM training, 
however, merges the therapeutic and the punitive in an uneasy amalgamation of treatment 
and control.  On the one hand, they do everything possible to construct bup as a medical 
treatment for a medical disease.  On the other hand, they emphasize the importance of 
avoiding even the appearance that they are drug peddlers supporting the habits of addicts. 
The ASAM training adopts wholesale the construction of addiction as disease that 
should be treated by doctors with pharmacological agents, like bup (Strain, Liberto et al. 
2004).  The training topics are themselves telling; they include, pharmacology, clinical 
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use (i.e., dosing), patient assessment, medical comorbidities, case presentations, clinical 
management, and record keeping.  Not coincidentally, these topic names could be applied 
to almost any medical education initiative about almost any disease.  Psychological issues 
and theories, which once dominated discussions of addiction, are almost completely 
absent except in discussions of possible interactions between bup and other psychotropic 
medications.   
The disease model of addiction is applied to almost every aspect of bup treatment.  
For example, the clinical protocol cited in the ASAM training mandates that patients 
undergo urine drug testing to screen for illicit drug use, a provision seen as punitive in 
most contexts.  In response to the rhetorical question, ―Why conduct urine drug testing?‖ 
the training materials offer the following reasons:  1) addiction is a chronic disorder; 
relapse can occur; 2) patients may deny or minimize drug use; and 3) drug testing is part 
of patient evaluation and treatment planning.  Not only is medical terminology and 
rationale used (e.g., ―chronic disorder,‖ ―patient evaluation,‖ ―treatment planning‖), the 
trainers explicitly distance themselves from law enforcement models, asserting that 
―[drug testing] is not to punish the patients‖ [emphasis in original] (Strain, Liberto et al. 
2004: 10).  Throughout the training, ASAM builds around bup all of the trappings of 
traditional medical treatment – clinical guidelines, dosing protocols, assessment forms, 
diagnostic criteria.   
However, for all its emphasis on the clinical issues of prescribing buprenorphine, 
the ASAM training spends a great deal of time on how to protect doctors from 
accusations of drug dealing and to convince outsiders (most likely the DEA) that they are 
legitimately treating a ―disease,‖ not supporting a drug habit.  For example, there is great 
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detail advising doctors about appropriate record keeping, particularly on how to 
document opioid dependence.  This emphasis stems from DATA 2000, which narrowly 
restricts bup prescription for the treatment of documented opioid dependence only.  The 
Federation of State Medical Boards, which issued model policies for bup treatment, tries 
to reassure doctors, while also attempting to guard against the perception that doctors are 
drug dealers: 
Qualified physicians need not fear disciplinary action from the Board or 
other state agency for appropriate prescribing, dispensing or 
administration of opioid drugs…for a legitimate medical purpose in the 
usual course of opioid addiction treatment.  The Board will consider 
appropriate use…to be for a legitimate medical purpose if based on 
accepted scientific knowledge and in compliance with state and federal 
law (Federation of State Medical Boards 2002: 2).   
 
Of importance here is language – like, ―legitimate medical purpose‖ and ―appropriate 
prescribing‖ -- that simultaneously tries to reassure doctors and tightly limit the 
prescription of bup.   
Patients, as well as doctors, are caught up in lingering crime and punishment 
notions of addiction.  For instance, the ASAM bup training provides a sample form that 
they suggest doctors require patients to sign before a witness.  Through this form, a 
contract of ―patient responsibilities,‖ patients agree (among other things) to store bup 
properly (to keep others from ―ingesting it‖), take it only as prescribed, comply with pill 
counts and urine tests, and notify the office immediately if pills are lost or stolen (Strain, 
Liberto et al. 2004).  It is difficult to conceive of doctors requiring a signed, witnessed 
agreement like this for many other medical treatments.  Those being treated with bup are 
being simultaneously constructed as patients with a legitimate medical condition and as 
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drug addicts with a propensity for lying, manipulation, and theft.  They are ―patients‖ but 
patients that require special scrutiny and treatment. 
The ASAM training contains additional evidence suggesting opioid addiction 
might be different from other chronic diseases after all.  On the one hand, the training 
cautions clinicians prescribing bup that other staff are likely to have concerns and 
preconceptions about bup patients as addicts, and that, unless these are addressed prior to 
beginning treatment, patients may feel unwelcome.  On the other hand, the training 
devotes an entire section to ―managing problem behavior,‖ including establishing rules 
and ―consequences for infractions.‖  As if implicitly acknowledging the effect of these 
special rules and provisions, the training materials warn: ―be prepared for defensiveness‖ 
(Strain, Liberto et al. 2004: 21).  While preconceptions, problem behavior and 
defensiveness are conceivable issues in treating other illnesses, that they the subject of a 
required training, sets bup apart from other medical treatments and casts addiction as both 
a behavioral and medical problem.    
An article in Wired explained that rather than encouraging doctors to prescribe 
bup, the DATA 2000 required training may actually deter them: 
Meanwhile, even private-practice physicians open-minded enough to seek 
bupe training find that it reinforces old stereotypes. ‗The courses are a 
disaster,‘ says Columbia's Herbert Kleber, who has a contract from the 
federal Center for Substance Abuse Treatment to redesign the curriculum. 
The classes rely on scenarios instead of letting doctors interact with live 
patients - who tend not to be the monsters that many doctors imagine, 
Kleber says. The message that comes across? ‗Addicts are a difficult 
group to deal with. They'll rob your office blind and steal your nurse's 
purse,‘ Kleber says, frowning. ‗You're a general practitioner: Tell me if 
you're going to prescribe.‘ (McGray 2005). 
 
Physicians are routinely asked to use new medications in their treatment of patients but 
are seldom required to receive training (much less 8 hours of training) before prescribing 
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it.  Other research based on interviews with physicians prescribing bup confirms that they 
view the required training as setting bup apart from other medications that they routinely 
use (Finkelstein, Netherland, et al. 2011).  Bup may be a medical treatment delivered in a 
medical setting supported by addiction medicine rhetoric and training, but it cannot seem 
to escape the competing constructions of and stigma associated with criminal 
understandings of drug use and its treatment. 
Conclusion 
DATA 2000 was one of the most profound changes in U.S. drug policy in decades 
and represented a major departure from the 80-year policy of restricting the role of 
physicians in addiction treatment.  Bup, even though it had not been approved for use in 
addiction treatment at the time DATA 2000 was passed into law, was central to 
arguments for its passage. Advocates for bup constructed the medication in particular 
ways and simultaneously constructed an idealized user of bup to ensure the law‘s 
passage.  The addict constructed by those lobbying for regulatory change is a young, 
suburban heroin user who has just recently starting taking drugs.  This user (presumably 
white) is contrasted with the urban (presumably Black), hard core user who is beyond 
redemption and consigned to the methadone system, which is portrayed as both highly 
stigmatizing and largely a failure.  This idealized bup ―patient‖ is a more sympathetic 
figure for legislators than the hardcore urban user.  Moreover, s/he does not invoke the 
troubling specter of prescription drug abuse.  By excluding any mention of the huge 
numbers of people addicted to prescription opioids who could presumably benefit from 
bup, advocates avoid raising the difficult problem of medicine‘s role in fostering 
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addiction. Raising the issue of prescription opioid addiction brings to the fore questions 
about bup‘s status as a legitimate medication, since bup is in fact a potentially addictive 
opioid itself. Rather, in these debates, doctors armed with a legitimate medical treatment 
are the solution to (not the cause of) the problem of addiction. 
Despite efforts to construct bup as a legitimate medical treatment, bup patients as 
sympathetic and treatable young addicts, doctors as the appropriate administers of 
addiction treatment, and addiction as a disease, the debates leading up to and surrounding 
DATA 2000 reveal deep ambivalence, tensions, and contradictions about addiction and 
medical treatments for it.  Bup is sometimes constructed as a revolutionary new 
medication completely different from methadone with almost no potential to be diverted 
or misused and at other times as completely analogous to methadone except for its greater 
safety profile. Arguments about bup, its abuse potential, and whether or not it can really 
be distinguished from methadone and heroin are muddy, shifting and sometimes tortured.  
Jasanoff (1987) argues that: ―In areas of high uncertainty, political interests frequently 
shape the presentation of scientific facts‖ (195).  That seems to be the case here where the 
pharmacology of bup is strategically deployed (and changes) depending on who is 
framing it and for what ends.  Nowhere in the record of its regulation is the ambiguity 
over bup's status as medicine or a drug fully resolved. 
The debates over the regulation of bup reveal both enduring incongruities inherent 
in U.S. drug policy and ongoing struggles to ―own‖ the problem of addiction. The 
government stakeholders demonstrate the bifurcated nature of U.S. drug policy.  NIH and 
SAMHSA are clear proponents for a more medicalized approach to addiction and use bup 
to lobby for the passage of DATA 2000.  The FDA and the DEA, although they 
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eventually support DATA 2000, focus on the potential for bup to become yet another 
street drug that will required a criminal justice response.  The addiction medicine 
community, which should presumably have the clearest stance on bup as a legitimate 
medical treatment for a ―real‖ medical condition, seems plagued by uncertainty and fear 
that physicians will once again be seen as causing, rather than curing, addiction. 
Addiction medical professionals and their government colleagues in the NIH and 
SAMHSA achieved a huge victory in legalizing the medical prescription of bup, but their 
constructions of bup are not uniform or internally consistent nor are they alone in 
constructing meaning about this medication. 
In recent years, scholars have argued that the main drivers of medicalization are 
shifting (Conrad 2005).  They are no longer medicine and professional organizations but 
industry.  In the next chapter, I explore the role of industry by taking a close look at the 
role of Reckitt Benckiser, the manufacturer of bup, in the development of bup and their 
efforts to bring it to a wider market by transforming US drug policy.  I will also look at 




Selling Buprenorphine:  




The passage of DATA 2000 and the introduction of buprenorphine as the first 
treatment for opioid addiction in 40 years could not have been possible without the 
involvement of Reckitt Benckiser (RB), the manufacturer of bup.  Reckitt Benckiser's 
ability to shape the social construction of bup and opioid dependence is influenced by a 
complex web of relationships that in many ways distinguish bup from other medications 
and Reckitt Benckiser from other pharmaceutical companies.  RB played an active role in 
lobbying Congress and were ultimately successful in becoming the first company to 
market a pharmaceutical treatment for opioid dependence that could be prescribed by a 
physician in the privacy of a doctor‘s office. Until bup‘s orphan drug status expired in 
late 2009, RB remained the only company selling bup for addiction treatment in the U.S.   
Increasingly, scholars have recognized the important role of corporate interests in 
medicalization and the social construction of disease (Conrad 2005; Healy 2004).  In this 
chapter, I explore the role of RB in the social construction of bup paying particular 
attention to the ways in which addiction treatment might differ from other 
―pharmaceutical logics‖ (Lakoff 2005).  I will also draw on literature suggesting that the 
cultural histories of medications themselves shape how we understand disease. While 
Reckitt Benckiser (RB) played an undeniably important role in the development of bup 
and legislative changes needed to bring it to market, this is not a typical story of a 
pharmaceutical company ―selling sickness‖ (Moynihan et al. 2002).  Reckitt Benckiser is 
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far from a standard pharmaceutical company, and, its interests in bup were completely 
intertwined with those NIDA, who worked closely with the RB to bring bup to market.  
In fact, it seems unlikely, that without NIDA‘s intervention, bup would have ever been 
developed and sold as an addiction treatment medication. 
Pharmaceuticals have distinctive social histories (Greene 2007), and the social 
history of bup -- how it was developed, formulated, marketed and sold -- provides a lens 
through which ―we can observe the social tectonics underlying contemporary politics of 
health and normality‖ (Greene 2007: 5).  Medications and the marketing that surrounds 
them affect how we understand disease and even how disease is experienced by those 
being treated (Greene 2007).  Understanding the social history of bup and how it is being 
constructed through marketing materials helps uncover another underlying logic that is 
being used to shape addiction and addiction treatment. Moore (2004: 419) has argued that 
illicit substances ―play an active and generative role within the drug/crime nexus in 
determining both the nature of the nexus and also legal and therapeutic responses.‖  That 
is, the way drugs are categorized and the cultural histories that surround them influence 
how we respond to their use.  I would extend this to medications, like bup, being used to 
treat addiction.  As consumer capitalism in general and pharmaceutical responses to 
social problems specifically continue to dominate contemporary society, the business of 
bup has the potential to reshape bodily experiences, cultural understandings, and policy 
responses to addiction. In addition, because addiction is by definition a condition of 
excessive consumption (Aronowitz 2008), addiction treatment medications provide a 
particularly interesting window into the marketing and politics of pharmaceutical 
consumption. 
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My analysis of how bup was developed and is being formulated and marketed 
relies on a review of documents produced by RB, including their Annual Reports, 
websites, and educational materials produced for both patients and physicians.  After 
providing some context about the rise of the pharmaceutical industry and some 
background on Reckitt Benckiser, I offer a brief history of the development of bup, 
followed by an analysis of the way in which RB frames addiction as a medical disorder, 
how it is also framed as a behavioral problem, and how RB works to distinguish bup 
from the illicit substances it is meant to replace.  As the discussion below demonstrates, 
RB‘s construction of bup is distinct from those described in the previous chapter and is 
meant to maximize the sales of bup while differentiating it from other prescribed opioids, 
particularly those used to treat pain. 
Rise of Pharmaceutical Solutions 
In 2009, Americans between the ages of 19-64 filled an average of 11.3 
prescriptions per year (Kaiser State Health Facts 2009).  Total sales equaled more than 
$217 billion.  The U.S. has become a pharmaceutical culture, and increasingly 
pharmaceuticals are seen as the solution to ever-expanding array of personal and social 
problems.  The rise of neuroscience (discussed at length in Chapter 5) means that 
behavior that deviates from the norm is more and more likely to be understood in 
biological terms as some sort of dysfunction of the brain.  As Diller notes, treatment with 
medication inevitably follows: ―if the problem is neurologically based, it should be 
treated with a drug‖ (1998: 110).  Pharmaceutical companies have been persuasive in 
convincing Americans that they have biochemical solutions to a wide array of problems 
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and, in the case of ―mental illnesses,‖ they have been tremendously successful in moving 
treatment from behavioral therapy to medications.  For example, conditions like 
depression, which were previously treated by specialists in behavioral therapy (e.g., 
psychologists and social workers), can now be treated by any physician with a 
prescription pad.  Not coincidentally, this shift is concurrent with the rise in managed 
care with its emphasis on brief treatment, outpatient care, and cost containment.  
The rise of a pharmaceutical culture has not gone unnoticed by social scientists. 
Abraham (2010: 106) refers this to transformation as the ―pharmaceuticalization‖ of 
society, which is driven largely by the promotion and marketing of pharmaceutical 
solutions by drug companies.  This transformation was accelerated by the FDA 
Modernization Act in 1997, which allowed pharmaceutical companies to advertise 
directly to consumers.  In ―Shifting Engines of Medicalization‖ (2005), Conrad argues 
that, as healthcare becomes more commodified and subject to market forces, it becomes 
more like other products and services.  Individuals as consumers play an important role in 
the scope and demand for medical treatments to human problems, but the pharmaceutical 
industry is seen as a central driver of medicalization (Conrad 2005).  Commercial and 
corporate stakeholders play a major role in how technologies are framed, and drug 
companies in particular are having an increasing impact on defining the boundaries 
between the normal and pathological. 
The development and manufacturing of new ―diseases‖ has gone hand in hand 
with the rise of pharmaceuticals.  Several scholars have demonstrated the essential role of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the medicalization of conditions to create new markets 
(see for example, Busfield 2006; Healy 2004; Lewis 2003; Moynihan et al. 2002).  
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Medicalization is increasingly entangled with corporate interests.  In fact, Moynihan et al. 
argue that: ―The social construction of illness is being replaced by the corporate 
construction of disease‖ (2002: 886).   Behaviors or moods, like shyness, are transformed 
into ―disorders‖ like social phobia and treated pharmaceutically with medications like 
Paxil. While Reckitt Benckiser cannot be credited with corporate construction of 
addiction (which has been viewed as a disease for decades), they frame opioid 
dependence and its treatment in specific ways that build a market for bup while carefully 
negotiating the concerns of government regulators and navigating between competing 
notions of addiction as a disease and a moral failing. 
Lakoff (2005) argues that the pharmaceutical paradigm implicates a wide array of 
forces and actors: 
There is an internal and external logic to it.  The internal part involves 
drawing a connection between illness phenomenology, neurobiology, and 
pharmaceutical indications.  But the external elements are what give it 
strength: globalization, money, publications, graduate training… (64). 
 
In the case of bup, the important external factors center around the relationships and 
money that flowed between NIDA, the research world, and RB.  Some have argued that 
one reason for the pharmaceutical industry‘s success is the tremendous power the 
industry wields over the production of scientific knowledge and the government‘s 
support and subsidy of the industry (Parrish 2003).  Busfield (2006), for instance, 
explores how the economic and political power of the pharmaceutical industry has led to 
their almost complete control over the production of pharmaceutical data and 
pharmaceutical ―facts.‖  Often pharmaceutical manufacturers run the clinical trails that 
produce the data that the government uses to determine a drug‘s safety and efficacy. 
According to Busfield (2006), this control over knowledge about medications, their 
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efficacy, and their safety is directly linked to the culture of pill-taking that permeates 
contemporary society.   Moreover, the relationships between researchers, government, 
and industry are often quite close and overlapping leading to questions about the true 
―objectivity‖ of decisions regarding the approval and regulation of medications.  The 
development of bup epitomizes these complex relationships and also complicates the 
narrative of corporate interests as driving the medicalization of disease. 
Pharmaceuticalization and Anti-addiction Medications 
In contrast to theories about corporate interests and profit driving medicalization 
and pharmaceuticalization, a landmark 1995 Institute of Medicine Report concluded: ―the 
disincentives for the pharmaceutical industry in the development of anti-addiction 
medications are formidable‖ (Fulco et al. 1995: 187).  According to Alan Leshner, former 
Director of NIDA, ―There are virtually no market incentives for pharmaceutical 
companies to develop medications for drug addiction‖ (Leshner 1999).  Indeed, NIDA‘s 
Medications Development Program, founded in 1990 has received substantial 
government funding precisely to overcome the reluctance of industry to develop 
addiction medications on its own.  For example, NIDA received a $500 million infusion 
of cash in 1996 for new medication development.  Bup received significant assistance 
from this program and probably would never have been brought to market without the 
substantial support and involvement of NIDA.  The development of bup is best 
understood by placing it within a broader context of the market, regulatory and cultural 
forces that both foster and impede the development of opioid addiction medications. 
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Market Forces 
There are no precedents for a highly profitable addiction medication.  
Pharmaceutical companies traditionally base their business models of investments in 
medications with large sales potential (Mark et al. 2009).  And while some kinds of 
addiction appear to be quite prevalent, there is no history of an addiction medication 
becoming a blockbuster (Mark et al. 2009).  Estimating the potential market for bup is 
difficult and clearly depends on how one defines opioid dependence as well as the 
recommended course of treatment.  One of the primary confounders in estimating the 
market for bup has to do with the recent increase in prescription drug abuse. With the 
possible exception of alcohol, our cultural understandings of and our policy responses to 
addiction have centered on illicit drugs, like heroin and cocaine.  Largely absent from our 
conversations about drug policy is attention to prescription drug abuse, which is far more 
prevalent than any other kind of substance misuse except alcohol and marijuana.  
Moreover, the medical community, especially those working for the medicalization of 
addiction treatment, have been reluctant to address this problem probably because the 
vast majority of ―abused‖ prescription drugs come from doctors (SAMHSA 2010). 
Epidemiological studies indicate that 1.7% of people aged 19–30 have tried 
heroin and 18.7% have used other opioids (prescription) in their lifetime (Veilleux et al. 
2010).  The total numbers of those dependent on heroin are actually quite small from the 
perspective of a pharmaceutical manufacturer looking for a market --  just over 200,000.  
From a marketing standpoint, non-medical use of prescription medications is a more 
attractive market than heroin use (see Figure 2).  As Figure 3 suggests, opioid-based pain 
relievers are the most widely misused of all prescription medications --  in 2007, an 
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estimated 5.2 million reported using prescription pain relievers nonmedically (SAMHSA 
2009). 
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Figure 3: Rate of Past Month Non-medical Use of Prescription Drugs 
 
Source: (SAMHSA 2010) 
These high rates of prescription drug abuse are not surprising when one considers that 
between 1991 and 2009, prescriptions for opioid analgesics increased from about 45 
million to nearly 180 million, a 4-fold increase (NIDA 2010).  As Figure 4 indicates, 
prescriptions for pain relievers have sky-rocketed along with deaths caused by 
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Figure 4: Sale of Opioids and Rates of Opioid-involved Overdose Deaths 
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According to SAMHSA, in 2004 approximately 1.4 million people were 
dependent on or abused prescription pain medications.  Unfortunately, SAMHSA does 
not separate out dependence from abuse (SAMHSA 2009). According to the CSAT 
National Advisory Committee considering the regulation of bup:  ―eligible patients 
should include vulnerable people who are using heroin often despite experiencing 
adverse effects on their lives, even is they are not physically dependent‖ (1999:18).   If 
the market for bup extends to both prescription opioids and heroin and to those who are 
―dependent‖ and ―abuse‖ these substances, the number of potential customers ris quite 
large. 
The potential market for bup is also affected by the course of treatment -- how 
long people should be prescribed bup.  The length of treatment is affected by two factors 
– the physical dependence created by the medication itself and the social construction of 
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opioid dependence as a chronic, relapsing disease.  There is little debate over the fact that 
bup, like most opioids, is physically addicting and therefore will be difficult for people to 
stop taking.  Some scholars suggest that people will substitute affordable treatment for 
drug use if it is accessible (Charles 2003).  That is, bup can be seen as essentially a 
substitution for heroin or other prescription opioids, but one that is legal, more 
economical, and easier to obtain from the user‘s perspective.  From a macro-economic 
standpoint, shifting people‘s dependence to bup moves the profit from the sale of the 
addictive substance to the pharmaceutical manufacturer (and the healthcare system) away 
from the illicit drug trade.  This is not to deny that personal and societal benefits may 
result from this shift, but from the standpoint of who profits --  it is the healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industry.  Moreover, to the extent that the addiction being treated is 
caused by prescribed narcotic medications, the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry is 
profiting on both ends – from the original prescription of the addictive opioids (i.e., pain 
medications) and from the prescription of the addiction treatment (i.e., buprenorphine).  
Bup ―treats‖ the harm caused by iatrogenic medicine while the pharmaceutical industry 
profits.  
Another potential source of profit stems from the social construction of bup as a 
chronic, relapsing disease.  The chronic, relapsing disease model has become ascendant 
in recent years (Dunbar, Kushner and Vrecko 2010).  This particular construction of 
addiction means that individuals being prescribed bup will be taking it ―for long periods 
of time, or perhaps even indefinitely in some cases‖ (National Advisory Committee‘s 
Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999).  Like insulin for diabetics, bup will be needed, if 
not forever, then for months or years.  In addition, acceptance of relapse as part of the 
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―disease‖ means that, rather than being seen as a failure of the medication, relapse 
presents another opportunity to re-engage the patient/customer in a new course of 
treatment.  The chronic, relapsing disease frame works to the benefit of the manufacturer 
by developing a customer base that will be advised by professionals to take their 
medication indefinitely and, if they should relapse and stop taking the medication, they 
will be encouraged to resume taking it as soon as possible.   
Despite the potential market for bup, realizing this market faces a number of 
barriers.  Addiction medications are competing with a very well established behavioral 
drug treatment industry as well as criminal justice responses to addiction.  Moreover, 
treatment for addiction is often not covered or has limited coverage by insurers 
(Finkelstein et al. 2011).  Both the delivery and payment of addiction treatment has 
historically been separate from medical care, which poses a number of financing barriers 
(Finkelstein et al. 2011).  Bup treatment, being one of the first and only medications for 
addiction treatment delivered in medical care settings poses unique financing challenges.  
For instance, it is often not clear which payer is responsible for covering the cost of 
medication and which, if any, is responsible for the cost of the visit itself, particularly if it 
involves counseling.  And because bup is considered novel (as one of the only addiction 
medications that can be prescribed in a physician‘s office), many insurers, hospitals, and 
pharmacists do not offer it at all (Finkelstein et al. 2011).  
Regulatory 
The regulatory barriers to developing an addiction medication market are clear --  
if such medications can only be dispensed through the highly regulated and intensely 
stigmatized methadone clinic system, they will reach relatively few people.  In 2000, Joe 
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Biden, then a Senator, lamented the ways in which the regulation of addiction treatment 
stifled the pharmaceutical industry‘s involvement: 
The difficulty of distributing treatment medications to addicts not only 
hurts those who are not getting the treatment they need, but also stifles 
private research.  I have often bemoaned the fact that private industry has 
not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies.  As we increase access to 
these drugs, we increase incentives for private investment in this valuable 
research (Congressional Record 2000: S9115). 
 
Here, Biden recognizes that the longstanding prohibition on physicians prescribing 
medications to treat addiction creates a disincentive to industry to invest in the research 
and development needed to bring new medications to market.  Government regulation of 
addiction treatment --  which is, in fact, quite different from that governing any other 
―disease‖ -- suppresses the profit motive.  If addiction is to become like other diseases, he 
argues, then regulations must change so that market forces can drive medication 
development.   
RB clearly understood that trying to market bup through the existing methadone 
clinic system was unlikely to be profitable: 
…from a corporate perspective it seemed unlikely that a drug confined to 
a limited number of clinics that were already comfortable using generic 
methadone would be used enough to justify the investment involved in 
taking buprenorphine through the regulatory process…  [T]o recover any 
significant portion of corporate expenditures… buprenorphine would 
need to reach the mainstream practice of medicine…[and] a period of 
market exclusivity would be needed to protect the product  (Jaffe & 
O‘Keefe 2003: S7-8). [emphasis added] 
 
RB was unwilling to invest in bup without some prospect that it could be marketed 
outside of the methadone clinic system to the medical mainstream even though they 
recognized that this required a significant legislative change.  Moreover, they required a 
period of exclusivity to insure that they could recoup some of their investment without 
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competition from a generic brand.  Reckitt Benckiser succeeded in achieving both of 
these aims.  Through the passage of DATA 2000, they created an entirely new 
distribution system (or ―expanded access to treatment‖ in the parlance of policymakers) 
and a huge potential market for their product. They also succeeded in insuring a period of 
exclusivity by getting bup protected by the orphan drug law.  Periods of market 
exclusivity are routinely granted to incentivize the development of new medications, so it 
is perhaps not surprising that RB obtained a 7-year orphan drug status designation from 
2002 to 2009.  
Stigma 
In addition to regulatory disincentives, the stigma surrounding addiction and its 
treatment for both ―patients‖ and physicians has been cited as impeding the development 
of anti-addiction medications (Congressional Record 2000: S9115; Fulco et al. 1995).  
The stigma surrounding drug addiction as well as its ambivalent status as a disease may 
also be the reason why there are few, if any, established patient advocacy groups calling 
for the expansion of medication treatments for addiction.
8
  And despite the high 
prevalence of people thought to have opioid dependence, stigma is widely perceived as 
keeping them from seeking treatment (Cunningham et al. 1993).   
Perhaps even more daunting for industry than patient stigma is the stigma 
surrounding physicians who treat addiction (see previous Chapter).  The restriction on 
physicians prescribing medication to treat addiction, which dates back to the court 
                                                 
8
 While bup is discussed on some blogs about addiction, I am aware of only one group dedicated to 
advocacy around bup (National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine Treatment, www.nabbt.org).  
However, this group is founded and run by medical professionals (the founder is a nurse at Yale Medical 
School who was deeply involved in some of the early clinical trails of buprenorphine) and funded in part by 
pharmaceutical companies, including RB.  Their primary mission is to link patients with physicians who 
prescribe bup, and there is no evidence of active patient involvement. 
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decisions following the Harrison Act, stemmed directly from the perception that much of 
the blame for addiction fell upon the physicians and pharmacists who manufactured and 
sold addictive medications (e.g., tonics containing opiates or cocaine) (Weinberg & 
Turner 2005).  Moreover, many of the early medical cures for addiction soon became 
seen as addictive agents themselves. This is especially true with opiate dependence, 
where synthetic (and legal) opiates have long been touted by medical experts as the 
solution to addiction.  This historical cycle of prescribed narcotic medications becoming 
the cause of addiction itself has contributed to the stigma surrounding addiction medicine 
(Weinberg & Turner 2005).  The recent rise in and attention to prescription drugs abuse 
has re-raised the specter of the drug-peddling doctor.
9
 
The ways in which pharmaceutical companies and doctors were implicated in 
causing addiction historically have continued to impact addiction treatment today.  Some 
scholars believe that medical professionals have actively abjured their role in the 
treatment of addiction and have thus discouraged the development of pharmaceutical 
treatments (Weinberg 2002).  Since doctors got out of the business of addiction treatment 
following the passage of the Harrison Act, medical education has largely excluded any 
attention to addiction or to treatment.  On average, medical students receive 12 hours of 
education on addiction (Miller et al. 2001), and only 8% of medical school curricula 
require a course on addiction (Physician Leadership on National Drug Policy 2000).  
Even if one surmounts the regulatory barriers to physicians‘ treating addiction as NIDA 
                                                 
9
 There are an increasing number if popular media accounts about doctors supplying pain medications for 
nonmedical use like this headline from the New York Daily News (11/17/2010): Staten Island's 'Dr. 
Feelgood,' 83, accused of peddling OxyContin to junkies, even had 'bouncers.'  Available at 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-11-17/local/27081466_1_bouncers-oxycontin-lanting . 
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and RB did, one must still overcome the reluctance of physicians to treat addiction and 
fears of being tainted by accusations that bup is just another addictive drug. 
NIDA’s Role in the Development of Buprenorphine 
The market, regulatory constraints, and stigma surrounding addiction have all 
been used to justify NIDA‘s extraordinary involvement in the development addiction 
medications, including bup (Congressional Record 2002; Harwood & Myers 2004).  The 
relationship between NIDA and RB in the development of bup goes back 25 years and 
exemplifies a tangled web overlapping relationships between government and industry.  
Despite the repeated references to bup as a new medication by policymakers in the 
debates leading up to the passage of DATA 2000, the first study of bup‘s efficacy as a 
treatment for narcotic addiction was published in 1978 by Don Jasinski, who worked for 
NIDA‘s research division (Jasinski, Pevnick & Griffith 1978).  Shortly after this study 
was published, NIDA approached RB (who held the patent rights to bup and were 
developing it as analgesic) and asked them to develop it as an addiction treatment 
medication (Campbell 2008).   
NIDA entered into a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with 
RB, the terms of which are described at a DATA 2000 hearing.  It is worth quoting at 
length because it details the close relationship between government and industry in the 
medication‘s development as well as the ways in which NIDA rationalizes this 
relationship: 
Buprenorphine and buprenorphine combined with naloxone are being 
developed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement  
(CRADA) between NIDA and Reckitt & Colman Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
The terms and conditions of the CRADA specified that Reckitt & Colman 
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would collaborate in the development of buprenorphine and 
buprenorphine combined with naloxone. Reckitt & Colman was required 
to produce all dosage forms, collaborate on the design of clinical trials and 
participate in joint analysis of clinical trial data, permit investigators to 
publish the results of their studies, produce New Drug Application (NDA) 
reports as required by the FDA, and file NDAs as warranted by the study 
results.      
 
NIDA's role was to provide access to a clinical trials network suitable for 
undertaking trials acceptable to the FDA under its Good Clinical Practices 
Guidelines, monitoring the trials and reporting adverse events to the FDA, 
to participate in meetings with investigators and the FDA, and to 
participate as appropriate in  publications resulting from the studies. Under 
the terms of a CRADA, no federal funds are provided to the outside 
collaborator.      
 
NIDA estimates that it provided in kind services (clinical pharmacology, 
analytical resources, and clinical trial support) related to the development 
of the buprenorphine products of approximately $26 million over a five-
year period, or about $5 million per year. It is important to note that the 
pharmaceutical industry estimates the cost of bringing a new medication to 
market at approximately $500 million.  Therefore, the expenditure of these 
funds, in pursuit of an orphan medication, and in view of the fact that two 
new dosage forms were developed and tested to potential NDA status is 
very reasonable.  It is also important to note that without the support of 
Reckitt & Colman, the cost to the Federal Government would have been 
substantially higher.      
 
NIDA was pleased to have Reckitt & Colman as the sponsor in the 
development and marketing of these products, especially given the 
reluctance of pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of 
pharmacotherapies for drug abuse and addiction. This is mainly due to the 
lack of market incentives and the societal stigma that companies perceive 
can be created if one of their products is approved for use in the treatment 
of drug abuse and addiction.  This reluctance by the private sector to 
develop anti-addiction medications is the main reason why NIDA's 
medications development program was created by Congress in 1988 
(Congressional Record 1999b: 100-103).  
 
There are several things of interest in this description.  First is the extensive collaboration 
between NIDA and RB.  Bup was formulated and provided by RB, but it was NIDA‘s 
clinical trial networks that provided the research infrastructure needed to test the 
medication and get it approved for addiction treatment through the FDA.  Also notable 
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are the financial incentives created by government for the development of bup, which 
include both the in-kind support of NIDA and the granting of orphan drug status, insuring 
that RB would get exclusive access to the market for at least 7 years.  Finally, the 
explanation of how the development of addiction medications differs from that of other 
pharmaceuticals because of the lack of ―market incentives‖ and ―societal stigma‖ is used 
to rationalize this government investment on behalf of industry.  NIDA is investing 
millions because of stigma that is generated in part by other government interventions 
and regulations surrounding addiction, like incarceration and the methadone clinic 
system.  This is just one example of the inconsistency in drug policies at the federal level, 
where NIDA is investing millions to overcome the stigma that is largely a result of the 
policies of other federal agencies, including the National Office on Drug Control Policy 
and the Drug Enforcement Agency. 
 This description of the Cooperative Agreement between NIDA and RB in the 
public record obscures the fact that the government and industry players are completely 
overlapping and intertwined (see Figure 5).  O‘Keefe, President of RB Pharmaceuticals, 
worked with Jasinski, the original researcher of bup, at NIDA, and Jerome Jaffe, the 
nation‘s first ―Drug Czar‖ under Nixon and a long time leader at the U.S. Center for 
Substance Abuse Treatment, worked for the Schering Corporation during the critical time 
when DATA 2000 was being lobbied for and negotiated.  At the time, Schering was 
licensed by RB to market bup.  In 2003 just after bup was approved by the FDA, Jaffe 
(who by then was working for University of Maryland Medical School) co-authored an 
article with Charles O‘Keefe, the President of Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals 
explaining how the company had worked with addiction medicine interests to pass 
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DATA 2000 (Jaffe & O‘Keefe 2003).  It seems likely that RB benefited from O‘Keefe‘s 
and Jaffe‘s relationships and reputation with government officials.  Most of the ―experts‖ 
consulted during the legislative process were government-funded research scientists.  Not 
surprisingly, some of these doctors are also connected to RB as consultants (see for 
example, the financial disclosures in Kleber 2008), which funds clinical trails and 
provides other benefits to addiction medicine doctors (like under-writing training, 
research and conference costs).  
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 Figure 5: Relationships Between Government Actors & Reckitt Benckiser 













 NIDA‘s involvement in the development of bup runs counter to other narratives 
about the role of the pharmaceutical industry in promoting the medicalization of social 
problems.  In the case of bup, the official story is that government investment was needed 
to overcome industry‘s reluctance to develop an anti-addiction pharmaceutical.  While 
industry‘s reluctance to develop addiction medications may well be true, by emphasizing 
the barriers that industry faces, NIDA justifies the continued investment in its 
Medications Development Program.  Moreover, the porous boundaries between NIDA 
officials, researchers, and RB staff suggest that many individuals both within and outside 
of RB stood to profit both personally and professionally from bringing bup to market, 
especially if it could be dispensed in mainstream medical settings.  From a social 
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constructionist perspective, what is important are the ways in which NIDA and RB work 
together to shape the meaning of bup.  Bup is not unusual just because the manufacturer 
worked so closely with government; it is unusual because the company that developed 
the pharmaceutical is not a pharmaceutical company at all. 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Founded in 1823 as an industrial chemical company, RB a is multi-national 
manufacturer of household and personal care products and the world‘s leading 
manufacture of fabric cleaners, disinfectants, and a host of other cleaning products.  In 
addition, it is the worldwide leader in several health and personal care categories, 
including antiseptics, depilatories, and over-the-counter sore throat medications.  RB also 
owns French‘s Mustard and Frank‘s Red Hot Sauce.  In 2009, the company overall had 
more than $12 billion in revenues and almost 25,000 employees worldwide.  The sole 
products in its pharmaceutical division are different formulations of bup.   
RB‘s transition from producing mustard to transforming U.S. drug policy came 
through its efforts to find an over-the-counter analgesic.  RB has developed a number of 
over-the-counter medications and was looking at bup as a possible pain reliever in the 
1970‘s when Jasinski of NIDA first showed its efficacy as a treatment for opioid 
dependence.  Charles O‘Keefe, who was being mentored by Jasinski and also worked at 
NIDA, had been hired as a consultant with RB on drug scheduling issues.  Following 
Jasinski‘s bup study, O‘Keefe went to work for RB, forming the pharmaceutical division 
of the company, which was focused solely on developing bup (Campbell 2008).  O‘Keefe 
became the President of Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals, and Ed Johnson, another 
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colleague of Jasinski from NIDA, became its Vice President of Clinical, Scientific, and 
Regulatory Affairs.  According to O‘Keefe, it was NIDA who pushed RB to develop bup 
for addiction treatment since RB felt that the drug had no market.  In an interview with 
addiction researcher Nancy Campbell, O‘Keefe explains: 
I was fortunately able to go to the board of Reckitt and say, guys... It‘s the 
right thing to do.  … The only future for this drug is going to be in 
addiction treatment, and you‘re not in that business. … So why don‘t you 
just work with NIDA and make it happen.  They said, no, we can‘t do that, 
we make mustard and shoe polish.  Ultimately, we just leaned on their 
sense that it was the right thing to do.  They were in fact English 
gentlemen who believed that they did have some social responsibility.  
Once you talked with them long enough, they said, go ahead and do it, but 
don‘t spend any money (Campbell 2008). 
 
Recognizing that addiction treatment was beyond the scope and comfort zone of the 
company, O‘Keefe pushed RB to join forces with NIDA, which was actively seeking 
medication treatments for addiction.  Again contrary to narratives about 
pharmaceuticalization being driven by profit, the story O‘Keefe tells is one of a company 
driven by social responsibility.  Indeed, Suboxone and Subutex (brand names for bup) 
comprise a relatively small portion of RB‘s overall business (7.5% of total net revenues).  
But they have been increasing in profitability.  According to RB‘s most recent annual 
report, the net revenue from Subutex and Suboxone grew 50% between 2008 and 2009, 
an increase ―predominantly driven by a continued increase of Suboxone in the United 
States‖ (Reckitt Benckiser 2010a: 8).  While the increase in profits is remarkable, 2009 
also marked the year that bup lost its exclusivity granted under the orphan drug act.  
According to the company: ―In the U.S., Suboxone lost the exclusivity afforded by its 
orphan drug status on 8 October 2009…  the protection of this business has a finite term 
unless replaced by new treatments or new forms‖ (Reckitt Benckiser 2010a: 4).   
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In October 2009, the FDA approved a generic form of bup manufactured by 
Roxane Laboratories, a subsidiary of Boehringer Ingelheim, one the top 20 global 
pharmaceutical companies with net sales for the company overall exceeding $15 billion.  
Sales data on the generic versus the brand name of bup are not yet available, but sales for 
bup overall reached $75 million for the 12 months ending June 2010 (Business Wire 
2010).  These figures suggest that whether or not RB was originally motivated by ―social 
responsibility,‖ bup has become fairly profitable. 
To address their loss of exclusivity, Reckitt Benckiser has recently developed two 
new forms of bup.  One is a film that dissolves when place under the tongue.  Pictures 
and references to the film formulation have replaced all earlier references to the 
sublingual tablet on RB‘s Suboxone website.  They claim that the film ―increases the 
likelihood of compliance‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a)) and addresses concerns about 
diversion and abuse (see Figure 6).  Given the new generic form of tablets available, RB 
wants its customers to use the film, which does not yet have a generic equivalent. 
Figure 6: Website Promoting Suboxone Film 
 
Source: www.suboxone.com  
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In late 2008, RB also announced a partnership with Atrigel, a company that manufactures 
―biodegradable polymers dissolved in biocompatible carriers‖ (Reckitt Benckiser 2008: 
1).  This can only be a precursor to a form of bup that is implanted subcutaneously and 
slowly released over an extended period of time (see Figure 7). According to a press 
release by Reckitt Benckiser and Atrigel: 
When the liquid product is injected into the subcutaneous space through a 
small gauge needle or placed into accessible tissue sites through a cannula, 
water in the tissue fluids causes the polymer to precipitate and trap the 
drug in a solid implant. The drug encapsulated within the implant is then 
released in a controlled manner as the polymer matrix biodegrades with 
time (Reckitt Benckiser 2008). 
 
Subcutaneous implants, like the one described above, have been used for contraceptives 
and for drugs to treat schizophrenia.  A competing pharmaceutical company recently 
published a study in JAMA (Ling et al. 2010) about the safety and efficacy of these kinds 
of bup implants. The partnership with Atrigel and the recent research surrounding new 
formulations of bup suggest that RB and other companies are looking for ways to capture 
the bup market.  Both the sublingual film and implant forms of bup address concerns not 
only about loss of market share, but also about compliance and diversion.  With the 
medication literally implanted under the skin, the company no longer has to rely on the 
―patient‖ to take the appropriate dose, and stopping the medication becomes much more 
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Figure 7: Diagram of Subcutaneous Buprenorphine Implant 
 
Source: Atrigel u.d. 
 
Reckitt Benckiser: Constructing Buprenorphine & the Buprenorphine Patient 
Following the development of bup and successful changes to regulations allowing 
it to be prescribed by physicians, RB began a marketing campaign targeting both patients 
and medical providers.  RB‘s portrayal of opioid addiction relies heavily on 
neuroscientific research and language (analyzed in the next chapter), which is not 
surprising given their close connection to NIDA, the chief proponent of the brain disease 
model of addiction.  However, RB‘s understanding of addiction is more inclusive of 
behavioral components than that seen in the neuroscientific literature.  In addition, like 
the proponents of DATA 2000 discussed above, RB appears to be constructing addiction 
in ways that particularly appeal to people unlikely to seek treatment through the 
methadone or traditional behavioral drug treatment systems.   
While debates over DATA 2000 throughout the 1990‘s drew upon a disease 
model of addiction, references to neuroscience were rare.  RB‘s marketing materials in 
contrast understand addiction in part as a brain disease.  In their key publication for the 
general public, ―Evolving Treatment Empowering Patients: A Guide for Friends and 
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Family About Opioid Dependence and Treatment with Suboxone Film,‖ they explain 
opioid dependence causes long-term changes in the structures of the brain.  In fact, they 
reprint a PET scan of the non-dependent and opioid dependent brain (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: PET Brain Scan of “Addicted” and “Non-addicted” Brains 
 
Source: Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a) 
 
This PET image constructs addiction as a physiological illness that can be located 
in the human brain.  Addiction, which for so long was diagnosed through self-report, now 
has a material and embodied presence.  RB emphasizes the medical and neuroscientific 
aspects of addiction in a number of other ways.  In explaining how Suboxone film works, 
they offer an illustration that shows how the pharmaceutical intervenes in the dopamine 
receptor system (see Figure 9).  As this figure suggests, RB explains addiction and bup 
treatment at the molecular level by showing how bup attaches to the brain‘s opiate 
receptors and blocks opiates from activating the pleasure systems in the brain.   
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Figure 9: Diagram of Neuronal Activity of Buprenorphine  
 
Source: Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a) 
 
In addition to scientific diagrams and explanations, RB constructs addiction as a 
medical disease through other cues.  For example, the way that bup is packaged and the 
consistent verbal and visual linkages to physicians emphasize the medical aspects of 
addiction and its treatment.  Throughout their literature, doctors are both referenced and 
depicted to drive home the point that addiction is a disease appropriately treated by 
physicians.  As they note in a press release about Suboxone film: ―Suboxone can… be 
dispensed for take-home use, just like any other medicine for other medical conditions‖ 
(Reckitt Benckiser 2010b).   
Despite this framing of opioid dependence as disease and bup as medicine, RB 
defines what bup treats in fairly narrow terms, noting that the medication addresses just 
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one small component of the larger phenomenon known as addiction.  On the home page 
of their website (www.suboxone.com), they note: ―Keep in mind that opioid dependence 
is so much more than a medical condition.‖  For RB, addiction also has a behavioral 
dimension, and they acknowledge the widely held belief that addiction is due to a failure 
in morality.  They advise the reader: ―try and stay non-judgmental.  Acknowledge that 
dependence is a medical condition, not a moral failing‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a): 18).   
Elsewhere, they clearly state that bup addresses only the physical symptoms of craving 
and withdrawal – and that does not a cure make.  In fact, they describe bup as a tool to 
―focus on treatment‖ by which they mean psychological counseling (Reckitt Benckiser 
u.d.(a): 6).  In contrast to the neuroscientists (discussed in the next chapter) who de-
emphasize the behavioral components of dependence, RB continually acknowledges the 
importance of behavioral change, counseling, and the support of family and friends.  
They adhere consistently to the model of treatment depicted in Figure 10.   
In this model, addiction is presented as a physiological, behavioral and social 
hybrid.  Addiction is not just a brain disease; it is a complex phenomenon that requires 
medication, counseling and social support.  Suboxone helps manage the physical 
symptoms of craving and withdrawal; counseling addresses the behavioral aspects (which 
include things like avoiding triggers, steering away from ―high risk‖ situations, and 
managing craving through exercise and music); and Here to Help offers professional and 
peer support.  Here to Help, which is run by RB, offers anyone who takes Suboxone free 
access to the following services: a ―personal care coach,‖ a special website, email 
support, online counseling, community message boards, and patient success stories.   
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Figure 10: Reckitt Benckiser Model of Addiction Treatment 
 
Source: Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a) 
 
All of these behavioral strategies are placed within a medical frame by 
emphasizing analogies to other illnesses: ―[O]pioid dependence treatment is similar to 
treatment for other chronic diseases, such as diabetes and asthma, where medication and 
behavioral changes may make a difference in the end result‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a): 
5).  And while these services receive a great deal of focus, physicians remain the primary 
source of authority.  In the disclaimer section about Here to Help, they note: ―Your 
doctor is your best source of information about your treatment‖ (Reckitt Benckiser 
u.d(b): 1).  RB carefully constructs a chronic disease that has both biological and 
behavioral components, while ensuring that medical expertise remains ascendant over 
personal experiences and lay knowledge. 
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RB‘s materials also acknowledge that hybrid notions of addiction leave open the 
possibility of a moral framework for understanding addiction as a failure of will or 
character.  In section called ―What you should know about relapse,‖ they write: 
Opioid dependence is a chronic disease, and people dependent on opioids 
may have cravings years after their last drug use.  Sometimes these 
cravings may lead to relapse.  In fact, studies show that relapse is a fairly 
common occurrence among opioid dependent patients.  It is important to 
realize your loved one who relapses is not a ―failure‖ – he or she just needs 
a little more help getting back on the right track (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a): 
14). 
 
This passage implies not only that bup may not resolve all cravings, but also that 
individuals, with the help and support of their families, can ―get back on track.‖  As noted 
above, when not seen as a failure of treatment but as a routine part of recovery, relapse 
can be an important business opportunity for RB.  But this also suggests that RB places 
some, if not all of the responsibility, for overcoming their disease with the individual.  It 
is he or she that needs get him or herself ―back on the right track.‖ 
This emphasis on the behavioral and psychological aspects on opioid dependence 
is striking.  In contrast, the website for Prozac (Lilly u.d.), a treatment for another 
―disease‖ that has also been portrayed as having both a psychological and biochemical 
element, has none of the same language and no resources comparable to Here to Help.  
Rather, it contains the medication guide and nothing else.
10
  While the economic motives 
for constructing opioid dependence as a chronic, relapsing brain disease are clear and 
were described above, it is less certain why they give so much attention to the behavioral 
and psychological components of the disease.  Many ―illnesses‖ are constructed as 
having both behavioral and physiological elements, but the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
                                                 
10
 Since I retrieved this page (www.prozac.com) in February 2011, Lilly, the manufacturer of Prozac has 
removed this page altogether. 
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has an investment in promoting the biological aspects of the disease which their 
medication is designed to treat.  One possible explanation for RB‘s emphasis on 
behavioral treatment adjuncts to bup is that they understand (and research supports) that 
those who receive counseling stay in treatment (i.e., will take bup) longer.  Another 
possibility is that they are going out of their way to help patients and physicians meet the 
DATA 2000 requirement that bup be accompanied by some kind of counseling.  For 
many mainstream physicians that do not traditionally treat addiction, finding a source of 
appropriate counseling may be a difficult (Netherland et al. 2009).  For example, the 
CSAT National Advisory Committee considering legislative changes to bring bup to the 
medical mainstream was concerned that physicians not be put into the position of 
providing uncompensated counseling services.  They ask: 
What measures can we take to assure physicians that they will be 
adequately paid for their buprenorphine patients and will not be expected to 
provide un-reimbursed psychosocial services (National Advisory Council‘s 
Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 1999: 8)? 
 
These addiction medicine professionals understand that, because of the historical 
separation between financing for behavioral health and medical services, doctors will not 
receive payment for counseling their bup patients.  RB, through its Here to Help program 
solves that problem by removing one more barrier to physicians prescribing bup by 
offering that counseling for free.  Here to Help may also be a strategy to establish 
ongoing personal relationships with their customers to build brand loyalty.  As Lakoff 
describes, this kind of ―disease management‖ builds a relationship between consumer and 
producer: 
[T]he concept of ‗disease management‘... helped to structure an ongoing 
relationship between producers of health interventions, especially 
pharmaceutical companies, and their consumers.  In a similar fashion, the 
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novel concept … of ‗personalized medicine‘ is an innovation linking 
production and consumption through the invention of a new need (2005: 
169.) 
 
Here to Help offers just this kind of ongoing relationship that both personalizes an 
individual‘s bup treatment and helps ensure that they stick to the treatment. 
While the RB website and documents show a balance between the medical and 
behavioral aspects of addiction in a way that is fairly nuanced, there are absences in their 
construction that are worth noting.  First, references to how structural or environmental 
factors might affect drug use and its treatment are missing.  Poverty, racism, exposure to 
drug markets, the meteoric rise in prescriptions for pain medications -- none of these are 
referenced in their materials.  In addition, there is repeated emphasis on the private and 
confidential nature of treatment with bup, an implicit recognition of the stigma associated 
with traditional drug treatment, but no explicit mention of the existing drug treatment 
system.  RB emphasizes psychological counseling but not therapeutic drug treatment 
communities, intensive outpatient programs, or methadone clinics.  This absence, while 
more subtle than the condemnation of traditional drug treatment seen in the debates over 
DATA 2000, helps distance bup from these highly stigmatized forms of treatment and the 
equally stigmatized people who generally end up there (i.e., ―hard core urban heroin 
users‖).   
Campbell argues that drug treatment is class-stratified in ways that medicalization 
supports: ―Medicalization [of addiction] remains the province of the insured middle and 
upper classes… addiction science has fitted seamlessly into the disciplinary regimes of 
drug control‖ (2007: 22).  RB constructs bup as a treatment for white, suburban people 
who ―accidentally‖ become addicted to pain medications.  Nowhere on RB‘s main 
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website or the Here to Help website are any images of people of color.  The featured 
video, a ―patient success story,‖ is about Jennifer, a white suburban stay-at-home mom 
who became addicted to prescription pain medications following a tonsillectomy.  All six 
of the ―patient success‖ story videos feature white individuals all of whom are addicted to 
prescription opioids – none of them mention heroin.  The ―care coaches,‖ Jess and Sandy 
are both young white women (see Figure 11) who closely resemble the addicted 
individuals featured on the website. 
 




These kinds of images combined with the distancing from traditional drug treatment 
suggest that RB is trying to get away from the stigma associated with drug use and drug 
treatment.  It is also likely that they are trying capture the market of prescription pain 
medication drug users, which as discussed above, is far bigger than the heroin user 
market.  While heroin addiction is mentioned occasionally as a problem that bup can treat 
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in RB‘s materials, the images and languages used throughout their educational 
information point to a different market – white, prescription pain medication users. 
RB frames the problem of opioid addiction largely in terms of addiction to 
prescription medication to accomplish two related aims.  First, it orients bup towards a 
larger and more lucrative market than if they were to target heroin users alone because 
prescription drug misuse far exceeds heroin use.  Secondly, it frames addiction as a 
problem of white, middle class people.  The ―non-medical use‖ of pain relievers is almost 
twice as high among whites as Blacks (SAMHSA 2010).   Rates of heroin use among 
Blacks, Latinos, and whites are almost identical (National Office of Drug Control Policy 
u.d.); however, because of the highly racialized war on drugs, stereotypes of heroin users 
tend to cast them as Black urban dwellers (see Scotti & Kronenberg 2001; Steiner & 
Argothy 2001).  By focusing on white, prescription drug users, RB avoids the stigma 
associated with heroin, heroin users, and traditional treatment for heroin (i.e., 
methadone).  In the RB literature, those who use bup are largely untouched by the world 
of heroin use and methadone treatment. 
Being untouched by this world is also important in framing the ―recovery‖ of 
people in the RB literature.  Unlike those on methadone -- which (in the language of the 
Congressional report on DATA 2000) is generally for addicts ―can no longer work 
productively‖ (Congressional Record 1999b: 13) --  the idealized bup user that RB 
constructs is one who only recently left and can return to a ―normal life‖ with the help of 
bup.  As Jennifer, a young white woman on the RB website, puts it, by taking bup she can 
―look forward to living a normal life‖ (see Figure 12).   A normal life is one unmarked by 
drug use, a history of incarceration, or by having to undergo stigmatizing treatment 
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within the traditional drug treatment system.  Jennifer and others like her can be treated in 
any medical setting just as if they had any medical disease. The ―normal condition,‖ we 
can deduce from the RB materials, involves being white, middle class and responsible.   
 




Drug vs. Medicine 
While focusing on bup as a treatment for prescription drug use may appeal to a 
lucrative market for RB and reclaim addiction treatment as the province of white middle 
class users, it creates the need for the manufacturer to clearly differentiate bup – a 
prescribed opioid—from the pain medications it replaces --  also prescribed opioids.  
Early chapters have suggested that the regulation and pharmacology of bup has been used 
strategically to distinguish it from illicit drugs (including the nonmedical use of 
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prescription pain medications).  RB, through the ways in which it packages, formulates 
and markets bup, is also working to distinguish bup from illicit drugs and to shape the 
experiences of the individuals who take it.  For bup to succeed as a medication and for 
opioid addicts to become a viable market, ―patients‖ must experience bup as a medication 
and not as a drug.  A number of scholars, beginning with Howard Becker and his classic 
work on marijuana users (1963/1997), have noted that the meanings and experiences of 
substances are socially contingent.  While the rhetoric of scientific empiricism and the 
randomized controlled trial (which specifically seeks to neutralize social and 
environmental variation) would have us believe that substances cause specific biological 
effects independent of any social or cultural influence, substantial evidence suggests that 
both the meaning of and a substance‘s ―drug effect‖ are mediated by the ―psycho-socio-
cultural matrix‖ (Cohen et al. 2001) in which the drug is ingested.  Bergschmidt (2004), 
for example, cites reports that prescribed heroin is experienced as less pleasurable than 
expected by drug users, and Gomart (2002) notes that the differences between methadone 
and heroin are largely interpretative.  This is not to say that substances have no biological 
effect on the body but rather that the effects and meanings of substances are not static 
truths revealed in their chemical structures.  They are dynamic social phenomena that can 
be controlled, shaped, and imbued with meaning.  RB, through its formulation, 
packaging, and marketing of bup, is actively working to imbue bup with specific 
meanings and to maintain the distinction between bup as a medication and as an illicit 
drug.  
Opioids are a particularly interesting case in which to look at if and how such 
efforts can succeed precisely because there has been so much historical slippage between 
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their status as medications and their status as illicit drugs.  Increasingly, with the rapid 
rise of prescription opioid abuse, they are often both at the same time. While the meaning 
of some substances (e.g., aspirin) is fairly unambiguous and seldom contested, those 
substances at the edge of the drug/medicine and addiction/treatment border must be 
defined and controlled with particular vigilance.  Gomart (2002: 112) argues that, 
compared to some medications, ―methadone is an under-determined object which can and 
must be controlled.‖  She notes that such control happens at multiple levels, including 
through rhetoric and discourse, regulation, and cultural representation. 
  Government regulators relied on bup‘s purported pharmacological properties to 
make distinctions between it, methadone and heroin.  RB uses different tools and plays a 
central role in creating a synthetic, commodified product that may share pharmacological 
properties with heroin but is packaged and branded to look like a legitimate medication 
(see Figure 13).  This figure, which shows street heroin on the right and Suboxone on the 
left, illustrates how RB uses professional branding and packaging to shape bup as a 
legitimate medication.  From the dosage listed on the front to the medication warnings 
and bar code on the back, this packaging signals to doctors and ―patients‖ that this is 
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Figure 13: Packaging of buprenorphine and street heroin 
 
Sources: www.suboxone.com  and www.talkofdetroit.com 
 
In his book, The Cult of Pharmacology, Degrandpre (2006) argues that the 
pharmaceutical industry synthetically manipulates substances to transform them from a 
natural product into artificial commodities from which they can profit.  He goes further to 
suggest that, as substances like cocaine and opium were prohibited, the pharmaceutical 
industry manufactured both their replacements and a justification for people to take them.  
The pharmaceutical industry, he argues: 
…synthesized new artificial angels that could substitute for the organic 
ones that had fallen from grace…  And finally in order to legitimize drug 
use under the guise of medical treatment, drug makers carried the day in 
redefining the stress of everyday life in terms of illness and disease…  a 
new white market of ―ethical‖ drug use erected side by side with emerging 
black markets of illegal drugs (DeGrandpre 2006: 139). 
 
RB has taken bup, a synthetic opioid, and repackaged it literally and through its 
marketing to be a legitimate medication to treat addiction – despite the history of 
addiction medications becoming the cause of addiction and even though bup itself causes 
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physical dependence.  Bup, like methadone before it, is constructed as an ethical medical 
antidote to illegal drugs, like heroin, and misused prescription drugs, like Oxycontin. 
Unlike some policymakers and regulators who argue that bup is 
pharmacologically different from other opioids (e.g., heroin, methadone, and prescription 
pain medications), RB openly acknowledges that bup is an opioid that causes physical 
dependence.  In answer to the rhetorical question in their primary patient education 
brochure ―What Are Opioids?,‖ they write:  ―Examples of opioids include some 
prescription pain killers (such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, buprenorphine, and 
methadone) and heroin‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(a):4).  They go on to say that ―Suboxone 
Film can be abused in a manner similar to other opioids legal and illicit‖ (Reckitt 
Benckiser u.d.(a):4).  Given this acknowledgment, RB is faced with the task of trying to 
distinguish bup from illicit drugs on the one hand and mitigating against its potential 
abuse and diversion on the other.  Throughout their literature, one sees this tension.  Bup 
is a legitimate medication, and bup is a potential drug of abuse. 
Having acknowledged that the chemical properties of bup are similar to heroin, 
RB must find other ways to distinguish bup.  The biggest boost to its legitimacy as a 
medicine was the passage of DATA 2000 allowing for its prescription by doctors, and 
RB draws attention to this difference whenever it can.  Keane and Hamill (2010) did an 
interesting analysis comparing how opioids are constructed in the context of pain 
treatment to how they are constructed in context of addiction.  They concluded: ―A key 
factor that separates the pain patient and the addict is the nature of their drug supply‖ 
(2010: 61).  Indeed, a primary feature of bup that distinguishes it from abused opioids is 
that its use is controlled and regulated through a series of careful relationships between 
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RB, government agencies, and physicians.  In some European countries, heroin has been 
prescribed for the treatment of opioid addiction with great success (Bell et al. 2002), 
which suggests that even a ―demon drug‖ can be made therapeutic when brought under 
the control of the state, repackaged by the pharmaceutical industry as a medication, and 
imbued with the authority of medicine.   
However, just because bup is manufactured, packaged and distributed by doctors 
does not mean that it will not slip into becoming an abused drug.  RB, with the 
encouragement of NIDA, therefore, took a another step to keep bup from becoming a 
illicit drug--  they fundamentally changed its formulation.  In the U.S., almost all sales of 
bup are a formulation that combines bup with naloxone.  Naloxone is added for the sole 
purpose of preventing diversion.  According to RB‘s materials: 
It [naloxone] is there to deter people from crushing or dissolving suboxone 
film and injecting it…  When suboxone film is used incorrectly (by 
injection) in an individual dependent on a full opioid agonist (i.e., 
oxycodone, hydrocodone, morphine, methadone, or heroin), its naloxone 
component can cause withdrawal symptoms to rapidly occur (Reckitt 
Benckiser u.d.(a): 9). 
 
RB acknowledges the illicit market for bup, which is dissolved and injected by people 
already addicted to other opioids.  To prevent the illegal use of bup, they add another 
pharmaceutical with the sole purpose of making people who inject bup while on other 
opioids experience rapid withdrawal symptoms – a kind of aversion therapy.  This 
phenomenon, known as precipitated withdrawal, causes a sudden onset of extreme 
withdrawal symptoms --  nausea, sweating, cramps, agitation.  If Suboxone is taken as 
prescribed (i.e., dissolved under the tongue), the naloxone has essentially no effect.  In 
addition to the including naloxone in the formulation of bup, the new products developed 
are also designed to insure that individuals only use bup as prescribed.  For example, the 
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new film formulation ―discourages misuse and abuse‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(b): 1). 
because it is difficult to crush and snort.  The sustained-release, surgically implanted 
forms of bup now being tested in clinical trails are also meant to take away any ability of 
individuals to ―misuse‖ or fail to take their bup. 
RB has also used packaging to deter misuse and abuse.  Suboxone is packaged in 
single dose units that each have a unique ten-digit code ―to discourage diversion‖ and 
―facilitate mediation counts‖ (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(b): 1).  In addition, RB has 
developed a comprehensive risk management program with the goal of ―minimizing risk 
of diversion and abuse‖ (Reckitt Benckiser 2010b).  This program includes: ―monitoring 
and control of drug distribution,‖ ―an active surveillance and intervention program to 
detect and deter misuse, abuse and diversion,‖ and a ―field medical advisor to monitor 
and advise practicing clinicians… on ways to minimize abuse and misuse‖ (Reckitt 
Benckiser 2010b).  All of these safeguards suggest that bup can only be maintained as a 
medicine through extraordinary efforts to keep it from becoming a drug.  In their advice 
to physicians, RB reveals more of the same concerns about guarding against diversion as 
well as a sense that those taking bup are not to be trusted.  They (Reckitt Benckiser 
2010c) created an ―Appropriate Use Checklist‖ for physicians that includes: 
 Prescribing only a limited amount of the medication at the first visit 
 Assessing and encouraging patients to take the medication as prescribed 
through the use of pill counts/dose reconciliation (i.e., have they taken more 
or less than what was prescribed) 
 Making sure the dose is appropriate (i.e., not too high).  They suggest ―the 
need for a higher dose should be carefully evaluated.‖ 
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 Assessing whether the patients is making progress towards treatment goals by 
conducting urine screens to assess the use of illicit substances. 
 
All of these checklist items are aimed at insuring that bup is taken only ―as 
prescribed.‖  Any use outside of that dictated by the doctor is seen as a sign that the 
individual, instead of treating their addiction, is feeding it with bup.  RB‘s materials show 
a preoccupation with diversion and misuse that belies just how close bup is to the illicit 
and ―abused‖ drugs it is meant to replace.  Through their packaging and formulation of 
bup, they have created a synthetic and commodified opioid and taken what steps they can 
to ―medicalize‖ it.  These include, of course, giving physicians control over its 
prescription, formulating it to discourage misuse, and working with physicians to prevent 
and monitor the diversion of bup --  single use packaging, coding packets for pill counts, 
encouraging urine screening, and tracking sales.  No doubt, many of these steps were 
taken to reassure the DEA and other government agencies that were wary of bringing bup 
to market. But beyond alleviating the concerns of government regulators, RB is also 
clearly working to construct bup as a legitimate medication by doing whatever it can to 
maximize physician‘s control over its dosage and administration.  Bup succeeds as a 
medicine only when it is ―taken as prescribed.‖  When ―patients‖ control either the 
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Conclusion 
The development of bup occurred during the rise of pharmaceuticalization in the 
U.S.  However, bup troubles the narrative of corporate disease construction in important 
ways.  The push to develop bup came largely from NIDA and the government‘s interest 
in finding a medical solution to addiction.  RB was driven partly by profit and partly 
through the persuasion of people at NIDA and people with strong ties to NIDA working 
within the company itself.  The challenge to developing and marketing bup centered on 
overcoming the historical, cultural and regulatory barriers that limited the role of 
physicians and the use of narcotics in the treatment of addiction.  This meant constructing 
bup as a legitimate medication that was different from heroin or from methadone, both 
widely perceived drivers of, rather than treatments for, addiction.  Through its marketing 
of bup, RB plays an active role in constructing bup, addiction, addiction treatment, and 
the addicted subject in ways that separate them from heroin and early treatment 
medications.  As the only manufacturer of bup until very recently, RB is particularly 
influential in shaping these discourses.   
As constructed by RB, recovery comes both through neurochemical and 
behavioral changes.  As such, this discourse is similar to that surrounding the 
medicalization of obesity, diabetes, and other ―public health problems,‖ which are seen as 
having both a physiological and behavioral component (see for example, Rogan & 
Morone 2005; Saguy & Ameling 2007).  RB relies heavily on neuroscientific 
understandings of addiction but consistently advocates for counseling and social support.  
Bup controls the physical symptoms of craving and withdrawal, but will power and 
changes to behavior are also required.  In his cogent analysis of Prozac, Lewis (2003: 57) 
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argues that a key message undergirding the pharmaceutical logic of Prozac is that ―all 
people/machines need is to take a pill and get back to the New World Order Inc. of 
hyperactive consumption/production.‖  That is, the medication alone restores the 
―patient‘s‖ ability to reenter contemporary capitalist society obviating the need for 
solutions to the deeper causes of depression that might be rooted in personal or societal 
problems.   
In contrast, RB suggests that something more than just a pill is needed for those 
who are opioid dependent.  Greene (2007) argues that we are ambivalent about drugs that 
short circuit personal responsibility, and RB materials carefully avoid such a short circuit.  
The opioid dependent customer needs a pill to be sure, but they must also take 
responsibility to deal with the psychological aspects of their addiction and to seek out 
support to overcome their ―disease.‖  ―Most people wouldn‘t try to treat diabetes or 
asthma with willpower alone,‖ RB tells us, implying that both willpower and medication 
play an important role (Reckitt Benckiser u.d.(b)).  For RB, those with opioid dependence 
are not passive subjects; rather they must actively engage to take their medication as 
prescribed and address the behavioral components of their illness.  They should act upon 
themselves both as a neurological subject (intervening at the level of their opioid receptor 
systems with a medication) and as a moral subject with responsibility for their own 
behavior and choices. 
Vrecko (2010b: 44), who has studied naltrexone, an anti-craving medication used 
to treat alcoholism, says that: 
…anti-craving medications do not simply materialize over pre-existing 
conceptions of behavioral addictions.  Instead, they help create a new one, 
insofar as they play an active part in reconfiguring or ‗mangling;‘ clinical 
and laboratory understandings of behavioral problems. 
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RB‘s discourse about bup reveals a mangled medical-behavioral hybrid.  The effect of the 
medication is defined narrowly as addressing craving and withdrawal symptoms.  That 
leaves a whole world of responsibility in the hands of the individual who must still, it 
seems, overcome his or her disease of the will by exerting willpower, seeking counseling, 
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Chapter 5: 
This is Your Brain on Buprenorphine: Neuroscience 
& the Chronic, Relapsing Brain Disease Model of 
Addiction 
 
It‘s all hypothesis at this point yet because we haven‘t sliced open 
anyone‘s brain yet, but it seems that normalizing the GABA 
receptor takes away the craving and anxiety that one would 
typically experience in the absence of the drug.  And it doesn‘t 
appear to be happening because of will power, love, God, 
discipline, family support, or anything else.  It seems to be 
happening because the protocol resets a faulty mechanism in the 
brain. 
Sanjay Sabani of Hythiam Corporation talking about a new 
psychopharmaceutical treatment for addiction (Denizet-Lewis, 
New York Times, 2006) 
 
Introduction 
In the United States, the National Institutes on Drug of Abuse (NIDA) has spent 
millions of dollars promoting one simple message: ―addiction is a brain disease.‖  As the 
opening quote suggests, neuroscience is changing the ways in which we understand, 
respond to, and treat drug addiction.  It also implies new ways in which addiction and 
addiction treatments, like bup, are being embodied within the brain and materialized at 
the level of biochemical processes.  Between 1980 and 1989, eighteen studies of the 
neuroscience of addiction were published in the medical and scientific literature; between 
1990 and 1999, the number rose to 129.  Between 2000 and 2009, 1,117 studies were 
published.  Neuroscience has expanded to encompass a wide array of medical and social 
phenomena (Vrecko 2010c), and addiction is no exception.  Neuroscience not only 
explains ―pathology‖ – increasingly, it is a prism through which we understand all of 
human behavior, including drug use.  Rose (2003) has referred to this proliferation of 
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neuroscientific understanding and authority as the birth of the neurochemical self; the 
―neuromolecular gaze‖ has become an ethos that provides a common vision of life (Abi-
Rached & Rose 2010).  Neuroscience is not just important within scientific communities; 
it has increasing cultural resonance, and some research suggests that ―folk neurology‖ – 
lay understandings of neuroscience -- is the frame through which people now 
comprehend themselves and their behavior, including addiction (Vrecko 2006).  
Neuroscience has become one of the dominant frames for understanding addiction, and, 
as I discuss below, many believe neuroscience is the key to the medicalization of 
addiction.   
The earliest studies of bup predate the rise of addiction neuroscience and, 
neuroscientific arguments about bup were largely absent from the debates surrounding it 
in the 1990‘s (see Chapter 3).  Nonetheless, in recent years, neuroscientific arguments 
have been adopted by proponents of bup and used to explain both how and why it works.  
In her work on the history of addiction research, Campbell argues that ―neuroscience 
hijacked the field of substance abuse research… and gave substance abuse research the 
stamp of legitimacy‖ (2007: 200-1).  Increasingly, bup is explained through the discourse 
of addiction neuroscience.  As one of the only medications available to treat to addiction, 
bup also plays an important role in shaping addiction neuroscience; it is among very few 
treatments that can be understood as a neurochemical solution to the brain disorder of 
addiction.  
While disease models of addiction have been around for decades, previous 
attempts to explain addiction as a biological phenomenon have only been partly 
successful (Dunbar, Kushner and Vrecko 2010; May 2001; Tiger 2011; Valverde 1998).  
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Medical constructions of addiction have consistently vied with paradigms that understand 
addiction as a criminal problem rooted in a failure of morality or character.  Moreover, 
historically, medical models of addiction have been troubled because the diagnosis of 
addiction relies on the self-report of a failure of will, and treatment has generally 
consisted of the reassertion of will power to ―kick the habit‖ - rather than on biomedical 
interventions per se (Valverde 1997).  According to addiction researchers, neuroscience 
marks a new era because of its potential to locate the causes of addiction within the brain 
and to treat addiction through neurochemical fixes.  From the perspective of addiction 
researchers, neuro-imaging technology holds the promise of making visible that which 
has heretofore relied largely on ―patient‖ self-report: the diagnosis of addiction and the 
efficacy of treatment.  
Like other paradigms before it (e.g., genetics), neuroscience is also giving shape 
to new kinds of subjects and providing new contours to the ways in which individuals are 
governed (Campbell 2010; Fullagar 2009; Rose 2010; Vrecko 2010a; Vrecko 2010d).  
The proliferation of neuroscientific research and rhetoric to explain addiction surfaces 
core questions inherent in addiction discourse and in contemporary society more broadly, 
such as the role of pleasure, rationality, and volition in the formation and governance of 
the self.  Neuroscience also has the potential to shape subjectivity, offering ―new means 
for individuals to understand themselves and manage their thoughts and behaviors‖ 
(Vrecko 2006: 301).  In the past decade, neuroscience has demanded more resources, 
wielded more authority, and has become central to how we understand both ―normal‖ and 
―pathological‖ human conduct (Rose 2010; Vidal 2009).  
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In this chapter, I examine the ways in which addiction neuroscience helps 
constitute new formations of knowledge and power that influence subjectivity and 
governance.  As one of the only medical interventions for the treatment of addiction, bup 
both shapes and shaped by this neuroscientific discourse.  I offer a detailed analysis of 
current neuroscientific discourse about addiction both to understand how bup is 
constructed within this literature and to lay the groundwork for my examination of the 
influence of neuroscientific discourse on the understandings of those being treated under 
this paradigm with bup (see Chapters 6-8).  If the ―neuromolecular gaze‖ is becoming the 
prism through which we understand life, then addiction neuroscience is becoming the 
prism through which we understand addiction. 
Existing analyses of addiction neuroscience have focused primarily on issues of 
craving and pleasure (Keane & Hamill 2010).  This chapter expands the work of others 
by including an exploration of rationality, plasticity, and volition.  My analysis of these 
themes helps provide context for my examination of how individuals taking bup 
understand addiction, its effect on their rationality, and their ability to exercise agency 
(see Chapters 6-8).  To explore these issues, I first offer some background on the rise of 
addiction neuroscience in the U.S. and briefly introduce neuroscientific treatments for 
addiction with a particular focus on how bup is being cast in neuroscientific terms.  Just 
as addiction has historically been conceived in multiple and flexible ways, the 
neuroscience of addiction is not a uniform paradigm but rather a set of assemblages that 
are enacted differently by different actors and in different settings (Mol 2002).  However, 
certain premises from the neuroscientific literature on addiction are particularly 
dominant.  I examine how four major themes in addiction neuroscience are being 
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addressed by the scientific community (and by individuals being treated with bup in 
subsequent chapters).  Those four themes are:  first, pleasure and the limbic system; 
second, rationality and the role of the prefrontal cortex; third, the influence of 
environmental factors and theories of plasticity; and last, the place of volition in 
neuroscientific theories of addiction.  I conclude with an analysis of the strengths and 
limits of the neuroscientific paradigm. 
This chapter is based on an examination of the research and scientific literature 
located through searches of PubMed on the terms ―addiction‖ and ―neuroscience‖ and 
―buprenorphine‖ and ―neuroscience.‖  I focused on the last decade of research and 
selected review articles and those articles most cited by other researchers. I also reviewed 
the National Institute of Drug Abuse‘s website for both scientific and ―patient-centered‖ 
publications to better understand the discourse being used to explain addiction 
neuroscience to those seeking information about addiction – whether researchers, 
clinicians or the general public.   
NIDA’s Role in Promoting the Chronic Relapsing Brain Disease Model 
For decades, behavioral interventions which attempt to address the psychosocial 
world of the addict have dominated drug treatment.  Indeed, programs focused on helping 
individuals achieve ―abstinence‖ through behavior change still make up the majority of 
treatment in the U.S.  (SAMHSA 2010).  Addiction, even when conceptualized as 
disease, was viewed as a mental illness best treated through behavioral interventions 
(Foddy 2010).  Nonetheless, the brain disease model now clearly dominates addiction 
research and has recently received attention from social scientists as well (Dunbar, 
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Kushner and Vrecko 2010).  As the brain disease model has gained traction, technologies 
that target the biochemical processes of the brain have been developed as potential 
interventions to treat addiction.  Since its founding in 1990, NIDA‘s Medications 
Development Program has tested more than fifty medications to treat cocaine dependence 
but obtained FDA approval for only two medications to treat opiate dependence (bup and 
levo-α-acetylmethadol or LAAM).
11
  In 2004, the National Research Council and the 
Institute of Medicine published a book on the use of immunotherapies, vaccines and a 
variety of sustained release formulations of medications to prevent and/or treat addiction 
(Harwood & Myers 2004).  With neuroscience as their rationale and medication at their 
disposal, addiction researchers and medical professionals have heralded bup as that which 
will finally move addiction treatment into the medical mainstream (e.g., Fiellin et al. 
2002; Merrill 2002; National Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Buprenorphine 
1999).  
It is difficult to overemphasize the role of NIDA in promoting the brain disease 
model of addiction.  Until recently, NIDA claimed to be the funder of 85% of the world‘s 
research on addiction (Vrecko 2010a); it is behind much of the scientific and popular 
discourse about addiction as a brain disease (Courtwright 2010).  NIDA‘s commitment to 
a biomedical model of addiction dates back to the early 1970‘s when Jerome Jaffe 
became the first director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention created 
by President Nixon.  Jaffe was ―committed to the view that addiction was rooted in an 
individual‘s biochemistry‖ (Vrecko 2010a: 58) and was responsible for promoting 
methadone and more generally trying to shift national drug policy towards a 
                                                 
11
 LAAM is synthetic opioid similar to methadone, though said to be longer acting.  Unlike bup, LAAM, a 
Schedule II narcotic, can only be dispensed through the same restrictive regulatory system as methadone. 
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pharmacological approach.  As noted above, he also played a central role in the 
development of bup.  In the 1990‘s, addiction research was able to take advantage of 
advances in neuroscience and brain imaging to formulate the brain disease model of 
addiction.  By the late 1990‘s, NIDA was actively promoting the brain disease model, 
which continues to dominate their rhetoric and their funding today.  NIDA began to 
reframe medications, like bup, that had already been developed in neuroscientific terms. 
In 1997, Alan Leshner, then Director of NIDA, published a landmark article 
entitled, ―Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters.‖  In the article, Leshner argues 
that addiction is as much a medical as a social problem and that the field and the public 
have focused too much attention on the latter.  He says: 
That addiction is tied to changes in brain structure and function is what 
makes it, fundamentally, a brain disease. …  Understanding that addiction 
is, at its core a consequence of fundamental changes in brain function 
means that a major goal of treatment must be to either reverse or 
compensate for those brain changes (1997: 46). 
 
It is this perspective that has guided NIDA since.  In 2003, Nora Volkow, a prominent 
neuroscientist who pioneered the use of PET scans in addiction research, became the 
Director of NIDA.  Since her appointment, she has vociferously championed the brain 
disease model in both NIDA‘s scientific and public education arms.  As Figure 14 
suggests, three of NIDA's five divisions are explicitly geared towards a neuroscientific 
paradigm, and a fourth, the Intermural Research Program, provides funds to outside 
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Figure 14: National Institute on Drug Abuse Organizational Chart 
 
Source: www.drugabuse.org/about/organization  
 
NIDA has also worked to promote the brain disease model to the general public.  
For example, in 2005 NIDA underwrote a widely-cited issue of Nature devoted to 
addiction neurobiology, and in 2007, NIDA, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and 
the television channel HBO produced a multi-part series on addiction, involving some of 
the most prominent addiction researchers in the world.  Supported by brain scans and 
interviews from neuroscientists, the message that addiction is a brain disease came 
through loud and clear.  NIDA has also produced a series of curricula for elementary and 
high school students to explain addiction.  These include: ―Brain Power,‖ ―Mind Over 
Matters,‖ ―Heads Up,‖ and ―The Brain.‖  NIDA‘s educational materials closely track the 
scientific literature, which has centered primarily on the biochemical changes drugs cause 
in the dopamine receptor and limbic systems; the relationship between drug use and 
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damage to the prefrontal cortex of the brain; and the role of the brain‘s plasticity in both 
the causes and effects of drug use (Koob & Simon 2009).  NIDA‘s power in the field of 
addiction neuroscience has led one scholar to describe them as largely responsible for 
making ―the neuroscientists‘ laboratory ... an obligatory passage point for the production 
of truths about addiction‖ (Vrecko 2010a: 58). 
Brain Scans and Images of Addiction 
Brain imaging has played a central role in the development of addiction 
neuroscience.  As Vidal explains, the enthusiasm for ―reading‖ the brain has historical 
antecedents and deep appeal: 
[F]rom 19
th
 century phrenologists palpating head bumps through EEG‘s 
starting in the 1930‘s and to today‘s brain scans the hope of being able to 
read the mind and the self through brain recordings has not subsided 
(2009: 19). 
 
As May (2001) suggests, one of the primary impediments to medicalizing addiction has 
been the necessity of relying on patient self-report for its diagnosis.  Brain science and 
the ability to depict the cause and effect of addiction holds the promise of ―objective‖ 
scientific validation about addictive states that is not dependent on the subjective and 
distrusted accounts of individuals.  Addiction neuroscience increasingly relies on brain 
imaging techniques, such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Dackis & O‘Brien 2005) and, to a lesser extent, 
proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy (Licata & Renshaw 2010).  PET and fMRI have 
been used to show how the brain responds to triggers or cues (e.g., Dackis & O‘Brien 
2005) and how the brains of those who have used drugs differ in their structure and 
functioning from those who have not (e.g., NIDA u.d.).  Imaging has also been used to 
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argue that drug dependency is a single disorder because diverse drugs trigger a common 
neuronal response (Dackis & O‘Brien 2005; Koob & Simon 2009).  Licata and Renshaw 
argue that: 
The strength of this technology in drug addiction research may lie in its 
utility as a diagnostic tool to predict treatment matching, to monitor the 
progress of treatment, or to prevent relapse (2010: 14). 
 
Despite their enthusiasm for the role of PET in drug addiction diagnosis and treatment, 
Licata and Renshaw acknowledge that the ―potential of these applications has not been 
explored thoroughly in the context of drug abuse‖ (2010: 14).  The clinical application of 
brain imagery in addiction has been limited, but it has been widely used as a political and 
discursive tool to shore up the brain disease model of addiction.  NIDA uses brain images 
liberally in both its scientific and public education materials, and as the discussion below 
will make clear, brain images are central to neuroscientific arguments about addiction.   
While images of drug-related brain damage or craving-induced brain activity are 
compelling, several scholars have noted that imaging technologies, far from being 
objective or neutral, are shaped by their social and economic context (see especially, 
Beaulieu 2001; Dumit 2004; and Joyce 2005).  In a review of fMRI technology, 
Logothetis notes that imaging technology is a powerful tool, but the beautiful images it 
produces ―often mask the immense complexity of the physical, biophysical and 
engineering procedures generating them‖ (2008: 870).   While brain imagery technology 
is rife with subjective decisions about how to visually display data, perhaps one of the 
most important is the decision to contrast the ―normal‖ or ―healthy‖ brain with the 
―addicted‖ brain.  Brain scans could be used to suggest a continuum between ―normal‖ 
and ―addicted‖ but instead almost universally display a sharp dichotomy (Kaye 2006).  
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Moreover, much brain mapping relies on the same data analysis software package that 
includes a ―normal‖ reference brain, which is, in fact, a composite based on averaging 
multiple brain images in ways that obscure important differences (Beaulieu 2001).  
Increasingly brain imaging has been discredited as ―voodoo science‖ for inappropriately 
correlating brain activity with participants' emotional state and a host of other statistical 
errors (see Vul et al. 2009).  Nonetheless, brain imagery remains particularly important in 
the study of addiction, which has not previously had a somatic marker of and 
physiological location for addiction.    
Neuroscientific Treatments for Addiction 
Similar to the largely unrealized promise of gene therapies, the application of 
addiction neuroscience to prevent, diagnose, or treat addiction is limited.  As noted 
above, while brain imaging is being widely used in addiction research, it has not yet been 
employed as a diagnostic tool for addiction in clinical practice - though many continue to 
hope it will be (e.g. Koob and Simon 2009).  In terms of treatment, as an editorial in the 
aforementioned special issue of Nature put it: ―our understanding of the neurobiology of 
disease has progressed substantially… [but] researchers have been less successful in 
translating this knowledge into effective therapies‖ (Taking addiction research into the 
clinic 2005: 1413).   
The development of a successful medical intervention is critical to the project of 
medicalization.  Courtwright, a leading scholar in the history of addiction, writes: 
[I]f the brain disease model ever yields a pharmacotherapy that curbs 
craving, or a vaccine that blocks drug euphoria, as some researchers hope, 
we should expect the rapid medicalization of the field (2010: 143). 
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As Courtwright suggests, theories about a brain disease model alone will not accomplish 
the medicalization of addiction.  He hypothesizes that a key driver of medicalization is a 
concrete medical intervention, a pharmaceutical – like bup -- that can address the 
physiological symptoms of addiction that are increasingly understood in neurological 
terms.    
This drive to find a medical solution to the brain disease of addiction has 
propelled an intensive research effort and several experimental interventions.  In general, 
these experimental treatments fall into three categories: 1) efforts to intervene directly on 
the brain; 2) immunotherapies and vaccines to prevent addiction and/or relapse; and 3) 
pharmacological strategies.  Researchers have developed only a few experimental 
therapies that intervene directly on the brain.  These include repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation, which uses rapidly changing magnetic fields to induce weak 
electrical currents in order to influence neuronal activity (Camprodon et al. 2007), and 
sterotactic surgery, which involves drilling holes in the skull and inserting electrodes into 
the brain (Gao et al. 2003).  Vaccines for nicotine and cocaine, which prevent these drugs 
from passing the blood-brain barrier, are currently being tested in clinical trails (Harwood 
and Myers 2004).  However, all of these approaches are experimental, and none are in 
widespread use.  
The most advanced and widely used neuroscientific treatments for addiction are 
psychopharmaceuticals.  The diagram by Nestler (2005) below (Figure 15) highlights the 
three pharmaceutical approaches currently being pursued by addiction researchers:  1) 
medications that block the effects of drugs; 2) medications that ―mimic‖ drugs; and 3) 
medications that directly influence the processes of addiction.  Although methadone has 
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been around since the 1970‘s, there remain relatively few psychopharmaceutical 
treatments for addiction.  In addition to naltrexone (which has been used to treat 
alcoholism, opioid addiction and impulse control disorders, like kleptomania), disulfram 
(an aversion therapy that creates sickness when alcohol is ingested), and acamprosate 
(used to treat alcoholism), bup (which Nestler classifies a mimicry medication) is the 
only addiction medication to enter into widespread usage in the past 40 years.   
 
Figure 15: Effects of Addiction Medications at the Neurochemical Level  
 
Source: Nestler 2002 
 
As Figure 15 illustrates, addiction neuroscience focuses at the neurochemical level to 
understand the ways in which abused drugs and treatment medications are attracted to 
and blocked by different receptor cells.  Within this paradigm, bup acts at the level of the 
opioid receptor cells within the brain and is classified with methadone as a substance that 
mimics the action of other opiates. 
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The Neuroscience of Buprenorphine 
Bup plays a central role in addiction neuroscience, not because it addresses broad 
neurological issues, but because it became the center of discursive and political 
arguments over the nature of addiction.  Bup was not a new scientific discovery that 
transformed understandings of addiction neuroscience.  Rather, it was developed at a time 
when a medical solution to addiction was being fervently sought, and it came onto the 
market just as neuroscientific understandings of addiction were gaining momentum in the 
scientific and popular press.  By being reframed in neuroscientific terms, bup bolstered 
the chronic, relapsing brain disease model that was increasingly being used as unifying 
conceptual framework for addiction science, the basis for a significant proportion of 
NIDA‘s appropriations, and a source of scientific legitimacy for the field (Campbell 
2007).    
With the explosion of addiction neuroscience research funded by NIDA in the 
1990‘s and early 2000‘s, bup was easily recast as a pharmaceutical treatment for a brain 
disease.  By being framed as a neurochemical intervention, bup could better escaped 
being seen as a ―substitution therapy,‖ like methadone,
12
 and help propel the 
medicalization of addiction.  Simply put, if the disorder is amenable to medical treatment 
that acts on the brain, then it must be a brain disease.  Dackis & O‘Brien (2005) explain 
how pharmaceutical treatments like bup fit into the political and professional project of 
addiction neuroscience: 
                                                 
12
 Methadone is widely known as a substitution or replacement therapy in that it acts as a substitution for 
heroin.  This language is problematic for those seeking to medicalize addiction because it acknowledges 
that methadone, an opiate, is simply replacing one ‗drug‘ for another.  Although some early studies of bup 
use these terms, most do not but focus instead on bup‘s action on the receptor cells of the brain to block the 
effects of opioids.   
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[P]harmacological strategies are emerging that target specific clinical 
components of addiction, including drug-induced euphoria, hedonic 
regulation, cue-induced craving and even denial.  The development of 
treatments that dramatically improve clinical outcomes should reverse 
social stigma and justify and expanded care delivery system (2005: 1435). 
 
Pharmaceutical strategies, like bup, are seen as targeting specific aspects of addiction 
neurobiology and, thus, justifying the expansion of the medical treatment of addiction. 
Although bup relies on and is framed by the language of contemporary 
neuroscience, from a scientific perspective it is not a particularly revolutionary 
medication.  It addresses only the fairly narrow physiological issues of blocking pleasure, 
reducing craving, and preventing withdrawal and has nothing to contribute towards 
addiction neuroscience‘s increasing preoccupation with the brain centers for self-control 
or the corticotropin-releasing factor‘s impact on stress (discussed below).  According to 
scientists, bup intervenes in the dopamine system by blocking the pleasurable effects of 
drugs.  Bup (a synthetic opioid) works by binding to the mu receptor (the brain receptor 
that attracts all opioids) so that, when someone uses another opioid, the pleasurable 
effects are blocked because the receptors are already filled.  Because the brain‘s natural 
opioid receptors are already occupied, heroin or other opiates are literally blocked from 
impacting the brain‘s pleasure system.  
Like methadone, bup creates a physical dependence but is said to cause less 
euphoria and have a lower overdose risk than either methadone or heroin.  As Kleber 
explains: 
Bup, as a partial mu agonist, has a number of advantages over methadone:  
it is longer acting… it has a ceiling effect on its respiratory depressant 
action, and thus safer as far as potential overdose, and has a very high 
affinity for the mu receptor so it is hard to displace other mu agonists 
(2004: 1476). 
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Despite technical explanations about bup‘s pharmokenetics, bup remains at its core a 
substitution therapy that works very much like methadone; it replaces one opioid with 
another (Nestler 2002).  Because it is slower acting than heroin or methadone, it is said to 
create less euphoria.  In this way, bup does address a central component of 
neuroscientific theories about addiction, the regulation of pleasure.  But bup‘s 
fundamental pharmokenetic property is to mimic the drug action of other opiates (Nestler 
2002).  As such, although bup can be explained in neuroscientific terms, it is in a long 
line of medications used to treat opioid addiction by replacing one opioid with another 
(e.g., morphine to treat opium addiction, heroin to treat morphine addiction, methadone 
to treat heroin addiction).  
In fact, though scientists, politicians, and industry alike portray bup as a 
revolutionary new medication, the first study about its efficacy as a treatment for opioid 
dependence was published not long after methadone first became widely available 
(Jasinski, Pevnick & Griffith 1978).  The long delays in bringing bup to market were not 
about advances in neuroscience or improving its efficacy in blocking the effects opioids 
but in addressing concerns about diversion.  As Vocci, Director of NIDA‘s Division of 
Treatment Research and Development, explains: ―People at NIDA knew of the great need 
to move opiate addiction treatment from the traditional clinic setting to individual 
physicians‘ offices.  But we had to address concerns about diversion and unprescribed 
use‖ (quoted in Mann 2004: 14).  In a 2004 NIDA publication heralding bup as major 
treatment breakthrough, NIDA emphasizes how bup‘s pharmacological profile is 
essential to justifying its particular suitability for office-based treatment: 
Buprenorphine‘s suitability for office-based prescribing is based on it 
pharmacological profile.  Like methadone, buprenorphine activates opiate 
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receptors, but its effects level off as the patient takes higher and higher 
doses…  The addition of naloxone reduces the potential for abuse by illicit 
injection.  If the combination tablet is crushed and injected by a heroin-
addicted individual in an attempt to intensify buprenorphine‘s euphoric 
effect, naloxone kicks in to induce the symptoms of withdrawal (Mann 
2004: 16) 
 
Here, as elsewhere, specific pharmacological properties of bup are emphasized to make a 
strategic point.  On the one hand, bup causes less pleasure than methadone.  On the other, 
just in case someone tries to take advantage of the euphoric properties of bup, naloxone 
prevents them from doing so and, in fact, rather than causing pleasure makes someone 
physically ill.  The pharmacological profile that makes bup particularly suitable for 
office-based prescribing is its low abuse potential. 
What is extraordinary about bup is neither its chemical make-up nor its 
neurological mechanisms.  What is extraordinary about bup is that relatively minor 
pharmacological differences between it and methadone were used to leverage a profound 
legislative change and a huge discursive victory in the effort to medicalize addiction.  
Despite its long history at NIDA and its similarity to methadone, bup was taken up by 
addiction neuroscientists as a key neurochemical solution to opioid addiction.  Bup 
entered directly into the discourse about addiction neuroscience that attempts to recast 
addiction as a chronic, relapsing brain disease most appropriately treated by mainstream 
medicine.  This discourse has several themes – the regulation of pleasure (which is how 
bup‘s pharmacological action is most commonly framed) is one of the most predominant. 
Pleasure: Opioid Receptors and the Hijacked Brain 
For many researchers, the modern age of addiction neuroscience began with the 
discovery of brain opioid receptors in the 1970‘s.  This breakthrough eventually led to the 
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acknowledgement that the brain produces both opioid receptors and endogenous opioids, 
which ―induce similar actions as morphine‖ (van Ree et al. 1999: 342).  Like externally 
introduced opioids, such as heroin or oxycontin, these naturally produced opioids block 
pain and cause pleasure by elevating levels of dopamine.  
The notion that the brain‘s dopamine system is the center of pleasure is relatively 
recent and potentially expands the reach of neuroscience to explain all manner of 
behavior, both ―pathological‖ and pleasurable.  Indeed, scans of the brain‘s pleasure 
center ―have revealed an embarrassment of riches‖ (Reinarman 2007; see also Vrecko, 
2010b).  Gambling, food, drugs, beautiful faces, and maternal support all ―light up‖ the 
pleasure center, and scientists are now suggesting a common pathway theory: pleasurable 
behaviors stimulate the dopamine system and, therefore, tend to be repeated.  Some 
scientists claim, for example, that substance and nonsubstance ―addictions‖ are similar in 
―fundamental, mechanistic ways‖ (Frascella et al. 2010: 2) - both activate the mesolimbic 
dopamine reward system.  However, too much ―lighting up,‖ too much pleasure, is 
pathological, and the ―normal‖ brain becomes hijacked.
13
  According to neuroscientists, 
drugs ―disrupt the volitional mechanisms by hijacking the brain mechanisms involved in 
seeking natural reinforcement‖ (Volkow and Li 2005: 1430); the brain is under the 
control of the compulsive quest to recreate pleasure.  
The control of pleasure is a central tenet of the brain disease model and has 
shaped much of the understanding about appropriate treatment strategies, like bup, that 
can either block or modulate the experiences of pleasure that those taking drugs 
experience and then seek to repeat.  As the most researched and best-developed area of 
                                                 
13
 See Acker 2010 for an interesting analysis of the hijacking metaphor. 
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study within addiction neuroscience, the dopamine receptor system has become the focus 
of pharmaceutical treatments and the basis for expanding the dominion of addiction 
neuroscience over a host of non-substance use behaviors.  Volkow, in particular, has used 
discoveries about the relationship between pleasure and the dopamine system to argue 
that obesity is a brain disease (Baler and Volkow 2006; Volkow et al. 2008).  Given the 
recent moral panic about the obesity epidemic (Meleo-Erwin 2011), this line of reasoning 
that links pleasure and addiction at the molecular levels has the potential to greatly 
enhance the reach and the power of the addiction brain disease model.  The modulation of 
pleasure and euphoria is also important to how those being treated with bup understand 
and experience their addiction treatment (see Chapter 6). 
 
Rationality & Self Control: The Prefrontal Cortex and Opioid-induced Brain Injury  
Finding a neuroscientific basis for the loss of control is essential to the 
construction of addiction as brain disease.  As long as individuals have self-control and 
choose to use drugs, they are not in the grips of a disease that has eroded their impulse 
control; they are merely exercising poor judgment.  The control of pleasure through the 
modulation of the limbic system has received the most scholarly attention (Keane and 
Hamill 2010), but addiction neuroscience is increasingly implicating conceptions of 
rationality and self-control.   
The brain has long been seen as the center of rationality, and addiction 
neuroscience reinforces this view.  Dackis and O‘Brien, for example, describe the 
prefrontal cortex as the ―seat of executive function in the brain […] involved in decision-
making, risk/reward assessment, impulse control and perseverance‖ (2005:1432-3).  As 
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such, this is the area of the brain believed to enable individuals to act rationally, 
according to plan, and to prioritize their actions on the basis of their social and emotional 
consequences. According to addiction neuroscientists, the repeated activation and 
disregulation of the endogenous reward system adversely affects the prefrontal cortex 
(Koob and Simon 2009; NIDA u.d.).  The addict‘s brain is not just hijacked; drugs 
literally damage the brain and diminish mental and motor functioning (NIDA u.d.).  
According to neuroscientists Licata and Renshaw: ―current and former opiate abusers 
tend to display persistent neurocognitive deficits that may result from opiate-induced 
brain injury‖ (2010: 7).  Ignoring questions about the direction of causality, they suggest 
that studies showing drug users have impaired cognition are evidence of brain damage 
caused by drug use.  Drug using behavior is somatized and embodied: ―the cycle of 
addiction becomes etched in the midbrain and frontal structures‖ (Dackis & O'Brien 
2005: 1432).  Addiction literally marks (and damages) the midbrain and frontal regions 
that, according to neuroscientists, are the seat of rationality and cognitive thought. 
The identification of damage to specific brain structures with addiction is an 
important turning point in the neuroscientific construction of addiction.  Earlier studies 
that focused on the dopamine system failed to explain why some people use drugs 
occasionally and others become ―addicted‖ – a failure that some saw as major 
shortcoming in the science (Koob & Simon 2009).  Research now focuses on locating 
―the neuroadaptive mechanisms […] that mediate the transition from occasional 
controlled drug use and the loss of behavioral control over drug-seeking and drug-taking 
that defines chronic addiction‖ (Koob & Simon 2009: 116).  The loss of self-control has 
long been a hallmark of addiction, but efforts to explain this in neuroscientific terms are 
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fairly recent. Volkow, the Director of NIDA, has been one of the leading researchers in 
this area and explains the neuromechanisms that inhibit self-control and reward the 
pleasure system in the schematic drawing below (see Figure 16).   This diagram depicts a 
profoundly diminished ―control of self-regulation‖ region in the ―dysregulated brain‖ of 
the addict (here, the addict of both drugs and food).  The role of saliency (which is the 
rewarding effect of the substance) dominates the addict‘s brain while self-control is so 
small as to barely be legible. 
 
Figure 16: Effects of Addiction on Brain’s System of Self-Control 
 
Source: Volkow et al. 2008 
 
Volkow et al. offer a technical explanation of exactly which parts of the brain responsible 
for self-regulation and control are affected by the chronic use of drugs or over-eating: 
A consequence of disruption of the inhibitory control/emotional regulation 
circuit is the impairment of the individual to exert inhibitory control and 
emotional regulation (processes mediated in part through the DLPFC, CG 
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and lateral OFC)…  As a result, the person is less likely to succeed in 
inhibiting the intentional actions and to regulate the emotional reactions 
associated with the strong desires (either to take the drug or eat the food) 
(2008: 3197). 
 
With the centers that regulate self-control damaged, the addict literally cannot help him 
or herself.  In article co-authored by Baler and Volkow titled, ―Drug addiction: the 
neurobiology of disrupted self-control,‖ they offer a less technical explanation saying that 
because drugs affect the physiological processes that support learning, decision-making 
and behavioral control, the ―addicted person‘s ability to exert self-control [becomes] … 
disrupted‖ (2006: 559).  In a series of questionable associations, they argue that 
compulsive drug taking may be linked to lesions in the frontal cortex found in people 
with behavioral compulsions and to the fact that the frontal cortex has also been 
implicated in obsessive-compulsive disorder: 
Interestingly, the fact that OFC [orbitofrontal cortex] has been previously 
implicated in the expression of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
together with the observation that OFC lesions lead to behavioral 
compulsion, strengthens in our view the evidence in favour of overlaps 
between the neurobiology of the compulsive drug-taking observed in 
drug-addicted individuals and the compulsive ritualistic behaviors 
characteristic of OCD (Baler and Volkow 2006: 562). 
 
This quote illustrates the way in which the existing neuroscience is stretched to meet the 
interest in finding a neurobiological explanation for compulsive drug use.  This link is 
critical because, heretofore, addiction neuroscience had little response to claims that it 
could not explain why many people use drugs but only some become addicted.   The 
rationale offered here is that compulsive drug users share some of the same brain 
deficiencies as those with obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
This strand of research on how drugs erode the self-control centers of the brain is 
a perfect companion to that on the limbic system and the management of pleasure.  On 
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the one hand, addicts are portrayed as uncontrollably pursuing pleasure; their hijacked 
brains making them compulsively seek drugs to re-create the pleasurable sensations of 
early use.  One the other, drug use also impacts the regions of rationality and control, 
diminishing users‘ ability to reign in impulsive behavior; pleasure-seeking is unchecked 
due to a lack of capacity to make rational decisions.  Thus, behavioral traits are reframed 
as brain problems:   
[F]unctional and structural abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex might 
therefore contribute to clinical characteristics of addicted patients (such as 
poor impulse control, lack of resolve, and faulty decision-making) that are 
viewed prejudicially by the general public (Dackis & O'Brien 2005: 1433). 
 
It is worth noting that in some of the literature, drug use causes damage to the prefrontal 
cortex, while in other literature damage to the prefrontal cortex leads to compulsive drug 
use. 
The dichotomy between a rational, addiction-free individual who stands in 
contrast to an irrational, drug-using individual -- false though it might be -- has been 
around for decades (Gomart 2004; O‘Malley & Valverde 2004).  Addiction neuroscience 
holds out the promise that the line between the rational, addiction-free subject and the 
irrational, addicted subject can at last be materialized and located in the brain, depicted 
through imagery, and treated pharmacologically.  Bup is not seen as intervening in the 
centers of rationality and self-control within the neuroscientific literature; however, these 
theories about the loss of rational thought and self-control are central to how the opioid 
addict taking bup is treated, understood, and understands him or herself. 
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Plasticity: the Neural Consequences of Environmental Risk  
Efforts by addiction neuroscientists to locate the line between rational, controlled 
drug use and addiction in specific regions of the brain suggest a form of biological 
reductionism in which the complex social problem of addiction is reduced a brain 
abnormality.  However, Pickersgill (2009) warns against portraying neuroscience as 
simple reductionism, and Pitts-Taylor suggests that the neuroscientific notion of plasticity 
―appears to challenge biological reductionism by providing room for the environment in 
brain development and function‖ (2010: 636).  Neuroplasticity refers to the brain‘s 
capacity to reorganize itself in response to experience or injury (Kolb & Wishaw 1991), 
and some scholars believe that plasticity offers new possibilities for the reintroduction of 
the social into the biological and erodes the lines between the mind as hard-wired versus 
socially shaped (Pickersgill 2009; Pitts-Taylor 2011).  In the case of addiction 
neuroscience, however, plasticity is used primarily to justify the brain disease model 
rather than account for the role of environmental and social factors in causing and 
resolving addiction, though some researchers do wrestle with these questions. 
As suggested above, one the chief victories for proponents of the brain disease 
model was the ability to point to differences between the ―healthy‖ and the ―addicted‖ 
brain in ways that provide a biological basis for addiction and locate the disease of 
addiction in a particular somatic abnormality.  Plasticity --  the ways the brain is changed 
by the use of drugs -- therefore, becomes central to the neuroscientific justification for the 
brain disease model.  As the picture from a NIDA publication below suggests, by being 
able to depict the diseased state of the brain (plastic changes wrought by drugs), addiction 
can be compared to and legitimized by other diseases, like heart disease, that have long 
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been thought to have a ―real‖ biological basis.  In Figure 17, PET images of a ―healthy‖ 
brain and a ―diseased‖ brain of a cocaine user are juxtaposed with images of a ―healthy‖ 
and ―diseased‖ heart to drive home the point that drug use causes the brain disease of 
addiction by literally changing how the brain looks and functions. 
 
Figure 17: PET Images of Healthy & Diseased Brains and Hearts 
 
Source: NIDA 2007 
 
 
Indeed, the ways in which drugs change the brain is at the core of NIDA‘s definition of 
addiction.  Authors of the NIDA-published booklet, ―Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: the 
Science of Addiction,‖ respond to the rhetorical question ―What is addiction?‖ by saying: 
Addiction is a disease that is characterized by compulsive drug seeking and 
use, despite harmful consequences.  It is considered a brain disease 
because drugs change the brain—they change its structure and how it 
works (NIDA 2007). [Emphasis added] 
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Given the mystical and sophisticated rhetoric of addiction neuroscience, this definition 
seems simplistic if not tautological.  As Foddy argues: ―plasticity is a normal and largely 
beneficial characteristic of the human brains, and thus if we made ‗changes in brain 
structure and function‘ a sufficient criterion for disease, we would define everyone as 
diseased‖ (2010: 26).  This propensity to argue that ―brain changes‖ are evidence of 
disease provides endless possibilities for the expansion of medicalization and the 
pathologizing of any behaviors that affect the brain.   
However, brain plasticity also suggests that factors beyond the consumption of 
drugs can affect the brain‘s structure and responses.  And some addiction neuroscientists 
have grappled with the issue of how external factors might affect the brain and addiction.  
In general, neuroscientific addiction research presents a complicated and sometimes 
contradictory picture of the interplay between environmental, psychological, and 
biological factors.  For example, in a review article on addiction neurobiology, Chou and 
Narasimhan (2005) claim that addiction is influenced by the drug, the user‘s personality, 
peers, and the environment; one paragraph later they assert: ―exposure to drugs causes 
plasticity in the neural circuits related to reward and motivation, supporting the idea that 
addiction is a biological disease. Plasticity results from drug use and drug abuse‖ (2005: 
1427).  Addiction has external influences but is fundamentally a biological disease, and 
the chief way plasticity works is that drugs change the brain. 
Ambiguity over the role of environmental factors within addiction neuroscience 
could offer new opportunities for researchers to address the role of the social world, but 
not much evidence suggests they have.  In fact, scholars have noted the failure of 
addiction neuroscience to explain either social factors (Campbell 2010) or the variations 
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in the prevalence of drug use between populations (Acker 2010).  In general, 
neuroscientific literature on addiction seems to construe the role of environmental 
influences quite narrowly.  One important exception is a line of (still largely speculative) 
research that investigates the role of environmental stress on brain function.  Here, 
Volkow and Li explain the ―neural consequences of environmental risk:‖ 
Low socioeconomic class and poor parental support are two other factors 
[along with drug availability] that are consistently associated with a 
propensity to self-administer drugs, and stress might be a common feature 
of these environmental factors […T]here is evidence that corticotropin-
releasing factor (CRF) might play a linking role through its effects on the 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine system and the hypothalamic pituitary-
adrenal axis. […]  If we understand the neurobiological consequences 
underlying the adverse environmental factors that increase the risk for 
drug use and addiction, we will be able to develop interventions to 
counteract these changes (2005: 1436). 
 
Even here, environmental influences are understood only in the context of how the stress 
they induce impacts the dopamine system.  Volkow and Li (2005) go on to suggest that 
the future addiction interventions may include medications that act synergistically with 
behavioral therapies to mitigate the impact of stress.  And in a later article, Baler and 
Volkow advocate for the development of medications that ―would block the initiation of 
the stress response in the brain‖ (2006: 564).  The stress of poverty, fear of relapse, or 
other life challenges that might cause one to take up or relapse to drug use could be 
managed, not through addressing the fundamental causes of ―stress,‖ but by taking a pill. 
The other role of the environment discussed in addiction neuroscience is the way 
that environmental ―cues‖ trigger the brain in ways that might lead to relapse and how 
repeated associations between cues and drug use change the brain to make it more 
susceptible to relapse.  Volkow et al. (2008) conducted an experiment in which they took 
brain images of ―cocaine addicted individuals,‖ showing pictures designed to evoke the 
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desire to use cocaine to one group and nature scenes to a control group (see Figure 18 
below).   The ―brain changes‖ between the two groups differ, showing increased 
dopamine activity in certain regions.  Volkow et al. conclude: ―It is likely that these 
conditioned responses involve adaptations in cortico-striatal glutamatergic pathways that 
regulate DA [dopamine] release‖ (2008: 3195).  That is, environmental cues can lead to 
changes in the brain that increase susceptibility to relapse.  It is not just drugs, but certain 
environments, that pose a danger to the addict‘s brain.   
Figure 18: Addicted Brain’s Response to External Cues 
 
Source: Volkow et al. 2008 
Issues of plasticity and susceptibility are central to the brain disease model and 
are worth some exposition.  Susceptibility takes a number of forms:  1) some brains are 
more susceptible to addiction (e.g., adolescent brains; brains affected by stress); 2) brain 
changes wrought by drug use increase future susceptibility; and 3) genetic predisposition.  
Some research has looked at how differences in brain structure might explain why some 
people become addicted and some do not.  Volkow et al., for example, did a study which 
purported to show that subjects with a family history of alcohol that did not become 
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addicted had ―higher D2 receptors in striatum‖ than those without any family history of 
alcoholism‖ (2008: 3194).  They conclude that ―high levels of D2 receptors could protect 
against addiction‖ (2008: 3192).  While research, like these studies, on brain-based 
susceptibility to addiction is still highly speculative, researchers routinely assert that 
―addicted brains‖ have been changed by the use of the drugs in ways that make them 
vulnerable to relapse.  For example, according to O‘Brien: ―A key point for clinicians to 
realize is that the proneness to relapse is based on changes in the brain function that 
continue for months or years after the last use of the drug‖ (1997: 66).  Genetic 
susceptibility to addiction, an old but widely used paradigm (Peele 1986), also 
complicates the picture of brain plasticity, susceptibility, and addiction.  For Volkow and 
Li, both genetics and environment can cause neurological vulnerability to addiction: 
It is estimated that 40-60% of the vulnerability to addiction can be 
attributed to genetic factors […] However, addiction-prone or addiction-
resistant phenotypes may also reflect sensitivity to reinforcing stressors 
and alternative reinforcers in an individual‘s environment (2005: 1479). 
 
Under this view, no one can really escape being ―at risk‖ for addiction; even if you are 
not genetically susceptible, environmental factors (through the mediator of stress) can 
affect your dopamine system and your propensity to use drugs.   
Baart (2010) notes a similar trend in psychiatric genomics in which genetic 
knowledge is linking up to epidemiology on risk and an emphasis on prevention.  In the 
case of addiction neuroscience, plasticity means both that drugs can damage your brain 
and that anyone and at anytime could have brain changes that make him or her 
susceptible to slipping from occasional, controlled use to full-blown addiction.  Also 
implicit in the notion of plasticity is the idea that the damage of drugs may be reversible 
(though the literature is equivocal on this point) and, therefore that addicts have the 
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opportunity and responsibility to repair their brains.  As Rose explains, the fear and 
promise that we can somehow mitigate or shape our biological vulnerability is powerful:  
[I]n many departments of life, we are seeing the emergence of a new 
‗human kind:‘ the susceptible individual…  biology is not destiny…  This 
kind of thinking, therefore, is so powerful because it is imbued with hope 
as well as anxiety (2010: 96). 
 
As I discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters, these ideas about plasticity and 
susceptibility shape the experiences and understandings of those being treated under this 
neuroscientific paradigm with bup. 
Brain plasticity has the potential to open up a new (or return to an old) discourse 
around how to ameliorate the problems of drugs by addressing the political and economic 
forces drug use: homelessness, lack of education, lack of opportunity, poverty, and so on.  
However, as Pitts-Taylor points out, recognizing the role of other factors in ―brain 
diseases‖ does not necessarily undermine the ―neoliberal ethic of personal self-care and 
responsibility‖ (2011: 639).  In fact, the acknowledgement of external factors in fostering 
drug use or relapse appears to increase the demands on the drug user to manage, not just 
their consumption of drugs, but also the kinds of environments and stressors to which 
they expose themselves.  
Addiction & Volition: Character Flaw or Bona Fide Brain Disease? 
In my discussion of the conceptual framework for this dissertation, I argued that 
scientific facts are always shaped by the social, cultural and political environment in 
which they are produced.  This process, however, is often occluded by claims of 
neutrality or objectivity.  One interesting feature of addiction neuroscience is that some 
researchers have made their political project very explicit.  A number of prominent 
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addiction researchers have used the brain disease model to argue for changes in both 
public perception and policy.  Specifically, several declare that they are reframing 
addiction as a brain disease for the explicit purpose of destigmatizing and decriminalizing 
drug use and bringing it more fully under the purview of medicine, rather than the 
criminal justice system.  Dackis and O‘Brien, for instance, claim that neuro-imaging will: 
substantiate the biological basis of addiction and […] ultimately erode 
entrenched societal attitudes that prevent addiction from being evaluated, 
treated, and insured as a medical disorder (2005: 1431)   
 
In their view, neuroscience will eventually end the discrimination based on and 
criminalization of addiction (ibid).  By highlighting and disseminating ―select advances 
in addiction research,‖ scientists can and should reverse the public‘s ―misconceptions‖ 
and ―facilitate changes in policy‖ (Dackis & O'Brien 2005: 1431).   In a review article 
about the state of addiction neuroscience, Baler and Volkow note the battle is between 
evidence of the brain disease model on the one hand and proponents of personal 
responsibility on the other: 
As we present the evidence and champion the concept of addiction as a 
chronic and relapsing brain disease, some quarters are reluctant to 
embrace a view that in their opinion undermines the robust moral 
boundaries that the concept of personal responsibility bestows on the 
individual (2006: 560). 
 
Such researchers believe that promoting a neurological basis for addiction will erode the 
persistent idea that addiction is ―a character flaw rather than a bona fide brain disease‖ 
(Chou & Narasimhan 2005: 1427), leading to the end of stigma and criminalization.  At 
stake for the researchers is nothing less than the definition and source of volition and free 
will.  Their argument hinges on the concept that addiction undermines volition because, if 
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addicts‘ behavior is involuntary, they cannot be culpable for their ―disease.‖  Volkow and 
Li assert: 
[D]espite these advances in understanding the neuroplastic changes to 
drugs and alcohol, addicted individuals continue to be stigmatized by the 
pernicious but enduring belief that their affliction stems from voluntary 
behavior. The loss of behavioral control in the addicted individual should 
spur a renewed discussion of what constitutes volition (2005: 1436). 
 
Finding a biological basis for the loss of control has become paramount and has led to 
some of the tortured arguments discussed above about hypothesized relationships 
between drug use and OCD.  It is not enough to simply assert that people use drugs to 
activate their brain‘s ―pleasure center.‖  What is needed is a neuroscientific rationale for 
the loss of control.  As Baler and Volkow says:  ―We posit that the time has now come to 
recognize that the process of addiction erodes the same neural scaffolds that enable self-
control and appropriate decision-making‖ (2006: 559).  The erosion of the neural 
scaffolds also erodes moral paradigms for understanding addiction in this view. 
Tension between medical- and moral- or behaviorally-based paradigms of 
pathology is not new to addiction (Campbell 2010; Courtwright 2010) and seems to be a 
feature of many medicalized conditions, especially those with a behavioral component.  
Addiction neuroscience‘s contribution is its claim to have pinpointed a biological basis 
for the loss of volition and to have located it in the addict‘s brain.  Historically, there has 
been confusion whether the pathology is the behavior or whether the pathology causes 
the behavior (Pickersgill 2009).  The neuroscience of addiction purports to have solved 
that dilemma by isolating the brain mechanisms that cause the undesirable behavior – 
compulsive use of drugs or alcohol.  The direction of causality remains confused, 
however, since the brain damage that causes the loss of volition still begins with 
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voluntary behavior.  Neuroscientists link questions of volition directly to a political 
project of reducing blame and destigmatizing addiction, but the effectiveness of these 
efforts has been questioned by scholars (Campbell 2010; Courtwright 2010; Keane 2010) 
and, as I will detail later, is also undermined and challenged by the experiences of those 
being treated with bup. 
 While the aim of neuroscientists appears to be relieving drug users of the stigma 
and blame associated with addiction, such rhetoric can also be used to justify the 
―suspension of their personal autonomy, installing an imperative that they be governed by 
others‖ (Brook & Stringer 2005: 319).  If they cannot control their behavior – if they 
have a ―defect of the will‖ (Bull 2008: 154) - they must, it seems, be controlled by 
someone or something else.  These issues of autonomy and control are explored in depth 
in Chapter 7 and are central to the project of medicalizing addiction. 
Conclusion 
 The neuroscientific discourse about addiction focuses on the control of pleasure, 
the restoration of rationality, the role of external factors in producing addiction, and the 
ambivalent status of the addict‘s volition.  It reinforces an individualization of the 
problem, structures a particular form of governance, and erases social differences. Vidal 
(2009) notes that the cerebral subject, such as that born out of addiction neuroscience, 
makes historical and conceptual sense in a society rife with possessive individualism  -- 
where the individual is ―proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing nothing to 
society for them‖ (Vidal 2009: 9).  Addiction neuroscience is part of the larger neoliberal 
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trend to individualize problems and downplay both the role of social factors in creating 
social problems and communitarian responses to resolving them.   
 Addiction is not a social problem; it is a somatic problem located in the brain.  
The idea that addiction is defect in the brain (whether caused by genetics, behavior, 
and/or environment), increases rather than diminishes the responsibilities of individuals.  
They must first of all prevent addiction and be vigilant about inducing too much pleasure 
thereby disrupting the brain‘s delicate neurocircuitry and/or causing brain damage.  
Second, they must also ―treat‖ any defects that do arise.  Last, they must achieve and 
maintain a ―normal‖ and ―healthy‖ brain.  Neuroscientists have a clear treatment goal: the 
constitution of a rational, responsible, normal and productive citizen.  Meeting this ideal, 
however, remains largely the responsibility of the individual addict; they are expected to 
overcome their brain disease - not with the help of the state, their family or community, 
but with the aid of the biomedical industrial complex (Clarke et al. 2003; Vrecko 2009).  
Today, the hope is to replace the drug-using subject (characterized by irrationality and 
uncontrolled pleasure) with a medicine-taking subject (characterized by rationality and 
productivity).  Will power, with the support of a psychopharmaceutical, is the new road 
to recovery.   
 In individualizing a problem that was earlier understood be social, the 
neuroscientific model of addiction also erases and obscures the role of race and other 
social differences.  In making a larger argument about the ways in which current regimes 
of public health divert attention from structural inequity, Metzl says: 
Calling this approach racism or capitalism or any number of other –isms 
would mobilize a particular critique.  But calling it health allows for a 
language of betterment that skillfully glosses over the structural violence 
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done to minority and lower-income Americans (2010a:4). [emphasis in 
original] 
 
Addiction neuroscience reduces any discussion about poverty, exposure to drugs, racism 
and other environmental factors to problems of the brain and its response to ―stress.‖  
Issues, such as the mass incarceration of African Americans under harsh drug laws or the 
lack of viable economic opportunities beyond the drug trade in some neighborhoods, 
have no place in neuroscientific discourse.  As Campbell notes: 
As an ideological code, however, CRBD [chronic relapsing brain disease] 
does not focus attention on social differences, including the differential 
histories and cultural geographies within which their subjects encounter 
drugs (2010: 101). 
 
In its erasing of social difference, reinforcing of individualism, and increasing personal 
responsibility, the brain disease model of addiction is consistent with the ―new public 
health‖ (Lupton 1995).  A focus on the health of the public becomes a way to enforce 
particular norms that privilege a middle-class rational actor who is invested in working 
on his or her own health.  Neuroscientific addiction discourse is not just about addicts.  It 
also frames the governance of ―healthy‖ populations.  Illness is defined in relation to a 
norm, and, in the case of addiction, one which is explicitly tied to ―good‖ behavior.  
Health becomes infused with a particular kind of morality – one the favors self-control 
and discipline.  Indeed, despite its claims to scientific objectivism, the brain disease 
model of addiction is not free from promoting a particular kind of morality.  As the 
discussion above suggests, within the neuroscientific paradigm the drug user is 
permanently marked as a disordered individual with chronic disease (and often a 
damaged brain).  They are explicitly contrasted with the ―normal‖ or ―healthy‖ individual 
in ways that seem to do to little to lessen the stigma that scientists claim they want to 
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alleviate.  Moreover, the existing neuroscience has not succeeded in its project to 
eliminate the role of will power or choice from addiction theories.  As Keane and Hamill 
explain: 
Because the brain disease of addiction is caused by the initially voluntary 
consumption of illicit drugs (a far from morally neutral category) the 
construction of the addict as a physically and morally pathological subject 
coexists with the molecular discourse of neural anomaly (2010: 54). 
 
It is not, however, just the initial voluntary consumption of drugs that troubles the 
neuroscientific model of addiction.  It suffers both from evidentiary and logical fallacies 
and from competing paradigms and explanations for ―addictive‖ behavior.  Several 
scholars have written extensive critiques of addiction science and pointed out a number 
of methodological flaws (see for example, Granfield and McCloud 1999; Peele 1999).  
They assert that most studies focus on people seeking treatment and are therefore biased 
towards the most severely affected individuals.  They also note the failure of biological 
model to account for: 1) the numerous people who quit using drugs on their own; 2) the 
variation in rates of addiction between cultures, over the life span, by substance, and by 
context (e.g., Vietnam vets using heroin at higher rates in Vietnam than when they 
returned to the U.S.); and 3) the majority of people who use addictive substances in 
moderation.  Even addiction neuroscientists admit that there are huge gaps in their 
knowledge.  Barr et al. say, ―use of illicit drugs and alcohol affects the CNS [central 
nervous system]… their exact mode of action on the brain are not completely 
understood‖ (2008: 328).  And Koob and Simon note: 
The biggest disappointment to scientists in this field is that 34 years into 
the modern era of drug abuse research, we still do not have a clear 
understanding of the cellular or molecular bases of the development and 
maintenance of the phenomenon of addiction, such as tolerance, physical 
dependence and psychic activity (2009: 128). 
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Nor has addiction neuroscience been able to completely reduce the social to the 
biological.  As Pickersgill asserts: ―even the most ‗biological‘ psychiatric research 
apportions at least some kind of causal role in the development of psychopathology to 
‗factors‘ that lie outside the limits of the body‖ (2009: 46).  Moreover, as was discussed 
above, neuroscience has largely failed to deliver on its promise biomedical solutions for 
addiction notwithstanding the enormous investment of resources.  And despite Volkow‘s 
assertions that substances change the centers of self-control and somehow trigger 
compulsive behavior, these arguments have not been scientifically substantiated (Foddy 
2010).  Perhaps one of the biggest weaknesses in the brain disease model is its simple 
equation that because drugs impact the brain, addiction is a brain disease.  As Morse 
points out: ―All human behavior has a biological substrate and is this were the criterion, 
all human activity would be the symptom of disease‖ (2000: 16). 
 Despite the limitations of addiction neuroscience, some social scientists (see for 
example, Vrecko 2010a) highlight the ascendancy of the brain disease model of addiction 
and suggest that it does, in fact, represent ―a textbook account of beneficent 
medicalization‖ (Courtwright 2010: 138).  Others have noted that this model seems to 
have had little impact on either clinical or policy responses to addiction (Pickersgill 
2010b).  I argue that addiction neuroscience is one powerful force for determining the 
meaning of addiction; one that is made more powerful by having a psychopharmaceutical 
that legitimizes it.  I will also argue, however, that there are a number of forces that 
challenge, limit and rupture this model.  These include the failure of addiction 
neuroscience to account for social factors; the fairly narrow biomedical impact of bup; 
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the ambiguity between medications, like bup, and illicit drugs; and the lived experiences 
of those being treated under a neuroscientific paradigm with bup. 
 In critiquing addiction neuroscience, my goal is not simply to discredit it but to 
complicate it.  The neuroscientific paradigm raises but does not resolve important 
questions about pleasure, rationality, and the role of external factors in influencing the 
etiology and treatment of addiction.  The fundamental questions about addiction that 
researchers grapple with are equally important to ―addicted‖ individuals being treated 
neurochemically with bup.  As my analysis of interviews with people taking bup will 
suggest, the medication and the discourse surrounding it have a very real impact on how 
they understand core issues raised by addiction, such as pleasure, rationality, social 
versus biological causes of addiction, volition, and agency.  These understandings also 
shape and are shaped by their subjective and embodied experiences.  These subjective 
and embodied experiences are the subject of the next three chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
Lived Experiences of People Taking Bup:   




In this chapter, I explore the ways in which bodies being treated with bup 
materialize and enfold as well as resist and reshape the medical discourse of addiction 
being promoted by neuroscience, government, and industry.  I also examine to what 
extent the innovative features of bup -- a medication prescribed by doctors in a medical 
setting  --  influence their experiences and understandings of bup as a medication and 
addiction as a disease.  I argue that, for the participants in my sample, addiction is hybrid 
entity and that bup remains in a liminal state somewhere between a drug and a medicine. 
As the previous chapters suggest, neuroscientific researchers led by the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) used bup in a deliberate and concerted effort to 
destigmatize and medicalize addiction.  Relying on the chronic, relapsing brain disease 
model, they worked with Reckitt Benckiser (RB) to place addiction treatment in the 
hands of physicians and to wrest it from the punitive methadone clinic system – at least 
for some drug users.  Haraway points out that: ―The language of biomedicine is never 
alone in the field of empowering meanings…  Scientific discourses are ‗lumpy;‘ they 
contain and enact condensed contestations for meaning and practice‖ (1989: 203).  In the 
small but growing literature on the sociology of neuroscience, scholars are debating just 
how influential neuroscientific discourse is in shaping notions of personhood.  Vrecko 
(2006), for instance, has argued that individuals increasingly use ―folk neurology‖ to 
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understand themselves.  Pickersgill, Cunningham-Burley and Martin (Subjectivity, 
forthcoming), in contrast, argue that neuroscientific concepts compete with and rarely 
supplant other culturally resonant discourse about the self. 
It is not, however, just at the level of discourse that meanings are contested and 
lumpy.  In this chapter, I argue that the embodied and lived experiences of those being 
treated for addiction add further nuance to our notions of  ―bup,‖ ―addiction‖ and 
―addiction treatment.‖  Weinberg, one of the only scholars to write about the embodiment 
of addiction, argues that the predominance of the social constructionist view in medical 
sociology generally has led to ―profound limitations‖ in the study of mental illness and 
addiction (2005: 2).  He says: ―One searches in vain for analyses that in any way provide 
for the terrible reality that mental illnesses and addiction seem to possess for those who 
claim to suffer from them‖ (2005: 2).  Others have suggested that social constructionist 
views of illness do a good job of elucidating the social and cultural meanings of disorders 
but a poor job of explaining the subjective experience of suffering that those who have a 
―disease‖ or who have been labeled as having a ―disease‖ describe (see for example, Berg 
& Akrich 2004; Lewis 2003; Shilling 1993/2003).   
Sociologists of the body have referred to this neglect of embodied experience in 
sociological literature as an ―absent presence‖ – that is, sociology has largely failed to 
address the body directly, even though the body is central to sociological interests, like 
issues of structure and agency (Shilling 1993/2003).  Understanding the embodied 
experiences of those labeled as ―ill‖ is important, not only to acknowledge the subjective 
experiences of individuals, but also because social and cultural meanings are transformed 
through these lived experiences (Berg & Akrich 2004; Budgeon 2003; Butler 2004).  
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Bodies are shaped by and largely understood in terms of preexisting categories and 
discourse, but they also transform and resist those discourses.  As Berg and Akrich 
explain: ―the ‗lived body‘ is not reduced by its encounters with things and technologies – 
rather, these encounters are what bring it to specific life‖ (2004: 9).  In the case of 
medications, like bup, bodies enter into ―global, industrial and technological flows‖ 
(Vrecko 2010b) through consumption and as commodities within the medical treatment 
system. 
However, bodies are not merely passive commodities; they are also the location 
of agency.  If the body of the addict is contoured by a complex world of medical, social 
and cultural discourses about addiction, then these discourses in turn are transformed by 
experiences of taking drugs, being addicted, and being treated.  Malins points out that 
even bodies that are profoundly shaped by existing categories and labels find ways of 
resisting and reassembling the very discourses that define them: 
A body does not inject drugs in a social vacuum: it may become subject to 
the physical intervention of the law, the coercive force of medicine, the 
reductive classification of psychiatry, the intervening categorizations of 
public health…  It may suddenly find itself a ‗risky‘ body; a ‗dirty; or 
‗polluted‘ or ‗criminal‘ body.  It may also play its own part, enfolding into 
its drug assemblages the representational languages and images circulating 
through film, media, advertising, and government rhetoric. (2004: 90) 
 
This chapter starts by examining how participants frame addiction generally.  I 
then explore the ways in which participants talk about methadone both in terms of their 
embodied experiences on methadone and in terms of methadone‘s setting and social 
context.  Much like bup, when methadone was first introduced, it was seen as the 
innovation that would medicalize addiction.  As such, and because almost all of the 
people in my sample contrast their experiences on bup with methadone, it warrants some 
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exposition.  Finally, I conclude this chapter with an examination of how participants 
describe their experiences on bup and what parts of their experience reflect and reshape 
medical versus other understandings of addiction. 
General Conceptualizations of Addiction: “It’s much vaster and deeper” 
Like neuroscientists, government regulators, and Reckitt Benckiser, those taking 
bup have hybrid conceptualizations of addiction.  In subsequent chapters, I will explore 
in more detail the important role of responsibility, blame and will power in individuals‘ 
conception of addiction.  In this chapter, I focus on how individuals understand addiction 
and medications (i.e., methadone and bup) used to treat it.  Participants in my sample as a 
group and as individuals have complicated and imbricated conceptions of addiction as a 
phenomenon that encompassed physical, mental, environmental, and moral elements.   
Addiction as a Brain Disease 
 Very few participants articulated addiction as brain disease or used neuroscientific 
language to describe either their addiction or its treatment. To the extent that people 
expressed an understanding of the neuroscience behind the brain disease model it was 
limited to the idea that the opioid receptor system played some role and that bup works to 
block the pleasurable effects of heroin and other opioids. One participant said: ―It 
[buprenorphine] solves the problem, man. It fills the receptors and all is good‖ (Terry).
14
 
Another put it this way: ―Bup is like a condom on the brain. You know, you don‘t feel the 
heroin‖ (Sylvester).  Both Terry and Sylvester have some understanding of the 
neuroscientific notion that bup blocks their opioid receptors preventing the effects of 
                                                 
14
 I use pseudonyms throughout to protect the confidentiality of participants. 
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heroin.  Another participant, Jose, had a vague notion that heroin affected his brain in 
ways that impaired his judgment: 
Miguel [a drug counselor] gave me this, ah, book, you know-- The 
Science of Addiction... And that opened my eyes more, you know, to 
understand why I was destroying myself. …My house and home and 
everything. Because, um, it is the part of the brain that makes me, ah, lose 
good judgment.  
 
Jose alludes to science suggesting that drugs damage one‘s ―good judgment‖ to explain to 
himself why he continued to use heroin even when he was ―destroying‖ himself.  Aside 
from these few mentions of drugs impact on the brain and the opioid receptor system, 
there were no other explicit discussions of the brain disease model. 
Physiological Elements of Addiction 
While neuroscientific understandings of addiction were rare, most people felt that 
their addiction had physiological components, which some framed it in terms of a disease 
or illness.  Carl, for instance, draws an analogy between his HIV and drug addiction:  
―Well, I got sick and was admitted to the county hospital and a counselor came over and 
talked to me. …  You know, I knew I needed some help.  [I had] the illness [HIV], and 
then I had the other illness of drug addiction.‖  More common than describing addiction 
explicitly as a disease, people talked about a physiological need or overwhelming urge to 
use drugs.  Jose says:  ―If I use drugs, ...the only thing in my brain is to get that drug.‖  
This single-minded focus on getting the drug was common and was sometimes described 
as craving. 
Darlene attributes addiction to the physical dependence that is caused by 
properties inherent in the substances themselves.  She says: 
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I had a bad back.  Over the years, your tolerance gets stronger and 
stronger.  So I was like on 600 milligrams of morphine…  But I don‘t 
think I was mentally addicted.  I think I was physically addicted. 
Q:  So it was a different type of addiction for you? 
A:  Right.  I mean you can‘t help the physical addiction.  It‘s going to 
happen when you are on painkillers, narcotics, whatever you call them. 
 
Darlene seems to understand both the scientific notion of tolerance (needing an 
increasing amount of a drug for the same effect) and that there is a purely physiological 
part of addiction that ―you can‘t help‖  --  it is neither ―mental‖ nor within her ability to 
control.  Also notable is that Darlene views morphine, prescribed for her in a medical 
setting, as a physically addicting drug. 
Even more common than craving or physical dependence, however, participants 
spoke of the physiological aspects of addiction in terms of avoiding withdrawal or ―dope-
sicknesses.‖  While some people acknowledged that they still enjoyed getting high, most 
people explained their continued use of drugs as a physical necessity. Dolly describes 
how she learned about dope-sickness after her boyfriend introduced her to heroin: 
This [shooting heroin] is a great feeling. So the next day I did it again. 
And the next day I did it again, and again. Then I thought, 'I'm coming 
down with the flu. Something's wrong with me. I'm feeling sick.'  [My 
boyfriend] said ‗Honey, you're not sick. You're dope sick.‘ And I said, 
‗What? What's dope sick?‘ ... And that‘s the only reason why I am on it 
[heroin]. So I don't get sick. 
 
After just a few days of use, Dolly becomes physically dependent on heroin and quickly 
moves from taking it for a ―great feeling‖ to taking it to avoid getting sick.  Darnel 
describes the physical price he pays if he stops using heroin: ―if I don't have no bag of 
dope, running nose, chills and diarrhea, cramps -- lower back and abdomen -- all the 
time.‖  So compelling is the need to avoid becoming dope sick, some individuals like Pat 
structure their entire day, indeed much of their lives, around obtaining and using drugs:   
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It's like when I wake up in the morning, I'm weak and stuff, and [I] either 
use or it just gets worse.  So I basically have to use… and that's just like 
the physical part.  … I feel like I don't have time for anything else. It's 
hard, I mean it, being a drug addict; it's like a 24-hour-a-day job, you 
know. … The reality is that I'm not gonna be able to accomplish anything 
if I'm spending all my time trying to maintain, you know, by doing drugs 
and stuff like that. 
 
Notable here is the embodied experience that she ―has to use‖ and the absence of any 
sense of pleasure she derives from using drugs.  This absence of pleasure stands in 
contrast to the neuroscientific literature, which is largely based on theory that people use 
drugs to stimulate their dopamine systems or ―pleasure center‖ of the brain.  Also, 
notable are the ways in which the need to acquire drugs disrupts the ability to engage in 
other activities. This description of the ways in which seeking, paying for, and using 
illicit drugs structures one‘s days was typical of many people and became an important 
point of contrast for their experiences taking bup. 
Psychological Elements of Addiction 
While most people articulated a physical aspect to addiction, many also held that 
addiction had a psychological component.  For example, Terry attributes most of 
addiction to ―being mental‖ and also hints at how her conceptions of addiction have been 
shaped by her experiences with different forms of treatment.  She says:  
Seventy-five percent of addiction is mental, I believe.  I‘ve been on both 
sides of the coin [an ―addict‖ and a counselor].  I was a senior client 
advocate in a 149 bed treatment facility.  So, I‘ve been on both side of 
coin.  I‘ve done the NA [Narcotics Anonymous] shuffle.  I‘ve been 
programmed. 
 
Here, Terry directly acknowledges that her exposure to Narcotics Anonymous 
―programmed‖ her and influences the ways she understands her own experiences of 
addiction and treatment.  The Narcotics Anonymous approach is consistent with a view 
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that addiction is a both a psychological and behavioral problem.  Within the NA 
framework, it is will power and changes in behavior --  not typically a medication – that 
overcome addiction.   
Pat, in contrast, draws on a different psychological addiction discourse and 
attributes drug use to having an ―addictive personality.‖  The following quote from 
Robert is illustrative of the hybrid notions of addiction as both physical and 
psychological held by many: 
[T]he medication itself solves the physiological and psychological aspects 
of opiate addiction, whatever it is that you're addicted to, because 
withdrawing from opiates is a miserable.  You wish you would die. It's 
just - it's awful.  So like I said, it removes that. It just - it just literally puts 
the physical and psychological aspects of the addiction away, so all that's 
left basically is how you fix the reasons that you use.  
 
In this, Robert‘s conception of addiction is similar to the one espoused by Reckitt 
Benckiser that medication can help with the physical symptoms so that individuals can 
engage in dealing with the psychological or personal issues that caused them to use.  
Interestingly, Robert acknowledges a third component of addiction, ―the reasons you use‖ 
that are beyond either the physical or the psychological aspects.  Like Robert, many 
people shared a sense that something beyond either the physical or psychological 
components of addiction caused them to use drugs in the first place and made it hard for 
them to stop using.  These included external factors, like one‘s social and economic 
context on the one hand, and a failure of spirituality, morality or will power on the other. 
External & Environmental Influences 
As my analysis of the neuroscientific, regulatory and marketing literature 
suggested, theories of addiction that include a role for external or environmental factors 
were limited.  With the exception of limited acknowledgement that the environment 
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might affect the brain‘s plasticity, most of the other sources I examined failed to explain 
addiction in terms of individuals‘ social and economic context.  The narrative of those 
living with and being treated for addiction differed significantly from these other sources 
in that most people felt that their families, peer groups, living situations, and economic 
standing either contributed to their drug use and/or affected their ability to stop using 
drugs.  Doug describes a fairly common scenario where the drug use of a partner 
eventually leads Doug himself to start using drugs: 
So I was in a strange town running out of money in a motel room and my 
partner is now back on heroin, so I feel like, you know, what did I do all 
this for?  Bob has obviously torn my life apart, destroyed it, and I'm sitting 
in Portland, and I'm going to be homeless.  Well, might as well go down 
the tubes with him. 
 
This idea that one‘s life situation – whether an abusive relationship, poverty, or illness – 
contributes to drug use occurred frequently and was often linked to experiences of living 
with HIV/AIDS.  Several people described how their feelings of hopelessness about their 
life circumstances generally or their HIV status specifically were connected to their drug 
use.  Portia explains that her identity as a ―dope fiend‖ and her expectation that she would 
die of AIDS led her to a hopelessness where death seemed the only logical solution: 
I thought for sure forever until the day I died of AIDS that I was going to 
be a dope fiend, a nothing.  I had nothing to offer any, anyone.  I had, I 
had no hope.  I wasn't ready to die.  But I was surely going to kill myself.  
In my mind I wasn't -- subconsciously I didn't want to die, but consciously 
I thought it was the right thing to do and then I was wondering, why the 
hell is it taking so long?  I'm running out of money here. 
 
Walker felt that, since his death was inevitable and perhaps imminent, he did not need to 
be concerned about the consequences of using drugs: 
So every time I watched a football game I used to always think that was 
going to be my last one.  Or any time, you know, I caught a cold, this is 
going to be my last one until I start getting to be depressed and I would 
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start letting myself go like that. ... Then I start getting into drugs and doing 
some stuff that I really didn't have no business doing because I didn't think 
I was going to live long enough anyway.  What difference do it make? 
 
Walker expresses a sentiment shared by others in the sample that their drug use was 
caused, not by changes to their brain structure or a misguided opioid receptor system, but 
by a hopelessness rooted in the reality of their lives and circumstances. 
People also understood that their ability to stop using drugs was linked not only to 
their physical health but also to their social and economic standing.  Participants 
repeatedly referenced poverty, lack of education, homelessness, and limited economic 
opportunity as affecting their drug use.  For instance, they spoke about the need for help 
with their employment, housing, mental health, and family problems in order to 
overcome their addiction.  Even those who felt that bup was effective made clear that 
their problems with addiction could not be separated from their social circumstances.  As 
one participant, Robert, put it: 
I don't believe that sobering somebody up solves the problem. It's much, 
much vaster and deeper than that. … You can't just give somebody 
Suboxone and then leave them alone. 
 
Pat explains how lack of social support combined with her proximity to neighborhoods 
where heroin is sold affect her likelihood of using drugs: 
I don't have really much support system right now… it's just too many 
ways for me to slip up. … where I live right now, it's like, it's right there. 
The people that sell heroin live in my building so it's really hard where I'm 
at. … [P]hysically and stuff, [bup] is keeping me from drugs but I have 
other problems besides heroin too that I don't think they're  [physicians] 
really equipped to address there and stuff, so. So, it's harder than heroin.  
 
Pat is clear that her problems with addiction go beyond a medical condition.  For her and 
many others, the physical aspects of addiction are only one part of much more complex 
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and varied phenomenon.  These multifaceted notions of addiction encompassed physical, 
psychological, and external factors.  In addition, for many people, their understandings of 
addiction were also informed by their spirituality or sense of morality. 
Addiction as a Spiritual or Moral Failing 
Even among those who held that addiction had a physical or psychological hold 
on them beyond their control were people who also believed that spirituality, morality, 
and will power play a fundamental role in addiction and ―recovery.‖  Some people, like 
Richard, seem to reject the medical model of addiction explicitly: ―[I]nstead of looking at 
it as being a medical issue, a mental illness, to me it‘s a weakness.  It‘s a moral weakness, 
you know, that I can‘t handle it.‖  Others combine a medical and moral understanding. 
For instance, Calvin believes God saw him through a host of physical ailments and now 
his addiction.  He explains: 
I'm a firm believer. … He [God] blessed me.  Blessed me through heart 
surgery, blessed me through this Hepatitis; he blessed me through the -- 
my appendix, blessed me through a hernia operation; he blessed me. ... 
[H]e said he'll protect me from all evil so I put it in his hands. 
Q:  Has it helped when you're in treatment this time? 
A:  Oh yes, yes. My higher power, oh yes, yes.  Yes, I ask him everyday to 
keep me from using, everyday. … I'm a very spiritual person, and I 
believe something spiritual happened to me last June and - and that was 
when I woke up one day and it was like no longer tug-of-war within me 
like it'd always been all my life. ... I don't give Suboxone the credit. 
 
Calvin does not eschew medical treatments or rely solely on God to cure, but clearly, for 
him there is more to overcoming addiction than treating its physical symptoms through a 
medication.  It is also worth noting that both Calvin‘s addiction and other medical 
conditions fall into the category of ―evil‖ suggesting an overt moral framework.  In 
addition, the reference to a ―higher power‖ invokes language used in Narcotics and 
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Alcoholics Anonymous treatment programs, where surrendering to a ―higher power‖ and 
admitting one is powerless over addiction is an essential step towards stopping use. 
Several others relied, not on God‘s power in overcoming addiction, but their own 
will power.  For example, Diane says bup helps, but a ―strong constitution‖ is also 
needed: ―You know, probably the pill would have been enough, but some people don't 
have a strong constitution.‖  Similarly, Derrick notes the importance of having inner 
strength: ―I'm scared I might get weak and, you know, want to try [using drugs], you 
know what I'm saying?‖  Several others, like Lesley, emphasized that bup only works for 
those  ―who really want to change.‖   Indeed a common theme throughout the interviews 
was the medication only works in combination with a deeply rooted desire for 
transformation.  Terry‘s comment is typical of many:  
If it‘s in their heart and if they really wanna be clean, and they want a life, 
it‘s gonna work.  If in their heart they wanna be a down and dirty junkie, it 
ain‘t gonna work, period. 
 
Terry‘s sense that being a ―down and dirty junkie‖ is a choice and that being ―clean‖ 
requires a change of heart shows the persistent role of will power in narratives about 
addiction and ―recovery.‖  Medication only works when combined with the desire and the 
will to both stop using drugs and have a different kind of life.  Not coincidentally, the 
language of ―clean‖ and ―dirty‖ with its clear moral overtones was used almost 
universally by individuals in this sample to describe their experiences of being addicted 
and being ―free‖ from drugs.   
For many of these individuals, a brain disease model is insufficient to explain 
their embodied experiences of addiction and trying to quite drugs.  Physiological 
experiences of craving and withdrawal are central to their experiences and their 
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understanding, but so are ideas about psychology and mental health, the role of external 
circumstances, and beliefs about God, morality and will power.  Individuals combined 
their lived experiences with a range of discourses that draw on medicine, psychology, 12-
Step programs, and a host of other popular ideas about addiction and recovery.  
Medications, like methadone and bup, enter into this amalgamated web of understandings 
about addiction and shape them in particular ways. 
 
Methadone: “The dope man was the government” 
First introduced for heroin treatment in the 1960‘s, for decades methadone 
remained the only medication for the treatment of addiction.  Like bup, methadone was 
developed within the context of a medical model of addiction.  Originally tested for 
treating heroin addiction by Dole and Nyswander, scientists at Rockefeller University, 
methadone was based on the understanding that ―heroin addiction is a metabolic disease‖ 
(Dole and Nyswander 1967: 20).  Similar to bup, methadone was used to argue against 
the idea that addiction was due to a failure of will.  Rather, it should be seen as a medical 
problem that should be freed from stigma and treated by medical professionals (Nelkin 
1973).  Dole and Nyswander argued: 
If, as is generally assumed, our patients‘ longstanding addiction to heroin 
had been based on weaknesses of character…  it was difficult to 
understand why they so consistently accepted a program that blocked the 
euphoric action of heroin (1967: 21). 
 
The same focus on blocking pleasure that is central to neuroscientific theories of bup was 
at the heart rhetorical arguments about methadone almost 5 decades ago.  Early 
methadone trails were heralded as a huge success both because participants reduce their 
use of heroin and because they were able to return to work and lead ―normal‖ lives (Dole 
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and Nyswander 1967; Nelkin 1973).  Despite Dole and Nyswander‘s fierce advocacy to 
treat methadone as a medication for medical problem, methadone never entered the 
medical mainstream.  Instead, it remained under the control of complex and highly 
regulated system of clinics that became the foil for advocates lobbying for the passage of 
DATA 2000 and for a less restrictive scheduling of bup by the Drug Enforcement 
Agency. 
Proponents of bup sought to overcome many of the failures of methadone through 
the way bup is formulated, regulated, marketed, and dispensed.  This makes comparisons 
between bup and methadone from the perspectives of individuals who have tried both a 
useful way to explore whether or not and how bup succeeds in differentiating itself from 
methadone.  Many people in the BHIVES sample had been exposed to and deliberately 
rejected methadone in favor of bup.  Therefore, when describing their embodied 
experiences of bup, most compared it to methadone.  It is in relation to methadone that 
bup is constructed, and it is bup‘s perceived similarities to and differences from 
methadone that in part shape individual‘s notions of addiction and addiction treatment.  
The degree to which bup is different from heroin and/or methadone in how it is 
experienced bodily, the setting in which it is dispensed, the social context that surrounds 
it, and it the impact it has the daily lives of those taking it are all central to whether 
people experience bup as a medication or a drug and how they conceptualize addiction 
and its treatment more broadly. 
Embodied Experiences of Methadone 
My analysis of interviews with people being treated for addiction suggests that 
methadone has failed to effectively differentiate itself from the drugs of abuse it is meant 
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to treat.  With few exceptions, participants in the BHIVES sample described their 
experiences with methadone as having many of the same properties as illicit drugs --  it 
made them high and/or sedated, it was addicting, and it caused horrible withdrawal.  
Several people described being on methadone as having a ―double habit‖ because it only 
increased their desire to use illicit drugs and because they felt that methadone itself was 
an addicting drug.  As Carl explains: 
The methadone just seemed like it made you crave even more for drugs 
because the methadone gave you something like a high, you know.  And if 
you add more [illicit drugs] to it, the higher you get. … I don‘t see the 
logic in that.  You‘re going to drink the methadone and snort the dope…  
Now, instead of having just one habit, you got two. 
 
Carl goes on to say, ―Methadone gives you a substitute high. Methadone gets you high, 
you know. ... If I wanted to get high, I'd stay with the heroin, you know.‖  The  
―substitute high‖ that Carl gets from methadone causes him to classify it as another habit, 
akin to his heroin addiction. 
Several people besides Carl noted that are few differences between methadone 
and heroin, other than their legal status.  According to George, ―methadone is just like 
shootin' drugs.‖  Habierto concurs:  ―The methadone, if I do methadone, it‘s like I‘m 
doing heroin… They give it to you and you drink it, but its like heroin.‖  Habierto implies 
that, even though it is ―given to you‖ by a professional and it is drunk, rather than snorted 
or injected, these differences in formulation and setting are not enough to make 
methadone significantly different from heroin.  Similarly, another participant, Clarence, 
refers to methadone as ―legal way alter consciousness,‖ and Portia went so far as to 
equate the government-run methadone system with drug dealers.  She claims:  ―When I 
was on methadone, I felt like I was being --  the dope man was the government. … They 
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were my dope dealers.‖  For Portia and others, the cravings and high caused by 
methadone placed it in the category of a drug, and its legality was not enough to 
accomplish methadone‘s status as a legitimate medication.   
Participants in the BHIVES study rejected methadone as a medication not only 
because it made them high but also because it caused physical dependence, another key 
marker of illicit opioids.  Several people described methadone as being worse to detox 
from then heroin.  After claiming she would rather have cancer than go through 
methadone withdrawal, Terry says: 
Because the methadone doesn‘t just get in your blood and in your system; 
it gets in your bones…  I‘ve seen people that wanted to throw themselves 
out the window just to make it [methadone withdrawal] stop.  I‘ve seen 
people begging to die because it hurt so bad.  I‘ve gone through heroin 
withdrawal; I‘ve gone through cocaine withdrawal --  I‘ve done both, and 
I‘ve seen methadone withdrawal, and that‘s something I would never 
wanna experience in a million, million years. 
 
Jesse was so fearful off coming of methadone that he felt that he was imprisoned by it:  
―Methadone made me like, I was still a prisoner, you know, of the drug.‖   
The perception that those on methadone are still on drugs was one shared not just 
by those being treated but in some cases by those providing drug treatment.  Jane 
describes being in a Narcotics Anonymous program where her sponsor refused to see her 
and another woman ―because we weren‘t clean because we were on methadone, and 
that‘s just like to them we were still getting loaded.‖  Another participant, Alan, noted 
that he could not be on methadone when he entered a residential treatment program 
because it was ―drug-free.‖  In their study of methadone clinics, Fraser and Valentine, 
observe that because those on methadone are not considered ―drug-free,‖ methadone 
maintenance ―offers a uniquely marginal social location for its consumers‖ (2008: 2). 
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Even Dole and Nyswander, the researchers who first used methadone for the 
treatment of heroin addiction, noted decades ago that, because it is perceived as 
substituting one drug for another, methadone has failed to achieve the status of other 
medications:  
What was not anticipated…was the nearly universal reaction against the 
concept of substituting one drug for another…  The analogous long-term 
use of other medications such as insulin and digitalis in medical practice 
has not been considered relevant (1980: 261). 
 
The idea that methadone is a ―substitute drug‖ did not go unnoticed by bup advocates.  
They seldom, if ever, refer to bup as a ―substitute.‖  And, as the earlier discussion 
suggests, they went out of their way to try and differentiate the pharmacological 
properties of bup from both heroin and methadone. 
Setting, Regulation and Diversion 
Another aspect of methadone that participants suggested contribute to its 
ambiguous drug/medicine status and fostered a marginal standing for those being treated 
with it was the setting in which it was delivered.  Many described how the drug use and 
drug trade that surrounded many methadone clinics shaped their perceptions of it.  
Several people described an active black market for methadone and other drugs that often 
took place at or nearby the clinics, contributing to feelings of stigma and reinforcing 
perceptions that methadone is a drug, not a medicine.  Portia says, ―They sell methadone 
on the street… There‘s some people just getting high off methadone.‖  As Jane explains: 
―that methadone, it just puts you into that lifestyle.  It really does because that‘s what is at 
that clinic --  drug addicts.  So you become a drug addict.‖  Methadone is tainted because 
it is sold on the street like other drugs and because it is sold by ―drug dealers.‖  In 
addition for Jane, just being around other ―drug addicts‖ at the clinic fosters a lifestyle 
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that, even apart from methadone itself, makes one ―become a drug addict.‖  These claims 
echo those in the congressional record, where advocates noted that the stigma 
surrounding methadone clinics was one important reason why bup should be regulated 
differently. 
Participants in the BHIVES study also make clear that methadone is a failure as 
medication because the way in which it is regulated and dispensed makes it impossible 
for them be ―normal.‖  As several participants explain, rather than fostering a sense of 
being in a medical treatment that restores one‘s ―normal‖ functioning, the rules governing 
methadone disrupt daily life and reinforce the idea that those in methadone treatment are 
addicts that need to be governed and controlled through punitive measures.  Most 
methadone clinics have a medical director who is a physician, but the vast majority of 
methadone treatment is delivered by counselors, and the dosing amounts, schedules, and 
rules about ―take home‖ doses are often determined by a set of administrative procedures 
and rules that vary from clinic to clinic.  According to the CSAT National Advisory 
Committee‘s Subcommittee on Buprenorphine: ―In some clinics, the medical decision-
making is really being done program administrators, with physicians being used to rubber 
stamp those decisions or forced to follow dosing policies that are not consistent with 
well-accepted medical standards‖ (1999: 27).  Clinics vary across the country but most 
share a requirement of daily attendance, directly observed dosing, and sanctions for 
failure to show up, having a ―dirty‖ urine (a sign that someone has used drugs other than 
methadone), or refusing to participate in different aspects of the program, like counseling.  
Figure 19 shows a typical dispensing window at a methadone clinic, where clients are 
referred to by numbers and staff are protected by a sheet of Plexiglas.  These kinds of 
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requirements set methadone apart from other kinds of medical treatment and, according 
to some of those who have participated, hinder rather than help their ―recovery.‖ 
Figure 19: Dispensing Window at a Methadone Clinic 
 
Source: Farley 2011 
 
Jane describes in detail how the restrictive methadone clinic hours and 
regulations, which require daily attendance at a specific time, combined with the fear of 
methadone withdrawal, contribute to relapse: 
It would be the worst feeling in the world to get up and know I had to 
come to this fucking clinic and drink that methadone. … So you're coming 
this way, and you keep looking at your watch and it, it's getting close to 
that time and you got 30 minutes … and then when you get off the bus you 
got five minutes.  You're running up the stairs, you waiting for the 
elevator, it doesn't come, so you run up the stairs, you're breathing and you 
step up to the window and they closed.  They won't give it to you. … They 
say, ‗well, I'll bet you'll be on time tomorrow morning.‘  You know, and 
then you have to wait until seven o'clock the next morning and ... so you 
either ran out of methadone, and you're actually sick.  So you go do 
something and you get you some money to get you some dope and 
especially if you don't have any money you gonna go and do something to 
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get you some money to buy some heroin.  Then you have to go into that 
rat race.  
 
Dana also found it difficult to get to the methadone clinic everyday, and when she missed 
her appointment, she used heroin to avoid withdrawal.  This only compounded her 
problems at the clinic because at her clinic, ―if you have dirty urine, you either start rapid 
detox, or you go up 15 milligrams.‖  She described how every time she ―slipped up,‖ her 
methadone dose was increased to the point where she was terrified of ever being able to 
get off it.
15
  These kinds of struggles led Dana to conclude that she wanted to get out of 
methadone treatment both because of her concerns about physical dependence and 
because she was tired of ―lying and trying to beat urines.‖  Mindy also ran afoul of 
another rule at her clinic.  She was kicked out of her methadone program for drinking 
alcohol and avoiding mandatory groups.  Her withdrawal from methadone became so 
severe that she too returned to using heroin.  In each instance, participants felt that rather 
than helping them treat their addiction, methadone actually contributed to it in large part 
because of the restrictive regulations that govern methadone treatment. 
In addition to being almost universally loathed by participants, the kinds of 
restrictions and regulations they describe undermine methadone‘s would be status as a 
medical model.  Members of the NIH consensus panel concluded: ―We know of no other 
area where the Federal Government intrudes so deeply or coercively into the practice of 
medicine‖ (NIH 1997: 19).   It is not, however, just that the rules and regulations abridge 
the authority of physicians; they are perceived by some people as making the ―normal‖ 
functioning the clinics purport to be fostering impossible.  Carl was one among many 
                                                 
15
 Clinics often increase doses when someone relapses on the theory that the individual must not be 
receiving enough methadone to effectively block the craving for heroin (see for example, Caplehorn et al. 
1993). 
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who noted that the methadone regulations, especially the requirement of daily attendance, 
prevent people from ―having a life.‖  He says: 
With the methadone program, you have to go down there each and every 
day and that could be a hassle if you are trying to have a life.  You know, 
if you got a job or something, you have to work your schedule around 
going to pick up your methadone. 
 
Other people talked about how methadone prevented them from traveling or 
visiting family out of town.  These kinds of experiences are consistent with Bull‘s study 
of methadone clinics in which she concluded that the regulations governing methadone 
impede clients ―from making certain types of decisions about their daily lives, even when 
such decisions are considered to be of positive therapeutic value – such as working or 
visiting family‖ (2008: 163).  To use Becker‘s words, ―the treatment of deviance denies 
them the ordinary means of carrying on the routines of daily life‖ (1963/1997: 35). Fraser 
and Valentine concluded that methadone produces the very kinds of people it purports to 
cure: 
In short, rendering the maintenance of paid work difficult, in providing 
few protections and comforts, and in making clients available to black 
market purchasers and sellers in a public space for long periods of time… 
regularly runs the risk of intra-actively producing the very clients it seeks 
to ‗cure,‘ the very clients that methadone maintenance therapy has been 
introduced to manage within liberal societies: unproductive, disorderly 
clients involved in illicit drug markets (2008:109-110). 
 
In this group of individuals, many of whom have explicitly rejected methadone in order 
to try bup, methadone is experienced and perceived largely as a drug.  Its effects on the 
embodied lives of those who take it, the regulations that govern it, the setting that 
surrounds it, and its popularity on the black market sale construct methadone as an 
ambiguous substance that is more drug than medicine.  Moreover, many people saw the 
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system of methadone dispensing as hindering their ability to leave the ―drug world‖ 
behind and to participate in the routines of daily life that signal ―being normal.‖ 
 
Buprenorphine: “Suboxone’s a wonder drug” 
Bup was meant to address many of the problems inherent methadone in part 
through its formulation and physical effects but also through its regulation and how it is 
prescribed.  The following section explores how those taking bup experience the 
substance and the effect this has on how they perceive it as a treatment for addiction.  I 
look at how the ways in which bup is regulated and dispensed effects the experiences and 
perceptions of those taking it.  I also examine the degree to which its placement in a 
medical setting and in the hands of physicians influences how patients understand bup 
specifically and addiction more generally. 
Embodiment of Bup 
Addiction researchers and Reckitt Benckiser highlight bup‘s safety (it is harder to 
overdose on bup) and its lower abuse potential (by adding naloxone, bup is seen as harder 
misuse and divert) as the important biochemical features that differentiated it from heroin 
or methadone.  Individuals taking bup, in contrast, rarely mentioned bup‘s safety or abuse 
potential but focused instead on its pharmaceutical effects (how it made them feel) – 
especially as it compared to methadone.  With few exceptions, people described bup as 
creating less of a high and significantly less sedation or ―nodding‖ than methadone.  
More importantly, bup seemed to succeed in both reducing cravings and preventing 
symptoms of withdrawal.  Julian‘s comment is typical of many: ―[W]ith buprenorphine, 
there‘s no feeling; you know, it‘s just like you wake up normal. … There is no, I don‘t 
 188 
think about getting high, you know, I just don‘t.‖  According to Derrick, ―I‘ve had no 
symptoms of withdrawals. … My mind is in a total different state.  I‘m not having the 
urge to having to run out and think about where I‘m going to get a blow from.‖  People 
widely commented that bup freed them from the need to prevent withdrawal or respond 
to cravings by using illicit drugs. 
A striking number of people, almost two-thirds of the sample, described bup as 
making them feel ―normal.‖  The interview guide did not ask any direct questions about 
acting or feeling ―normal.‖  Rather, these comments were volunteered in response to an 
open-ended question about how buprenorphine made the participant feel or what s/he 
liked about bup.  Links between medicalization and normalization have been noted 
before (see for example, Conrad and Schneider 2002; Lewis 2003; Sanderson et al. 
2011).  In a review of literature about how people repair ―biographical disruptions‖ 
associated with illness, Sanderson et al. note most people focus on ―behavioral attempts 
to maintain a normal life‖ and ―demonstrate normalcy to others‖ (2011: 620).  They also 
note that responsibility for normalization generally rests on the ill individual --  an 
observation certainly true of my analysis and to which I return later.  Here, I want to 
extend the work on normalization to suggest that ―normal‖ is achieved both by ―acting 
normal‖ (the restoration of typical behavior that Sanderson describes) and by ―feeling 
normal‖ (an embodied state).   
For several people, ―normal‖ referred to their embodied feelings of not being ―on 
a drug,‖ which can mean not having cravings, not feeling sedated, not feeling high, and 
being able to think clearly.  For example, for William, ―just normal‖ means ―I don‘t have 
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any cravings.‖  For Nancy, ―normal‖ is the absence of feeling either excessively speedy 
or sedated: 
I think Suboxone‘s a wonder drug actually, because I‘m just normal.  Like 
I‘m not speedy.  I‘m not sleeping all day long. …  And I think it‘s good 
actually because I don‘t feel like I‘m on any drug. ….  It just makes me 
feel normal. 
 
Lesley also equates the normal caused by bup as feeling ―like I‘m not taking anything.‖  
Doug credits bup with making him feel ―extra normal,‖ which for him was the absence of 
withdrawal symptoms and not feeling high.  He says: 
That‘s what I‘m getting at.  It‘s not high.  It‘s just almost like a drug that 
would make you feel normal.  A drug that makes you feel extra normal.  
Extra normal.  …  Just a touch, a bit of an opiate should make you feel 
like that.  If I go and take my dose, I feel it, but I don‘t feel an 
overwhelming sense of well-being other than feeling normal.  Suboxone is 
nothing like methadone.  Suboxone got me back to normal. 
 
A few people also noted a change in their thinking.  For example, Gwen contrasts 
her mental state on bup with her mental state on illicit opiates: 
It [bup] works good, you know? …  I mean, it‘s good a clear head.  You 
know what I mean?  I‘m never cloudy no more – a different way of 
thinking…  [No more] of that junkie mentality thinking. 
 
For others, bup seemed to offer a physical, mental and emotional state that was seen as 
return to an authentic self – a self that existed before they became addicted to drugs.  
According to Pat: 
[I]t just really felt like it kind if took me back to like before I had ever 
done opiates….  You know, I wake up, I feel normal… It doesn‘t make 
you feel like you were on methadone.  With buprenorphine you just feel 
like you‘re just normal.  That‘s why I say it‘s kind of like it takes me back 
to before I had ever done opiates. 
 
According to Habierto, ―The difference with Suboxone is acting normal…  You know, 
it‘s me, it‘s me, it‘s the real me.‖  Other scholars have noted the seeming contradiction of 
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using a mind-altering medication to reclaim an authentic self (see for example, Stevenson 
and Knudsen 2008).  
In addition to reducing cravings and not causing a high, bup was seen as less 
addicting and as causing fewer withdrawal symptoms than methadone.  Doug notes that 
bup restored normality by getting rid of feelings of sickness and euphoria:  ―I felt normal.  
I didn‘t feel high.  I didn‘t feel sick.‖  Several people described going a day or two before 
realizing that they had forgotten to take their bup – something that was inconceivable 
with heroin or methadone.  As Pat explains: 
Even though I get off the bup, I don‘t get sick from that really.  I just … 
feel like a little bit weak.  But I know if that if I were on methadone,… no 
matter what, then I‘m sick from the heroin or from the methadone …  But 
if I were to stop bup cold turkey, it‘s easy… There‘s not really much of 
what I would consider like I was kicking anything. 
 
While there was widespread agreement that bup addressed craving and 
withdrawal symptoms while creating fewer feelings of being high, sedated or sick, many 
participants seemed to struggle with whether bup was a drug or a medicine primarily 
because it caused physical dependence.  At times people described it as a medicine, but 
many (including some of the same people who referred to it as a medicine) also seemed 
to view it as another substitute drug like methadone.  This ambivalence was in part 
grounded in their embodied experiences of bup.  It may have made them ―feel normal,‖ 
but it also caused a physical dependence and was experienced by many as a substance 
that was merely replacing the drug to which they had been addicted.  
Some people seemed to be trying to convince themselves that bup was like other 
medications.  Stephen, for example, says: ―I‘ve slowly gotten away from even thinking 
about it [taking bup].  You know, for what it does.  I just have my medicine case, and I 
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have all meds in it, and I have my suboxone meds, and I take my meds, and that‘s it.‖  
This suggests that there was time when Stephen did think about it as being different from 
the other medications he takes.  Jesse asserts that bup is just like other medications but 
then feels the need to assure the interviewer that he does not abuse it but takes it as 
prescribed: 
I mean it‘s [bup] just like anything else.  To me it is a medicine. …  I take 
it in the morning along with my other medicine; I take it with my HIV 
meds. ... Like I take a pill for high blood pressure. …  Okay.  No 
difference…  And I just take it.  I don‘t abuse it.  I take it as prescribed. 
 
One the one hand, Jesse equates bup with his HIV and hypertension medications.  But he 
also acknowledges that bup can be a drug of abuse; only by taking it ―as prescribed‖ does 
the substance becomes like other medications.  Richard directly acknowledges that he has 
to mentally construct bup as a medication because he is prone to viewing it as a crutch.  
He explains how understanding bup as a medication is linked to understanding addiction 
as ―medical situation:‖  
I think the Bup for somebody that's struggling and deciding that they want 
to try something, they would also have to be open to the fact that -- or not 
have that mental image that I have sometimes of it being a crutch.  You 
know, they would have to look at it as a medical situation.  And if they 
have that ability or if that can be conveyed to them that this is something 
that you can take to help you deal with your substance abuse and stuff like 
that and, and eventually get off of it, I think it'll work. 
 
This passage from Richard reveals how bup as a medication is a discursive achievement 
but a tenuous one.  Not only does bup need to be framed ―as a medical situation,‖ people 
need to reject Richard‘s view that bup is crutch.  The language of ―crutch‖ discloses 
Richard‘s understanding that bup itself is an addictive substance and that ideally his 
addiction is something that he should master by himself, presumably through an assertion 
of will power.  The last line reveals a common theme that undermines the construction of 
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bup as a medication for a chronic condition, which is that many of the participants feel 
that the goal of bup treatment is to ―eventually get off it.‖   
This desire to ―get off bup‖ stems from a widely shared belief among participants 
that recovery without a ―crutch‖ is somehow more meaningful or authentic than 
overcoming addiction through bup.  An analogy can be made to diabetes where insulin 
offers a medical solution, but controlling the illness through diet and exercise is seen as 
somehow better or more moral (Broom & Whitaker 2004).  In addition to the idea that is 
better to overcome the illness without a ―crutch,‖ is the understanding by participants in 
my study that bup is an opioid that cause physical dependence.  As such, bup occupies an 
ambivalent location somewhere between an addictive drug that makes one ―dirty‖ and a 
legitimate medication that makes one well.  Wendell‘s comment below is emblematic of 
this ambivalence about bup.  He struggles to articulate whether or not taking bup makes 
his body ―clean‖ (i.e., free from drugs) or ―dirty‖ (i.e., polluted by drugs): 
I mean my body is clean.  I‘d say it‘s clean from illicit drugs.  I got a drug 
in my body now that‘s given to me my doctor, and that‘s the only thing 
I‘m going to use, ‗cause it‘s going to keep me straight. 
 
Like Jesse quoted above, Wendell turns to the role of the doctor as legitimizing bup as a 
medication.  Diane also struggles with the idea that bup makes her ―dirty,‖ and her doctor 
offers a medical explanation to persuade her that bup is a necessary medication.  But even 
so, she resists the idea of having to take it forever.  She says: 
You‘re not totally clean [on bup].  But Dr. N said something.  I said, ‗do 
you ever get off buprenorphine?‘  And he said, ‗Well, would you ever get 
off your diabetic medicine?‘  You know I was like some people do and 
some people don‘t. 
Q:  So how would you feel about being on bup for the rest of your life? 
A:  It‘s okay.  Yeah, it would be okay because you don‘t have to take it 
everyday if you have a strong constitution. 
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Diane, like Richard above, understands how bup can be viewed as a medication but is 
unwilling to let go of the idea that it is some internal resource, ―a strong constitution,‖ 
that is the preferred source of overcoming addiction, especially since the alternative 
means ―you‘re not totally clean.‖  
Diane‘s resistance to having take bup indefinitely was widely shared, and, Dana, 
like several others, talks about how she wants to slowly take lower and lower doses of 
bup until she can stop taking it altogether.  She says:   
I wanna break it down, maybe eight or four [milligrams] a day.  I don‘t 
want to be addicted to nothing any more. …  I‘m tired of being a fucking 
slave to something all my life.   
 
Dana, like many others, understands that bup creates an addiction like other opioids and 
here uses the language of slavery --  a metaphor that was also widely used to describe 
people‘s relationships with methadone and heroin.  Clarence shared Diane‘s dislike of 
being reliant on a ―drug‖ and succeeded in reducing his dose ―down to practically 
nothing…because I don‘t want to be dependent on anything.‖  Darnel describes his cycle 
of illicit and prescribed medication use and suggests how and why it might be difficult 
for people to make clear distinctions between opioids that cause addiction and opioids 
that treat addiction. He says: 
So I have used buprenorphine to get off heroin and to get off morphine.  
Now because she [the doctor] cut my Percocets… I went and picked up 
heroin again, so I ended up having to go in and do the buprenorphine 
again to get off the heroin.  I only take buprenorphine for maybe 14 days 
at most. 
Q:  Why? 
A: Because I don‘t want to replace it with another drug. …  I don‘t need 
where you are going to give me another pill or take one pill and replace it 
with another one. 
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This quote from Darnel reveals how individuals struggle understanding on a personal 
level the kinds of distinctions between drugs and medicines government actors and 
Reckitt Benckiser tried to reinforce in earlier chapters.  It is precisely this kind of 
ambiguity that their constructions of bup sought to address. 
  From the perspective of people in this study, bup has some clear advantages over 
methadone and heroin in terms of its impact on their bodily experiences.  It creates less 
euphoria, addresses cravings and withdrawal symptoms, and is easier to withdraw from 
than methadone --  all features which make it more like a medication than a drug and 
which help those taking it to feel ―normal.‖  However, bup also creates a physical 
dependence and is generally prescribed for a long or indefinite length of time --  features 
which make it like a substitution for the drugs it is meant to treat.  These embodied 
experiences of bup suggest that it remains in a liminal and ambiguous state somewhere 
between a drug and a medicine. 
Role of the Medical Setting 
As we saw in the case of methadone, it is not just the embodied experience of a 
medication that influences how it is perceived and constructed.  The setting and context 
as well as the rules and regulations surrounding a medication also shape its meaning.  
Indeed, as earlier chapters suggest, government regulators and RB wanted to change the 
context on which bup was delivered precisely as a strategy to medicalize addiction 
treatment.  In his landmark essay, ―Becoming a Marijuana User,‖ Becker (1953) argues 
that enjoying marijuana is a learned behavior, and Zinberg (1984), in his classic work, 
Drug, Set, Setting, argues that one of the key factors shaping subjective experiences of 
drug effects is setting.  That is, one‘s physical and social setting influences how illicit 
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drugs are experienced.  I would suggest that the same is true for prescribed medications.  
In addition to a change in who is delivering the treatment (i.e., physicians instead of 
addiction counselors), buprenorphine marks a significant change in the setting where 
drug treatment is delivered.  For the first time in decades, individuals with opioid 
addiction can obtain treatment in the privacy of one‘s home, rather than having to go to 
the highly stigmatized methadone clinics or drug treatment facility.  Regulators 
emphasized the doctor‘s office, but the doctor‘s office is where the prescription is 
written.  With a few exceptions (generally when people first start bup treatment), bup is 
consumed in the privacy of one‘s own home or wherever the ―patient‖ chooses.   
In In Labor (1982), Katz Rothman details the importance of setting in processes 
of medicalization, describing how the move from home to hospital births changes both 
the experience of birth and the dynamics of power and control between doctors and 
midwives.  Here, I am interested in understanding what the change of setting heralded by 
buprenorphine means for the medicalization of addiction as well as the experiences and 
perceptions of those being treated.  In this section, I examine how the setting and context 
in which bup is taken and the rules and regulations that surround it shape individuals‘ 
experience of bup.   
The biggest change made possible by DATA 2000 was to place addiction 
treatment in the hands of physicians in an ―office-based‖ setting.  As described in 
Chapter 3, this law deliberately sought to distance bup treatment from methadone, which 
has become a highly stigmatized medicine/drug delivered within a highly stigmatized and 
disruptive setting.  Reckitt Benckiser also focused on bup as advantageous because of the 
―private and confidential‖ setting in which is prescribed.  Setting was seen by bup 
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addiction medicine specialists, advocates for DATA 2000, and Reckitt Benckiser as a 
central factor in achieving the medicalization of addiction.  However, as the analysis 
below suggests, the role of doctors and the medical setting seemed to have relatively little 
impact on how individuals understood either bup or addiction, though being able to take 
their bup prescriptions home had enormous significance. 
A few participants already quoted above felt the fact that it was being prescribed 
by a doctor helped legitimize bup as a medication, but Richard, who was quoted earlier 
describing bup as a crutch, was among the only people who expressed how the medical 
setting could and should shape perceptions.  When asked if he liked receiving addiction 
treatment in the same place he got his HIV care, he says: 
It‘s okay.  Part of what it gave me was the opportunity to not only talk 
about my HIV stuff, but the chance to talk about recovery some. … For 
me, it set up a situation where I didn‘t feel like my doctor was judging me 
around my recovery either.  We‘re talking about a medical piece that I was 
able at times to look at bup as being a medical thing like I was treating my 
diabetes or AIDS.  
 
For Richard talking about his ―recovery‖ in a medical context where other medical issues 
were being addressed helped him understand ―bup as being a medical thing.‖   
However, this kind of articulation of how a medical setting shaped perceptions of 
bup or addiction more generally was extremely rare.  More typically, when individuals 
discussed the significance of receiving drug treatment in a medical setting, they focused 
on convenience, the benefits of being able to disclose both their drug use and their HIV 
status to their medical providers, and the belief that such disclosures might improve their 
medical care.  For instance, Walker liked being able to find out if and how his HIV 
medications might interact with the bup.  But the thing he liked most was not having to 
go to more one than one facility:  
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Instead of me having to go here to see about this and then go cross-town to 
check with somebody else to see about something else. You know what 
I'm saying, it's convenient and everything by it being in the same place. 
 
Mindy agrees: ―It‘s like killing two birds with one stone.‖ 
While people liked the convenience of getting their medical and addiction 
treatment in the same place, they seemed ambivalent about the role of doctors in 
addiction treatment and about whether doctors could in fact treat addiction like other 
medical conditions.  The National Advisory Committee‘s Subcommittee on 
Buprenorphine asked the rhetorical question:  ―Doctors treat all kinds of illness; what is 
addiction different‖ (1999: 12)?  For participants in the BHIVES sample, addiction was 
different, and many doctors treated it differently.  Some people felt that their doctors 
either did not want to hear about their addiction, lacked the expertise to do so, or that it 
was simply outside the scope of their physician‘s job.   
In response to a question about what role her HIV doctor played in her bup 
treatment, Lesley explained: 
He really don‘t want to hear about drugs; that‘s not really his thing.  He 
wants to focus on the HIV.  But if we talk about buprenorphine and drugs, 
that‘s not…  Doesn‘t want to hear that, you know.  So I don‘t point it out 
to him; I strictly stay on the health spot with him. 
 
This quote illustrates how both Lesley and her doctor make a distinction between HIV (or 
the ―health spot‖) and addiction, even though her addiction is supposedly being treated as 
a medical disorder in a medical setting.  In some cases, the focus on traditional medical 
issues and the exclusion of addiction were the decision of the ―patient‖ not the doctor.  
Portia says, ―I‘m not trying to talk to the man about too many things.  I want him to 
concentrate on my t-cell counts and listen to me when I am talking about neuropathy.  I 
don‘t want to get his mind on anything else.‖  Keeping the doctor focused on her health 
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status means not distracting him with her addiction treatment.  Pat shares Portia sense 
that maybe physicians are just not equipped to handle dealing with both traditional 
medicine and addiction treatment: ―With the addictions, I can see how it‘s different.  In 
some cases, doctors just aren‘t, aren‘t willing or aren‘t equipped to deal with stuff like 
that.‖  Robert is more direct in condemning his doctors for not being adequately educated 
about bup:  
The doctors half the time somebody will say, ‗Okay what meds are you 
on?‘  And I‘ll say, ‗I‘m on, duh, Suboxone.‘  And they‘re like, ‗well, back 
up.  What‘s Suboxone?‘  And then I‘ve got to explain it to them.  They 
don‘t know what the hell it is, and I feel like telling them, ‗well, you know 
what?  Go get online and educate yourself.  Call the pharmacist.  Ask him.  
You know, get out a PDR [Physician‘s Desk Reference].‘ 
 
Medical providers have long played a central role in the medicalization of social 
problems, acting as key mediators between the scientific literature, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the individuals they treat (see for example, Healy 2004).  However, the 
relationship between medicine and addiction has historically been filled with tension and 
ambiguity.  Doctors‘ lack of expertise about addiction generally and bup specifically 
undermines their credibility as an effective source of addiction treatment in the eyes of 
these individuals being treated by them.  Doctors‘ seeming unwillingness to know about 
and treat addiction is perhaps easier to understand when one remembers that doctors have 
been largely prevented from medically treating addiction for more than 80 years.  In 
addition, because most treatments for addiction are behavioral, many physicians do not 
believe that addiction is a condition that they can or should treat (Roche, Guray & 
Saunders 1991).  In fact, the average four-year medical school curriculum devotes less 
than 12 hours to addiction issues (Miller, et al. 2001), only 8% of medical schools require 
any substance abuse education in their curriculum (Physician Leadership on National 
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Drug Policy 2000), and there is remains no board certification in addiction medicine.  
Research supports what people in this sample reported: many physicians have a poor 
understanding of opioid agonist treatment and struggle with prejudices and negative 
attitudes about addiction and drug users (Gerbert et al. 1991; Merrill et al. 2001).  
Some scholars have suggested that doctors have also deliberately shunned treating 
mental illnesses, like addiction, because of its association with the custodial 
administration of deviance (Lakoff 2005).  Lakoff further suggests that the intangibility 
of psychiatric objects (which emerge out of the encounter between patient‘s subjective 
reports and clinicians‘ interpretative schemes) give those addressing mental disorders a 
marginal place within medicine that makes the treatment of those disorders undesirable 
(2005: 2).    
Dinglestad et al. (1996) argue that debates about drugs reflect the ―influence of 
groups with the greatest power over the perception and the deployment of the drug in 
question‖ (1830).  In the case of bup and medical treatments for addiction, the influence 
of the medical community does not seem to hold particular authority for the people in the 
BHIVES sample.  Their minimal influence is due in part to doctors‘ perceived lack of 
knowledge and interest but also to what kinds of knowledge are valued by those seeking 
addiction treatment.  One participant, Lesley, expresses a sentiment held by many that, 
when it comes to addiction, it is experiential, not ―book,‖ knowledge that has the most 
meaning: 
A person who strictly come out of school, you know, and don‘t have any 
experience at all.  How could you tell somebody something?  I mean, the 
books are good, I don‘t knock it. …  But for someone who has never 
experienced the streets or being homeless; I mean, how could you tell 
somebody something, how?   
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The value placed on experiential knowledge is drawn in part from traditional drug 
treatment programs, like therapeutic communities and Narcotics Anonymous, where it is 
the knowledge and experience of those ―who have been there‖ that supports the treatment 
of others (Borkman et al. 1998; Freed 2008).  Related to this belief and noted in the 
earlier section about how people conceptualize addiction is the conviction that medicine 
alone cannot address the problem.  If addiction is a hybrid construction that includes both 
medical and behavioral elements, then no doctor --  however, knowledgeable and willing 
– can effectively treat addiction.  This line of reasoning led Derrick to conclude that 
counselors not doctors should prescribe bup because it is they who can handle the 
multiple facets of addiction.  He says: ―because I feel that actually chemical dependency 
counselors should prescribe it because part of your recovery is not only ‗here‘s the 
medicine.‘‖   
The role of doctors is further complicated by the part they have played in the 
epidemic of addiction to opioid painkillers and other prescription medication and the 
ambiguity between prescription and illicit drugs.  Bup is not alone in occupying the 
ambiguous space between drugs and medicines.  There is an active and rich street 
economy centered on the sale of the prescribed drugs, and doctors‘ role in both providing 
and preventing access to these substances was a common theme among participants in the 
BHIVES study.  But the clearest message from the interviews was how much confusion 
there is about what constitutes a medicine and what constitutes a drug.  On the one hand, 
some people, like William, felt their doctors were supporting their addiction: ―I‘m trying 
to avoid pain medications because being in recovery, which I‘ve explained to all my 
doctors.  I don‘t want none of them Tylenol 3‘s with codeine [an opiate].‖   Darlene 
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struggles with the notion that any opiate, even one that is prescribed, is a drug:  ―I have so 
much pain, but if I take a pill, I‘m -- you‘re not relapsing.  That‘s not a relapse; it‘s from 
a doctor; you‘re in pain.‖  Darnel describes how he realized that he didn‘t need to shoplift 
to support his habit because ―you can go to your doctor to write these prescriptions and 
then you can take it over here to this man and he‘ll give you a couple hundred dollars.‖  
For him, bup‘s greatest utility is as a free medication that can easily transform into a 
profitable drug.  Clarence says ―I went through a period when my main drug of choice 
was some opiate cough syrup. …  I detoxed off heroin by using the cough syrup.‖  People 
in this sample understood that doctors could be complicit in providing medications/drugs 
that cause addiction or foster relapse. 
This confusion between medications and drugs and the crossover between treating 
addiction by using drugs found on the street and getting high from drugs legally obtained 
from a doctor further undermines the role of doctors as an authoritative voice for 
understanding addiction.  As Moore (2004) explains, they are but one in range of voices: 
There is no one voice which says, ‗this is a drug and this is what it does 
and this is how we shall respond it.‘  The realm of drug control lacks that 
kind of coherent sovereignty.  Rather we are faced with a cacophony of 
voices, all of which work to constitute characteristics of substances to 
which we must respond (426). 
 
Doctors are not alone in constructing medications and our responses to them.  Many 
people in the sample had substantial experiences using medications obtained on the 
street, not only to get high, but also to manage their own addiction and withdrawal.  As 
Fraser and Valentine point out: ―grouping all diversion under the rubric of reckless and 
dangerous diversion misreads those instances of diversion as informal care‖ (2008: 137).  
These experiences of informal care were as meaningful to participants as those they had 
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in a medical setting.  A number of people had, in fact, first tried and successfully treated 
themselves with bup purchased illegally -- another sign that the medical setting alone 
does not shape perceptions of bup as a medical treatment.  
Terry‘s story is typical: 
Because of this person, I knew of Suboxone. …  It was prescribed to her 
by her doctor.  But I don‘t know where, why, what, how or whatever.  All 
I know is she gave it to me and it made me feel better.  And when I 
decided that I was done getting high, I came in and, and Dr. O got me 
hooked up. 
 
Terry‘s focus here is not on medical expertise or the setting but on how the bup made her 
feel.  Similarly, Dana was introduced to bup on the street and seemed to have no trouble 
using it to treat her symptoms of withdrawal: 
I wasn‘t on the program.  I‘m buying ‗em [bup pills] on the street; $10 a 
piece. …  I would wake and not feel well, take the Suboxone, and within 
an hour I felt fine.  So, there was really a total of a few hours that I didn‘t 
feel well.  Way better than meth[adone]. 
 
Bup‘s usefulness in treating addiction extends beyond the doctor‘s office to the street.  
Feeling better with bup does not necessarily require medical expertise or medical 
intervention.  Bup, even though relatively new, has already entered informal street 
markets where medications and drugs are largely interchangeable. 
I have argued that neither the embodied experiences of bup nor the role of doctors 
and the medical setting are determinative.  Bup, while experienced as less of a drug than 
heroin and methadone, still has some of the embodied properties of a drug.  The medical 
setting and the role of physicians, which were seen as critically important and 
determinative to regulators and to the pharmaceutical manufacturers, seem to have 
limited effect for this sample of drug users who have long crossed back and forth over the 
lines of prescription and illicit medications.   
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Regulations and Enacting ―Normal‖ 
Unlike the medical setting and role of doctors, which had limited impact, bup‘s 
exemption from the regulations governing methadone turned out to be very important in 
shaping the experiences, perceptions and lives of those taking it.  Specifically, bup‘s 
availability and ease of use helped people to ―act normal.‖  Whereas in the earlier section 
I focused how embodied experiences of bup made people feel normal, in this section I 
focus on how the availability of bup and the way it was taken by people in the study 
helped people enact ―normal.‖  That is, features of bup regulation -- its ability to be taken 
at home and its legality – allowed people to engage in activities that they perceived as 
helping the reenter the mainstream of society and make them ―normal.‖ 
Acting normal was fundamentally linked to feeling normal for many.  
Specifically, several people explain that because they felt physically better when they 
took bup, they were able to behave differently in ways that allowed them to improve their 
lives.  As Jose describes: 
[Bup] keep me out of the street. …  Because I knew I would never feel 
normal, you know, because I had abused so much drugs…  It‘s not like I 




Sylvester describes how his physical need for methadone made him wake up and leave 
the house first thing, something he does not feel he has do on bup: 
 
I be feeling normal from Suboxone…  I have the time to get up in the 
morning and brush my teeth and wash my face, and I didn‘t even have that 
time even on methadone.  You know, I‘d get up in the morning trying to 
get out of bed and make sure I get the methadone in me.  And it was an 
every day thing. 
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The physical need for a drug disrupted the daily lives of many, like Sylvester.  And one 
of the most favored features of bup was the convenience of being able to take it home and 
not be forced out of the house by either the need for heroin or methadone.  Bup 
succeeded by simply being available to people and minimizing the disruption to their 
lives.  Tracy explains:  ―I like being at home, and that‘s the thing I like best about the pill 
is that I am able to stay home and take care of the things I need to do.‖   
The idea of being able to ―take care of things‖ was a constant refrain, and many 
people linked this ability to their ability to lead a normal life.  Whereas the earlier 
emphasis on feeling ―normal‖ meant not being high, having cravings or being sick, 
―normal‖ here refers to the ways in which bup restored the ability to people to engage in 
the quotidian pleasures and responsibilities of every day life.  These were made possible, 
not just because people did not feel sick, but because bup was provided to them legally 
(and free of charge during the study) so they did not have to ―hustle‖ or figure out ways 
to ―score‖ heroin.  Nor did they have to endure the rigors of daily attendance and the 
restrictive regulations of the methadone clinic.   
Jesse explained that, now free from the burden of going to the methadone clinic 
everyday, he returned to work: 
I went back to work, ‗cause I‘m a carpenter. …  That‘s another reason 
why I wanted to get on buprenorphine, because I couldn‘t be going to the 
clinic and go to work too.  So it worked out perfect for that.  I just take my 
medication and go to work.  No problem, just free. 
 
For many people not having to spend money on drugs was a key element of how bup 
helped them to become ―normal.‖  As Pat explains:  ―[Bup] just kind of gave me 
permission to start doing everything again.  Just normal things, like going out to the 
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movies.  I mean using my money on clothes and music, instead of on that, you know.‖  
For Walker, access to housing and money that was made possible by overcoming his 
addiction to heroin using bup transformed his life in concrete and material ways: 
 
I‘m more at peace with myself. …  I‘m more comfortable because I have 
a roof over my head…  I haven‘t been homeless.  I‘m more comfortable 
because I can change clean clothes every day.  I got food in my 
refrigerator.  I got people that respect me, that talk to me.  I don‘t know 
how many times I used to not be able to get 15 cents, but I can get 15 
dollars if I need it today.  So it changed my life a whole lot. 
 
 
Walker notes that the changes in his material circumstances led to more respect and 
social engagement, but he, like many others, also focuses on the everyday things that 
signal security and comfort --  having food in the refrigerator and clean clothes.  Another 
participant, describing his first experience on bup, notes how he was able to what 
―normal people do:‖ 
 
I woke up the next morning feeling like a, a normal human being, instead 
of getting up, running out the door, looking for a bag [of heroin], I got up 
and, and, and took my time, get up and do like normal people do in the 
morning, shower, eat breakfast, and sit around and watch the news (Carl). 
 
 
Buprenorphine allowed this man to take care of himself and, rather than being forced out 
of the house by the urge (and likely the physical need) for heroin, he was able to do 
everyday things that suggest rationality, order, and normalcy.  
Conclusion 
Among the people in my sample, neuroscientific concepts competed and merged 
with other ideas about addiction, suggesting individuals draw upon an array of culturally 
resonant frameworks – neuroscience being just one and not a particularly common one -- 
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to understand themselves (Pickersgill, forthcoming).  Typically, participants had a 
blended view of addiction, sometimes talking about it as a disease and other times talking 
about it as problem of will power or a failure of character.  Meleo-Erwin (2010), in her 
work on weight loss surgery, notes that even when people have accepted biomedical 
labels and interventions, they often remain ambivalent and interpret biomedical discourse 
through their own (albeit largely normative) frameworks.  In the case of people being 
treated with bup, psychological, moral, and environmental explanations of addiction 
mixed with medical constructs. 
In my sample, patient experiences (both material and social) led them to reshape 
and reinterpret neuroscientific and medical concepts.  Their constructions of bup were not 
straightforward but were imbued with ambivalence about the differences between 
medications to treat addiction and drugs that cause addiction.  Some of the perceived 
physiological effects of bup (not causing euphoria or sedation and preventing withdrawal 
symptoms) led people to view it as a legitimate medication, especially in relation to 
methadone.  However, the idea that bup created a physical dependence or that it would 
need to be taken indefinitely caused many people to assert a desire to get off of the 
medication and to reassert the importance of will power or conviction in doing so.  
Surprisingly given the central role it played in the regulatory, marketing and 
neuroscientific discourse surrounding bup, the role of doctors in prescribing bup and the 
medical setting as the place where it was prescribed seemed to have little effect on 
whether or not individuals understood bup as a medication and their addiction as a 
disease.  Doctors‘ expertise in treating addiction was seen as limited, and many people 
easily treated themselves without any medical intervention by using bup obtained on the 
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street.  Overall, individuals went back and forth about whether bup was a medication or 
another substitute drug.  Most people valued bup because it both made them feel normal 
and allowed them to act normal and because they no longer had to maintain a heroin habit 
or attend a methadone clinic.  Bup did not necessarily transform addiction into a medical 
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Chapter 7: 
"It Makes Me Feel Free:" Buprenorphine’s Constraints and 




Issues of structure and agency are at the heart of sociological thought and theory. 
Addiction enters directly into these questions because it is defined as the loss of control -- 
being powerless before the incontrollable urge to use drugs (Valverde 1998).  However, I 
found, as Valverde found in an previous study, that: ―the discourse…was constantly 
undermining itself by falling into the older language of ‗vice‘ and ‗habit‘ … even the 
medicalizing project was not internally consistent‖ (1997: 257).  As the previous chapter 
indicated, people taking bup held onto ideas that behavior, will power and/or morality all 
play a part in both causing and overcoming addiction.  Importantly, such amalgamated 
conceptions also meant that they refused to relinquish their sense of responsibility, blame, 
or agency over their addiction.  By refusing to reduce their addiction to a neurological 
disease and its cure to taking a medication, individuals taking bup retain a measure of 
both responsibility and agency.  The exercise of agency is not simply a function of how 
individuals understand ―addiction,‖ though that plays some part.  Rather, as this chapter 
explores in more detail, how and when people taking bup were able to exercise control 
depends on a complex system of internal understandings and external constraints (and the 
interplay between these) that governed both their drug and medical treatment. 
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Holding onto Will Power & Choice: “Mind over matter” 
In striking contrast to the neuroscientists who focused on locating the loss of 
volition in the brain and thereby de-emphasized the role of choice, the BHIVES 
participants held on tenaciously to their agency and volition.  Even those who credited 
buprenorphine with blocking their cravings for heroin felt that will power still played an 
important role in not using: 
 
I didn't even get cravings, you know. I guess it was also mind over matter 
thing because I was determined not to go back to this stuff […] so I was 
just determined to stop using the drugs (Wendall). 
 
 
Buprenorphine blocked the cravings, but sheer determination stopped the drug use.   
Many participants had a persistent hold on the idea that they bore some responsibility for 
overcoming their addiction.  Nancy expressed a sentiment share by many that the 
ultimate decision to quit or use drugs was not a matter of biology but a matter of choice:  
―because when it comes down to it, it‘s my decision whether I can quit or use…  It all 
depends on the person whether they want to change or not.‖  Similarly, Walker says: 
―‗cause in the end, whatever I tell you or I give you, if you don‘t want to do it for 
yourself, there ain't nothing I can prescribe to give you that can make you change until 
you going to do it for your own self.‖  Here, we see how much individuals value the idea 
that they alone are making decisions about their addiction.  They ascribe incredible power 
to the idea that, even if a medication helps address the physiological components of their 
addiction, it is sheer determination or will power that ultimately overcomes the 
compulsion to use drugs. 
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  The exercise of will power, however, is not unfettered but takes place within 
certain confines.  The choice to use or not use drugs is shaped by social and economic 
contexts and by the medical and drug treatment systems that both surround and contain 
them.  Will power is of central importance, but threats of incarceration, drug treatment 
programs (including bup programs), and medical providers all restrict and shape the 
decisions of those in this sample.   
 
Systems of Constraint: “They have total control” 
 One consequence of the mixed notions of addiction as containing both medical 
and moral elements have been hybrid ―treatment‖ responses that include both therapeutic 
and punitive approaches.  Tiger (2011) holds out drug courts as a paradigmatic example 
of this approach, which she calls ―enlightened coercion.‖  She outlines the ways in which 
drug court professionals draw on both medical and behavioral theories in their attempts to 
―cure‖ addiction.  Addiction may be a disease of the will but, within the logic of 
enlightened coercion, the threat of incarceration or other sanctions can aid the will in 
achieving abstinence.  External constraints and punishment are brought to bear on the 
internal work of rebuilding willpower. 
 Many of the participants in the BHIVES study had been involved in forms of 
coercive treatment, generally mandated by a court and/or required by a parole of 
probation officer to attend behavioral drug treatment programs.  The criminal justice 
system - the single largest source of referrals to drug treatment in the U.S. - favors 
behavioral therapies over psychopharmaceutical approaches in its mandated drug 
treatment programs for a variety of reasons, ranging from the relative scarcity of 
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medication-assisted treatment programs to beliefs that such medications are, in fact, 
another kind of ―drug.‖  For example, of the hundreds of courts addressing driving under 
the influence, only a handful use medications, like naltrexone, purported to reduce 
alcohol consumption (Vrecko 2009).   
 None of the people in the BHIVES study were or could be mandated to participate 
in bup treatment, though as I will discuss below, the bup programs in the study were not 
without their coercive elements.  Most, however, had experience with methadone that 
they described as constraining and coercive, and many had experiences with other drug 
treatment or social service programs that also held tremendous power over them.  For 
those operating under these kinds of constraints, the exercise of autonomy often came at a 
very high price. 
 One participant, Habierto describes a common scenario where he cycled between 
mandated treatment programs and prison: 
I did four and half to nine [years in prison]. … I did 54 months.  For a year 
and half straight I stayed home, and I give dirty urine to my parole officer 
and I went upstate again.  After that, I went upstate three times so now I 
am finished [with my prison sentence]. 
Q:  Were you getting any kind of treatment at that point? 
A:  At that point, you know if I went to the program or to detox, it was 
because my parole officer told me to go.  I wasn‘t doing it for me; I was 
doing it for my parole officer. 
 
Habierto did not freely choose to enter drug treatment; rather he went to treatment as a 
condition of his parole, and his ―failure‖ at treatment resulted in his re-incarceration.  
This quote shows the seamless relationship between carceral and ―therapeutic‖ regimes.  
It also highlights the centrality of urine toxicology tests, which are widely used 
throughout both criminal justice and drug treatment systems to monitor relapse and mete 
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out consequences for ―being dirty.‖  Incarceration can be a consequence not only of using 
drugs but also of not adhering to specific treatment requirements.  Jesse describes a 
situation where he had been sent to a clinic as part of a prison diversion program.  Similar 
to what was described in an earlier chapter about the restrictions of methadone being 
untenable for many, Jesse had difficulty showing up for both his daily mandated 
treatment and his court appearances.  He said: 
I had to go to a drug treatment thing for an hour a day, five days a week --  
court mandated.  I couldn‘t even do that… ‗cause it was getting in the way 
of what I was doing.  And I missed showing up for an evaluation in court. 
…  And the next day, they came out and actually got me, and handcuffed 
me, and put me in jail. 
 
 
 Sometimes it was not the threat of incarceration but the loss of income that acted 
as lever of control.  Both government agencies and drug treatment programs sometimes 
link access to individuals‘ benefits and finances to their drug treatment, forcing people to 
make difficult choices about whether to submit to treatment or lose their only source of 
income.  For example, Tracy‘s probation requirements included a mandate to provide 
routine urine tox screens.  When she ―gave a dirty urine,‖ her parole officer filed a 
technical parole violation, resulting her losing access to her benefits:  ―They stopped my 
checks…  January, February and March with no income.‖  Her parole status combined 
with her economic status made her particularly vulnerable to control by others. 
 Another form of external control described by many was the threat of being 
kicked out of a drug treatment or social service programs.  For those on methadone, this 
could mean painful withdrawal or the need to go back to using heroin to avoid 
withdrawal.  Mindy, for example, was required by her methadone program to adhere to a 
rigorous schedule of counseling groups and get a card signed proving she had attended.  
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She noted: ―if you don‘t have that card, you ain‘t getting your stuff [methadone].‖  For 
others, especially those living in residential programs, challenging the rules could mean 
becoming homeless.  George describes how the requirement of a shelter that residents 
return at a specific time creates a system of forced choices: 
I don‘t wanna go to a shelter.  So you‘d rather sleep on the ground, down 
there, than go to a shelter. …  You gotta be in by 5 or 8.  But I wanna go 
out and hang with my friends.  Come on, she [social service worker] said, 
‗you gotta want this thing [sobriety].‘ But they not gonna control me.  The 
way I see it, no, they‘re not controlling, but…. Now to get these things, 
you gotta want these things. 
 
For George, the shelter staff tell him what he ―has to want‖ in order to get a very concrete 
and material benefit -  a place to sleep.  He clearly understands that this is a strategy for 
trying to control his desire and his behavior --  one that he rejects even though it means 
sleeping on the street.  Doug, a man who was living in his car with his male partner, 
described how they became increasingly vulnerable as their methadone and heroin 
addictions left them destitute and desperate.  They turned to a church group for help; the 
group offered them food and shelter, but at a heavy price – being separated from one 
another.  The group, perhaps motivated by homophobia, decided that he and his lover 
were bad for one another and needed to be separated.  According to Doug:  
They took over and took control. …  They found a way of shipping him 
off to Alabama to one of his friends who might take care of him while he 
detoxes off of methadone.  Poor Bob got on the bus and said goodbye and 
went down to Alabama. 
 
 
What George and Doug describe here is the series of trade offs that people in the study 
made everyday between the exercise of autonomy and their physical and material 
wellbeing.  The choices available to them were often within very constrained systems, 
and going outside of those systems generally carried high penalties.  For the most part 
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people, people were impoverished, often quite sick, and at the mercy of those with more 
power and money.  The decision to use or not use drugs, even though it was often seen as 
a matter of individual will power or choice, was also profoundly shaped by the 
circumstances and systems within which people operated. 
 It is also worth noting that many of the people in this sample, because of their 
HIV status, had been inculcated into systems of medical control for years.  While many 
viewed medical systems as helpful and their healthcare as something over which they had 
influence, some people described experiences with medicine that were seen as controlling 
and punitive.  Several, like Lesley, had received medical care in prison where they were 
literally forced to take medications during a ―pill call‖ where a correctional officer would 
observe them taking their medication: ―They would prescribe it to me every morning.  
During pill call.  I would take it right there in their face.‖  Darnel described his 
experience in a program where, if he didn‘t take his HIV medicine (verified through pill 
counts), those running his program ―would call Medicaid, and let Medicaid know that I 
am on restriction.‖  Far from being free of coercion, the medical systems some people 
encountered gave them little opportunity for autonomy. 
 The idea that doctors and medical systems were controlling was compounded for 
some by their status as drug addicts; several people described how difficult it was for 
them to get doctors to listen to their medical complaints and/or prescribe them 
medications.  As Darlene notes: ―‘cause I‘m a drug addict, sometimes it‘s hard to get 
medication.  I have suffered bad anxiety and wanted to die.  They put me in the hospital.  
I know they have Valium, but they wouldn‘t even think of giving it to me. ..  I meant they 
have total control.‖  Some people, like Carl, chafed against the control of doctors so 
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much that he says he used heroin just to spite his doctor:  ―[E]everyday I was putting the 
needle in my arm.  That‘s what I was doing because my doctor told me not to.  I say, 
‗fuck you doc.‘‖  George put it very succinctly when he said, ―the doctors are like the 
police.‖  Rather than a benevolent alternative to more authoritarian systems of control, 
medicine was seen as more of the same. 
 As Pitts (2003) points out:  ―certain groups are more closely scrutinized under the 
medical gaze, and pathologized more readily than others… pathologization is never 
politically neutral‖ (18).  This group (81% of whom were unemployed and 25% of whom 
were homeless) was already living at the margins of society with relatively few options at 
their disposal.  Participants in this study were very aware that they had few real choices 
and were operating within different systems of constraint that limited their autonomy.  
Many felt controlled by the courts, by drug treatment programs, and by the medical 
system.  These experiences doubtlessly shaped heir perceptions of receiving bup within a 
medical setting, and as we shall see, the bup programs in this study were not without 
some of the punitive characteristics that participants described in other drug treatment 
programs. 
 
Constraints within Bup Programs: “It’s just too much like prison” 
 The BHIVES study consisted of 10 different sites across the country.  Each site 
was allowed to develop its program independently, and as a result, the programs varied 
tremendously, especially in terms of how restrictive or flexible they were (see Weiss et 
al. 2011 for a full description of the program models).  In some programs, there were few, 
if any, penalties for continuing to use heroin or other drugs.  These programs adopted a 
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harm reduction approach that embraced the idea that keeping people engaged in their 
medical care was their primary aim and any reduction in drug use, however limited, was 
beneficial.  Other programs modeled themselves on methadone programs and required 
daily attendance, mandated counseling, and penalized people for continuing to use drugs 
or not complying with treatment requirements.  Like drug courts that appropriate medical 
language (Tiger 2011), bup programs framed these punitive measures as therapeutic.     
 Like many methadone programs, some bup programs allowed individuals a 
certain number of ―slips‖  (i.e., return to using) before they would kick them out of the 
program.  Jose explains the seemingly contradictory approach of one bup program that 
encouraged him to call for help when he is using heroin but threatened to expel him from 
the program if he used too many times: 
[The bup counselor] says, ‗call me any time if you‘re weak or dirty.‘ 
Q:  Have you ever called him? 
A:  No. …  He called me before I started to get clean, and he said ‗I‘m 
gonna test you ever week.  You come up four times dirty, you‘re out of the 
program.‘ 
 
In the above example, the moralistic language of ―weak‖ and ―dirty‖ combined with the 
threat of expulsion make it difficult to distinguish how this ―medical‖ intervention differs 
substantially from either a methadone or behavioral drug treatment program.   
 All of the bup programs used urine toxicology screens, which are also commonly 
used by parole and probation offices to ensure that someone is not using illicit drugs.  
Some bup programs, like the program described by Jose above, used the tox screens as a 
way of documenting ―failure.‖  Others conducted lab tests to detect the presence of both 
illicit drugs and bup, which allowed them to discover relapse to illicit drugs, monitor 
treatment compliance (i.e., was the individual taking the bup as prescribed), and guard 
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against diversion (i.e., if someone were not taking their bup, they would be suspected of 
selling it).  Most patients understood the screens as a way to enforce their compliance 
with treatment and to prevent them from selling bup on the street.  As Diane explains: 
―[To] find out if they still getting high, they give us drops [urine tox screens].  [The 
counselor] gives us drops every month to find out if they selling them or using them [bup 
pills], you know?‖  Derrick describes a common practice of random urine tox screens, 
which were used to catch people off guard so that they could not purchase clean urine in 
advance.  He says: ―You only hurting yourself [if you use] ‗cause… you only get three 
dirty drops in this program, and if you want to gamble, she [the counselor] can drop you 
at any time.‖   The ―gamble‖ he describes is continuing to use drugs and risk a random 
drug screen that would get one kicked out of the program.  In addition the humiliation 
described in getting a ―urine drop‖ (staff observed people urinating to ensure they did not 
―cheat‖), participants like Derrick understood tox screens, not as tool for medically 
monitoring their progress, but as a way to enforce compliance with the requirement to 
abstain from using illicit drugs.  Although bup is only meant to treat addiction to opiates, 
all of the programs also screened people for the use of other illicit drugs, like cocaine, 
and some used relapse to other drugs as cause for expulsion.  People were essentially held 
responsible for overcoming addiction to a drug, like cocaine, for which they were not 
being treated. 
 Programs had other systems for addressing their concerns that ―patients‖ would 
divert their bup and sell it on the street.  Sometimes patients were required to take the bup 
in front of medical staff (a requirement of most methadone programs) or to bring in their 
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pill bottles for pill counts.
16
  Robert describes how he had to stay in the ―med room‖ the 
first time he took bup so that his providers could be sure that he had taken it as 
prescribed: ―I sat there for 20 minutes because you have to sit there and wait for it [bup 
sublingual tablet] to dissolve.  They don‘t want to let you out of the room because you 
might spit it out and give it to anybody.‖  Robert clearly understands that he is being 
monitored, not for medical complications, but because his doctors suspect he will try and 
divert the drug. 
 Tox screens and the threat of expulsion were not only ways that the bup programs 
exercised control over the participants.  Several programs required frequent attendance at 
counseling programs or return visits to the bup program to meet with a counselor there.  
Julian says: 
They were seeing me three, four times a week, just in the beginning, and 
then it went to once a week. 
Q:  And did you find that helpful? 
A:  I mean, you want something bad enough, you‘ll, you know, stick to it. 
 
Here, Julian is complying with frequent visits, not because he found them helpful, but 
because he wanted to stay in the bup program.  He understands complying with the visit 
schedule is the only way to get the medication.  Dana notes that she is willing to put up 
with the weekly visits her program requires but would refuse a mandate to attend daily:  
―Weekly‘s alright.  Of course, I mean the less you have to come the better.  Daily would 
be unacceptable for me; it‘s just too much like prison, having to, every single day, get 
here.‖  Absent in Dana‘s comments are any indication that she attending the clinic for a 
reason other than it is required.  She is willing to submit to some control, but she has a 
                                                 
16
 Staff count the number of pills left in a bottle and compare it to the number of days the individual has the 
prescription to determine if s/he has used the medication at rate faster than the prescription would suggest. 
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limit.  Later in the interview, Dana explains how the counseling requirements at her bup 
program became untenable for her: 
You know, so they‘re telling me that I‘m gonna come in there and take the 
suboxone, and that‘s probably not gonna, you know make me well. …  
And then they wanted me to stay there all day long for groups.  I said, you 
think I‘m gonna sit here all day long in group, sick.  I mean I would give it 
try if I could of come in, got dosed, and then went home …  No.  They 
wanted to me stay there all day for groups.  So I said, well forget it, and I 
went and got high. 
 
 These forms of control within bup programs – constant monitoring of urine, 
threats of expulsion, guarding against diversion, requirements to show up for counseling 
or other visits --  reflect the mixed notions of addiction as both a problem of medicine 
and of behavior.  Proponents of a medical model of addiction may claim they want to 
restore the autonomy of individuals and move away from punitive systems of control, but 
in practice, (at least among my sample) this model continues to abridge the agency and 
control of individuals.  While participants generally felt that bup afforded them more 
autonomy than methadone, many were still required to adhere to a set or rules and 
interventions that were sometimes constraining and often treated them more like drug 
addicts who could not be trusted than medical patients being given control over their own 
treatment.  The idea that the medical system acts as a form of social control is not new.  
However, in the case of bup treatment, traditional systems of medical control were joined 
by strategies from more traditionally punitive systems of controlling addiction, like 
criminal justice and methadone programs.  Toxicology screens, onerous counseling or 
visit requirements, threats of expulsion, observed dosing, and safeguards against 
diversion are tactics used in the kinds of stigmatized programs bup treatment was meant 
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to replace.  Stringent and prevalent as these kinds of controls were, they did not prevent 
people taking bup from subverting them and finding creative ways to exercise autonomy. 
 
Buprenorphine and Agency: “I know my body better than anybody” 
 Whether participating in a very restrictive or a very permissive program, 
individuals in the BHIVES study exercised agency in the ways they used buprenorphine.  
In doing so, they produced and enacted meanings of and uses for the medication that 
exceeded those promoted by researchers, government regulators, and the manufacturer.  
With few exceptions, people in the study admitted that for one reason or another they had 
experimented with not taking or taking their bup in ways other than prescribed.  Almost 
half the sample volunteered that they used heroin while taking bup.  Most individuals 
tested the dictum of their doctors that they could not get high from the bup itself or by 
using heroin in addition to bup.  Richard admits, ―You don‘t get high off it [bup]. … At 
one point I did take damn near my whole bottle and didn‘t get high.‖  George tested bup 
even though his medical provider told him ―you could die.‖  He says, ―I decided to try it 
anyway.  I was doing the bup and I decide I‘m gonna shoot some heroin.‖  Either George 
did not believe his doctor or decided that experimenting was worth the risk. 
 People also tested bup by stopping its use to see what kind of withdrawal 
symptoms would ensue.  When many of them learned that bup was easier to withdraw 
from than methadone or heroin, they resumed using it to manage their own experiences 
of withdrawal.  Darnel, for example, explains that he uses the bup specifically to detox 
from heroin in order to prevent his withdrawal symptoms:  ―I take bup to get off the dope. 
… If I take the bup, it will take the place of the dope for a couple of days, and then I can 
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stop taking the bup, and I won‘t, my body won‘t go through no withdrawals.‖  Clearly, 
Darnel is using the bup to meet his own objectives, which do not include giving up heroin 
altogether.  In doing so, he has reconfigured bup from an ongoing treatment for a chronic 
condition to a medication to be used intermittently to control withdrawal symptoms.  
Similarly, Habierto uses bup off and on depending on whether or not he wanted to get 
high from heroin: 
I was taking it [bup], like, sometimes I was taking it, and sometimes I 
wouldn‘t take it.  You know, sometimes I got to party, if I get off the 
medication….  I told you I was taking holidays [from the bup], you know 
what I mean? 
 
Habierto did not want to be completely abstinent from heroin, nor did he always want to 
be taking bup.  He learned to manage his bup dose so that he could use heroin 
intermittently, a drug use pattern that belies the stereotype that any heroin use leads to 
uncontrolled, compulsive use.  In Habierto‘s case, he would use heroin when he wanted 
―to party‖ and bup rest of the time. 
Robert managed his dose of bup to handle changes in his schedule that were 
beyond his control.  He took a double dose of bup to avoid withdrawal because he knew 
he was going to be incarcerated for up to 15 hours: 
When I turned myself in on warrants, I knew I was going to be sitting in 
this god-awful steel box for like 12 or 15 hours, however long it was going 
to take before they released me. …  So I took two pills that morning.  
Made damn sure I was covered. 
 
By increasing his dose, Robert uses bup to avoid withdrawal in a situation where 
he knew he would be denied access to both prescription and illicit opioids.   
 As noted in an earlier chapter, one of the most common ways that people resisted 
and reconfigured bup was through their refusal to accept it as a medication that they had 
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to be dependent on for life.  Rather, many participants used it sporadically, took less than 
was prescribed, or planned to ―wean themselves off it‖ completely.  Many people 
understood being on bup as another form dependence, one that undermined their sense of 
being a moral, strong and autonomous agent.  In addition to not wanting to be dependent 
on a medication, many participants did not like being dependent on medical authorities.  
When asked why he was detoxing himself from bup instead of returning to his medical 
provider, Darnel says, ―I‘m used to doing things for myself; I‘m used to having control 
over my life.  I‘m 45 years old.‖  He rejects the control and infantilization that he feels 
submitting to his doctor‘s authority causes.  Similarly, Clarence said that he was weaning 
himself off bup after he and his doctor had disagreed about how much and how long he 
should take bup.  He ultimately rejected his doctor‘s advice because, ―I know my body 
better than anybody.‖   Far from being passive recipients or submitting fully to the 
authority of medicine, many participants creatively used bup in ways that gave them 
some measure of agency over their own drug use and treatment.  Whether trying heroin 
while taking bup, experimenting with their bup dose, or going on and off bup to suit their 
own needs, many individuals deliberately choose not to ―take their medicine as 
prescribed‖ but rather as a tool to manage their own physical and social needs. 
 
Bup as Productive Constraint: “It helped me a lot” 
 Drug treatment in general and bup treatment in particular are systems of 
constraints that shape the beliefs and behaviors of individuals.  The control they exercise, 
however, is not absolute, and individuals find ways to exercise autonomy within these 
systems.  Just as they interpret, adapt, and resist neuroscientific discourse about 
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addiction, so too they interpret, adapt and resist the systems of authority and control they 
enter into to receive treatment.   
 It is tempting, and indeed common, for scholars of addiction to adopt a critical 
stance towards drug treatment that critiques it as a coercive system that subjugates the 
individual subject.  The individual leaves the enslavement or freedom (depending on the 
scholar) of a life of drug use and enters the unfree world of drug treatment, which may 
involve enslavement to another drug/medicine (e.g., methadone or bup).  Bourgois, 
Bergschmidt, Fraser and Valentine are just a few examples of addiction scholars who 
have made these kinds of arguments.  This kind of scholarship implies a certain theory of 
human agency.  Fraser and Valentine (2008), for instance, suggest that all acts of 
―agency‖ within the structure of a methadone program can be construed as acts of 
disobedience: 
For the methadone client, however, this surveillance and regulation results 
in a choice of submission or rebellion…  Alternative choices and courses 
of action, of which methadone clients are demonstrably capable, are not 




However, the paradigm of the unrestrained addict and the constrained or disobedient drug 
treatment patient falls short in several ways.  First, it set up a false dichotomy that refuses 
to acknowledge that all of us --  including both drug users and drug treatment ―patients‖ -
-  are always operating within systems of constraints.  Second, it fails to recognize 
subjects as more than slaves of the drug/medicine or slaves of drug treatment, neglecting 
instances where individuals use drugs/medicines to create new possibilities for action and 
agency.  Third, it has no way to explain what Gomart (2004) calls the ―enthusiasm‖ with 
which many people enter into such systems of repression.  Finally, it overlooks the 
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productive capacity of such regimes, that is the opportunities they create for new 
expressions of agency.   
 In her ethnography of a French methadone clinic, Gomart admits that she first set 
out to critique the ways the clinic constrained the freedom and agency of those being 
treated.  She notes: 
It was clear that a rapid and deadly critique of their practice was possible: 
the rhetoric of medical sociology could immediately be used to describe a 
conflict of interest between authoritative doctors and vulnerable individuals 
who seemed to have lost in advance (2004: 86). 
 
As the above discussion on the punitive aspects of bup treatment suggests, a similar 
critique of bup is certainly possible and probably warranted.  However necessary, it is 
also insufficient; for as Foucault reminds us, power is both repressive and productive: 
We must cease always describing the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‗excludes,‘ it  ‗represses,‘ it ‗buries,‘ it ‗censors,‘ it ‗abstracts,‘ it ‗masks,‘ it 
‗hides.‘  In fact, power produces; it produces the real; it produces domains 
of objects and rituals of truth.  The individual and our knowledge of this 
individual come from this production (Foucault 1975/1994: 196). 
 
 
The issue is not one of freedom versus constraint but rather an issue of what kind of 
freedom is possible and what kind of constraint is tolerable. 
 Many people use drugs without great harm to themselves or others and may never 
seek treatment.  Others may enter drug treatment only if coerced through drug courts and 
other government agencies.  But many people willingly seek treatment on their own 
because they are troubled by the way their drug use (or society‘s response to it) affects 
their lives and relationships, and they want to regain a sense of normalcy, repair 
relationships, and rebuild their lives.  In fact, the number of people seeking treatment far 
exceeds the capacity of our current treatment system (SAMHSA 2010).   
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 People in the BHIVES study, like many other drug users, were not living lives of 
unfettered freedom before they subjected themselves to the constraints of bup or the 
biomedical paradigm.  Imbued with stigma, denied access to jobs and government 
benefits, separated from their children and other family members, and often imprisoned – 
many drug users, including those in this study, are denied the resources needed for the 
exercise of most ―freedoms‖ available in a modern consumer society.  Moreover, to the 
extent that addiction (whether conceived as biologically, psychologically, or socially 
produced) leads to compulsive or uncontrollable behavior, it also limits real autonomy.  
 Rose notes with important exceptions ―doctors do not force diagnostic labels onto 
resistant individuals‖ (Rose 2007: 702).  Interviews with those taking buprenorphine 
suggest that many individuals have willingly taken on the label of ―addict,‖ the 
constraints of an addictive psychopharmaceutical, and the control and monitoring of the 
medical system.  They do so, not because they have been duped, but because it offers 
new possibilities for the exercise of agency.  As Gomart notes of those who submitted 
themselves to the constraints of methadone: 
[I]t became possible to hold that constraints – not just intersubjective but 
also chemical – might become resources for care, buildings blocks in the 
construction of the subject (2004: 94). 
 
Interviews with people taking bup reveal the complicated ways in which the very things 
that are constraining also offer new possibilities for autonomy.  There is no doubt that 
many resisted and disliked the idea that bup was another substance on which they were 
dependent.  Moreover, some felt that it undermined the importance of will power, 
constitution, choice, or morality in overcoming addiction.  Others resisted the way it was 
dispensed or the requirements attached to it by their medical providers.  And many 
  226 
choose to use it in ways other than their doctors prescribed.  Despite or perhaps because 
of these contradictory notions about bup and agency, many also embraced the constraints 
of bup and medical control and in doing so found new possibilities for action.  
 Jesse, for instance, remarked that, once he realized he could control his addiction 
through bup without having to endure the rigors of methadone, he felt like ―it was like a 
big yoke being lifted off a my shoulders.  It means freedom to me, you know.‖  For 
Robert, bup gave him the ability to focus on why he used drugs in the first place.  He 
said:  
I started the Suboxone and that literally solved the addiction problem. 
Didn't solve my problems but it solved the addiction problem. … I could 
just focus on why I use. That's been the biggest blessing. I never focused 
on why I used. 
 
Several others attributed bup with helping them in concrete, material ways or to rebuild 
their families and relationships and restore their health.  According to Portia, ―it was just 
a miracle. … Ever since I took that pill, my whole life has changed. … I put it this way, if 
it wasn't for Buprofen, or whatever it's called, I think I'd be dead.‖   
 At the same time he expresses ambivalence about needing a drug/pill [bup] to feel 
good, Alan credits bup with making him feel free: 
I need the pill [bup] though you know, like I said, I need a drug or 
something, I'm going to have to take it to make myself feel that, feel that 
good. You know, to feel that goodness that I need. You know, that's, that's, 
that's what I wish to do. But the Savoxin [sic], it's helped me a lot ….I 
don't want to go back to the life I had when I was using heroin. And I 
don't, but it just make me feel free, so to speak you know, from drugs, 
from the drugs, you know. 
 
When drug users, like Alan, come under the constraints of a neuroscientific treatment, 
like buprenorphine, they trade one drug/medication for another and one set of restrictions 
and freedoms for another.  In Butler‘s words, ―one purchases one sort of freedom only by 
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giving up another‖ (2004: 91).  In the case of bup, individuals enter into a new but 
familiar system of medical constraint; they are literally dependent on a medication and 
the medical system that dispenses it.  However, people found ways both to subvert and 
resist those constraints and to use them in productive ways that offered new possibilities 
for action and for reentering ―legitimate‖ society. 
 
Conclusion 
 I have argued that the constraints of bup are productive in that they allow for new 
forms of action and new forms of subjectivity.  This is not to say, however, that these 
freedoms are not contained with larger regimes of knowledge and power.  And just as the 
lives of the individuals in my sample were constrained in certain ways before entering 
treatment, so too their lives in treatment are constrained.  The kinds of agency enacted 
and the kind of subjectivity performed shape and are shaped by discursive and embodied 
experiences with bup as well as the larger sociopolitical context that enfolds 
contemporary society.  In the next chapter, I will explore what kind of subject is being 
produced within these newly configured systems of agency and constraint. 
 








 In this chapter, I examine how the discourses about and embodied experiences 
with bup reflect and/or challenge the larger sociopolitical context in which they are 
contained.  I argue that --  through the control of pleasure, the restoration of rationality, 
and a redirection of consumption -- bup provides the conditions for neoliberal 
personhood.  I also suggest that neuroscientific rhetoric, which locates addiction in the 
brain, provides a scientific rationale for understanding addiction as highly individualized 
and placing the responsibility for overcoming addiction in the hands of the individual 
―addict.‖ Moreover, the commonly and deeply held desire to be ―normal‖ expressed by 
people taking bup and reinforced by its manufacturer is one that is imbued with notions 
of responsible, productive citizenship consistent with neoliberalism.  Neoliberal 
personhood is not just about feeling normal, but also acting normal.  Finally, while bup is 
generally constructed in ways consistent with neoliberalism, I also suggest that the 
persistence of hybrid notions of addiction (as a disease, a moral failing and a crime) and 
ambiguity about bup‘s status (as a medicine and a drug) allow for ruptures in neoliberal 
form of governance.  This opens the door for more a traditionally repressive exercise of 
power in ways that are likely to be racially and socially stratified.  
  Rose (2003), in the ―Neurochemical Self & Its Anomalies,‖ argues that we are 
amidst a shift in how we understand and regulate pathological conduct.  Both genomic 
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and neuroscientific frameworks suggest that all people need to be scrutinized for their 
susceptibility to pathology and that one can be ―sick‖ or pathological without any 
outward signs or symptoms (Katz Rothman 1998; Rose 2003).  Rose suggests that these 
new forms of knowledge may lead to targeted governance where individuals with 
―correctable errors‖ (e.g., neurochemical deficiencies or genetic abnormalities) can be 
identified and treated.  He also notes that neurochemical approaches result in a re-
spatialization of disease, creating a somatic individual whose illness lies in the brain.  
Although these new forms of knowledge have a deterministic and essentialist bent, they 
also allow for individuality, autonomy, and choice (Rose 2003).   
 Public health and medicine, drawing on the memes of individuality, autonomy 
and choice, are increasingly being used to enlist individuals in efforts to govern and 
regulate themselves in the name of better health (Lupton 1995; McNaughton, Salmon and 
Bell 2011).  McNaughton, Salmon and Bell argue: 
Most chronic diseases are now viewed as a failure to take appropriate 
precautions against publicly identified risks - a failure of individual 
control, a lack of self-discipline, an intrinsic moral failing.  Present notions 
of health and disease have therefore reinforced the privatisation of the 
struggle for generalised wellbeing.  Indeed, privatised risk management is 
a fundamental expectation of citizens under the conditions of 
contemporary forms of neoliberal governance (2011: 1).  
 
In a neoliberal society where the ―risks‖ to health are known, those who fail to protect 
themselves from those risks clash ―too uncomfortably with the image of the ‗good 
citizen‘ as someone who actively participates in social and economic life, makes rational 
choices, and is independent, self-reliant and responsible‖ (Galvin 2002: 108).  Diseases, 
especially those like diabetes or addiction that are thought to have a behavioral 
component, remain marks of moral failures.  Blame and shame for the individual‘s failure 
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becomes another tool to enlist him or her in reclaiming responsibility and restoring 
health.  
 Several scholars have suggested that these new, less repressive forms of 
governance can be used to understand methadone (see Bergschmidt 2004; Bjerg 2008; 
Bourgois 2000; Gomart 2002, 2004; O‘Malley and Valverde 2004) though to date none 
have explored it in relation to buprenorphine.  In her review of addiction studies, Keane 
(2009) concludes that there are two trends in the literature, one which sees methadone as 
a disciplinary, oppressive power attempting to produce docile bodies and one that has 
more complex understandings of power.  Both Bourgois (2000) and Bergschmidt (2004) 
examine methadone maintenance as an exemplar of how biopower operates to govern 
subjects and have subjects govern themselves.  Bourgois points out that, despite the 
relatively minor pharmacological differences between heroin and methadone, the heroin 
user is constructed as a self-destructive criminal, while the methadone user is constructed 
as a well-disciplined patient.  By carefully analyzing the ways in which methadone 
clinics operate, Bourgois concludes the methadone is ―the state‘s attempt to inculcate 
moral discipline into the hearts, minds, and bodies of deviants who reject sobriety and 
economic productivity‖ (2000: 167).  Bergschmidt (2004) focuses more explicitly on the 
ways in which methadone encourages patients to quest for normalcy and participate in 
their own self-disciplining, while O‘Malley and Valverde (2004) suggests that methadone 
is aimed, not at the direct governance of drug users, but at governance through ―freedom‖ 
that encourages the autonomous choices of individuals.   
 As the chapters on both the neuroscientific and regulatory discourse suggest, bup 
was in many ways conceived explicitly as a way to re-construct addiction treatment to be 
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compatible with notions of autonomy, freedom and self-improvement.  Framed as a 
medication, like insulin or hypertension medications, bup was intended to circumvent the 
need for overtly punitive strategies to manage addiction (i.e., incarceration) and the 
highly stigmatized and still coercive methadone system.  Addiction, however, represents 
very real threats to neoliberal ideals, and for bup to succeed it must address these threats.  
Under the control of a substance that by definition erodes the will, those addicted to illicit 
drugs are seen as unable to make the free, responsible choices required by neoliberalism.  
Moreover, addicts are seen as dropping out of or threatening consumer capitalism as they 
are perceived to not work, foster a black market economy, engage in criminal activity to 
support their ―habit,‖ and generally prioritize the consumption of drugs to the exclusion 
of consumer goods.  Bup has been constructed by neuroscience, regulators, the 
pharmaceutical industry and patients alike as the technological fix that can disrupt this 
cycle and restore autonomy.  Bup does this both through the ways in which it is 
embodied and the ways in which it operates discursively to shape conduct.   
 
Embodied Experience 
 Both the neuroscientific literature and the embodied experiences of those taking 
bup highlight the important role of bup in controlling pleasure and restoring rationality.  
In addition, the control of cravings and/or the prevention of withdrawal symptoms are 
central to making people ―feel normal.‖  These perceived physiological effects, especially 
the blocking of pleasure, help shape a particular kind of subject and a particular kind of 
governance that is compatible with neoliberal ideals. 
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 Mackenzie (2006) has argued that pleasure is read as risk in public health today.  
On the one hand, pleasure is at the core of consumer capitalism.  On the other hand, an 
expanding array of ―diseases‖ are seen as the result of excess pleasure.  In addition, the 
propensity to overindulge in pleasurable substances or activities is increasingly framed as 
an addiction (i.e., gambling addiction, food addiction, sex addiction).  The neoliberal 
subject in his or her quest for health, then, must be on constant guard against the risk of 
excess pleasure and addiction to it.  O‘Malley and Valverde (2004) argue: 
The emphasis on freedom of choice in neo-liberal politics has generated 
new approaches to the government of drug and alcohol consumption that 
brings the felicity calculus --  and thus ‗pleasure‘ --  almost to the surface 
of regulatory politics (35). 
 
Of course, not all pleasure caused by substances is bad.  The responsible consumption of 
a substance, like a drink after work, is permitted and, in fact, encouraged through 
advertising, social norms, and cultural depictions (O‘Malley & Valverde 2004).  As 
Moore argues, this kind of substance use ―allows a ‗time-out‘ release from work and 
other responsibilities without necessarily interfering with them…  [It is] both a reaction 
to and an expression of capitalist consumer society‖ (2008: 357).  More and more, certain 
mood-altering medications (even those that cause physical dependence), like Prozac or 
Ritalin, enter into this class of substances.  Rather then threatening neoliberal consumer 
capitalism, they support it (Kushner 2006). 
 Drug users, especially heroin addicts, in contrast, are seen as exceeding this 
controlled pleasure.  Rather than moderating pleasure, they are seen as relishing in its 
excess.  In the language of neuroscience, their brains have become hijacked by the desire 
to recreate euphorigenic experiences of flooding their dopamine systems.  Drug users 
describe it as not being able to think about anything other than getting the drug.  
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However, in general, people in this sample reported using drugs, not to get high, but to 
avoid withdrawal.  Nonetheless, the relationship between drug use and excess pleasure 
has taken on cultural significance and becomes important, not just for controlling the 
behavior of individual drug users, but for controlling the behavior of the population as a 
whole.  As Lenson describes:  ―The drug user is assumed to be someone who has seen 
these things – who has seen ecstasy and excess…the candid and undisguised hunger for 
the kinds of pleasure that drugs offer‖ (1995: 20).  Drug users represent uncurtailed 
jouissance and as such are the source of moral panic (Loose 2002: 236).  According 
Loose (2002), we view the addict as one who rejects all but the pursuit of pleasure and 
one who abandons all convention and restraint in that pursuit. 
 The control of pleasure through bup, therefore, has the potential to restore the 
individual drug user and to quell the moral panic surrounding illicit drug use.  Bup helps 
rebuild the capacity of the subject to meet norms of neoliberal society at the physiological 
level because purportedly: 1) it blocks the pleasurable effects of heroin and 2) it does not 
itself cause pleasure.  Through bup, individuals can curtail experiences of pleasure and 
―feel normal‖ --  that is, not high.   
 In addition to controlling pleasure, both the neuroscientific literature and people 
taking bup saw drugs as disrupting rationality.  For the neuroscientists this was conceived 
of as damage to the prefrontal cortex or changes in key brain structures.  But for people 
taking bup it was understood as the restoration of ―clear mindedness‖ when they started 
taking bup.  Like controlling pleasure, rationality is prerequisite for the exercise of liberal 
autonomy (Valverde 1997).  Mackenzie argues that, given our emphasis on self-
improvement through the use of pharmaceuticals, the rational consumer is one that 
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―aspires both to maintain neurochemical mood control and to apply the aesthetic of 
moderation‖ (2006: 95).  That is, by taking bup, people are restoring their rationality 
through neurochemically rebalancing their brains and expressing that rationality through 
the desire to achieve a mood state that is marked by moderation and control.   
 
Acting Normal: “I am John Q. Citizen” 
 The embodied states that bup appears to make possible – the control of pleasure 
and the restoration of rational thinking – are necessary but not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of neoliberal personhood.  As Chapter 6 made clear, for people taking bup, 
―normal‖ was not just about how they felt; it was also about how they acted.  Rose has 
argued that the neurochemical age marks a shift ―from strategies of normalization of the 
deviant to measures seeking the correction of specific anomalies‖ (2003: 34).   Similarly, 
Vrecko (2010b) suggests that: ―[T]he contemporary brain sciences have not taken as their 
project the governing of wills, but rather, the civilizing of problematic cravings and 
desires‖ (48).  For both Rose and Vrecko, neuroscience makes possible a biochemical 
correction that is sufficient to restore the subject because the deficiency is believed to be 
rooted in faulty neurochemistry. 
 But addressing a neurochemical anomaly or civilizing problematic cravings and 
desires does not alone assure that an ―addict‖ can meet the demands of neoliberal 
personhood.  The continued presence of will power and behavior change in the ways that 
bup is being constructed by the manufacturer, government agencies, and individuals 
suggests that certain kinds of conduct are also required.  As one participant, Habierto 
says, ―the difference with Suboxone is acting normal.‖  Acting normal among those in 
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this study required more than controlling cravings or correcting a neurochemical 
deficiency by taking a pill; it encompassed a way of life and set of activities characterized 
by autonomous, responsible citizenship achieved through medication and will power. 
 The regulatory changes that govern bup (e.g., take home prescriptions; generally 
no requirement for daily attendance; less exposure to other drug users) in addition to its 
physiological effects were widely perceived as letting people get on with their daily lives 
without burdensome interruptions and tasks.  Likewise, the legal status of bup meant that 
people no longer had engage in criminal activity (i.e., possession of illegal drugs), and its 
availability at no cost meant that most people did not need to engage in criminal activity 
to support their drug habits.   The embodied experience of the pill itself, the changes in 
how bup is delivered and regulated, and the desire or will to stop using drugs made 
possible certain kinds of conduct – all helped make people become ―extra normal.‖ 
 When describing what they meant by bup making them ―normal,‖ many people 
said that they were able to be responsible for themselves and/or their families.  As Mindy 
puts it, ―[Bup] helped me to get up and do what I was supposed to do every day.‖   
Several people talked about how bup allowed them to routinize their lives and participate 
in conventional activities.  Others describe engaging in activities of self-improvement, 
such as going back to school, focusing on their health care, or volunteering in the 
community.  Wendall notes that beyond its physiological and embodied effects, bup 
allows for a ―lifestyle‖ change: 
[T]he majority of the people, who I know, that's on the program, that's 
taken the bup, is just doing a 100 percent better you know. They lifestyle 
done changed. You know, uh, they got better rapport with their kids you 
know, paying their bills, buying groceries you know, clothes… 
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Overcoming addiction for these participants means changing their whole lives in ways 
that most connected to productive, responsible citizenship.  As Jesse noted, ―on 
[buprenorphine], I am John Q. Citizen.‖   Similarly Mindy notes that: 
My life is not different.  It‘s normal.  I mean I could have had a life 
without drugs, but it‘s like I haven‘t even used drugs.  And it ain‘t like I‘m 
on no drug, ‗cause like I said, it‘s just maintenance.  And my life ain‘t 
never been this normal.  I‘m able to pay bills and do the right thing. … 
And on my hygiene, I take care of myself. 
 
Interestingly, Mindy struggles here to explain how being on bup is different than being 
on other drugs.  For her being on bup is contrasted with ―a life without drugs‖ because 
her life is now ―normal‖ by which she means paying her bills and taking care of her 
personal hygiene --  markers of responsible citizenship. 
There are noteworthy parallels here with Fullagar‘s (2009) study of women taking 
anti-depressants.  Fullagar (2009) found that medication helped many women feel that 
they were redressing a neurochemical deficiency in order to reach a functional norm.  
The medication does not itself restore normalcy; it fosters the ability to work on oneself 
to achieve or enact ―normal.‖  Similarly, Sanderson in a study of rheumatoid arthritis 
patients founds that: 
…struggling to maintain normality, self-value is focused on… the notion 
that citizenship can only be maintained through participation in normal 
activities and roles… this self is only made possible through expensive 
drugs… it is a biological citizenship, dependent on a specified response to 
the medication (2011: 630).  
  
Normality becomes a project, part of the work of continually monitoring and managing 
one‘s self both through adherence to a medical regime and through participation in 
―normal activities‖ (Rose 2009).   
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Becoming “Normal,” Buprenorphine and Neoliberalism 
 Several features of how bup is being constructed, embodied and enacted are 
consistent with neoliberal self-governance.  This includes a focus on individualism and 
self-management and the redirection of consumption.  Vidal argues that ―the 
neuroscience hype highlights the ascendancy… of a certain view of the human being‖ -- 
one which he calls the ―cerebral subject‖ (2009: 6).  This subject is consistent with the 
contemporary insistence on individualism and the propensity to locate the causes of 
pathology within the individual.  Individualism and self-control go hand in hand: 
Modern western cultures seem to have a fascination with issue of self-
control.  Perhaps this is not surprising in cultures that have come to value 
individualism so highly.  Not being in control of oneself is regarded as a 
serious problem (Hammersley & Reid 2002: 20). 
 
The brain disease model of addiction locates the loss of self-control within the individual 
brain.  Simply put, the danger lies within the person.  First, the individual must prevent 
addiction and be vigilant about inducing too much pleasure thereby disrupting the brain‘s 
delicate neurocircuitry and/or causing brain damage.  Second, s/he must also ―treat‖ any 
defects that do arise.  Last, s/he must achieve and maintain a ―normal‖ and ―healthy‖ 
brain.   
 This emphasis on the role of the individual in both causing and curing their illness 
is a classic feature of neoliberalism, where responsibility is shifted from the state to the 
individual.  As Galvin (2002) explains: 
With the collapse or… shrinking of the welfare state and emergence of 
neoliberalism and economic rationalism as the guiding principles of 
government in contemporary western culture, the concept of social 
engineering and tutelage have been swept aside by the belief that 
individuals should be empowered to take control of their lives…  As a 
result, circumstances which were once viewed as either resulting from the 
failure of the modern state or simple a matter of social responsibility such 
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as sickness, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, racism and exposure 
to crime, are now being redefined as matters as personal responsibility 
(117). 
 
The responsibility of the individual for his or her own illness is not unique to addiction 
but rather a marker of the ways that addiction has entered into the rhetoric of the new 
public health.  With the rise of pharmaceuticals for both health and self-enhancement, 
medications play a key role in promoting these ideas of self-management and 
responsibility (Lakoff 2005).  Bup can be seen and is largely constructed as a technology 
of the self that confers both new responsibilities and new freedoms in ways that are 
radically individualistic.  For example, one BHIVES participant, Walker, describes the 
loneliness he felt as a ―clean,‖ responsible and autonomous bup self: ―I don't have no 
friends, got nothing to do, know what I'm saying.… [It‘s] like I'm in a -- on an island by 
myself.‖  For Walker and others, bup offered the advantage of a treatment that could be 
controlled and taken in the privacy of one‘s own home, but this advantage also reinforced 
that the individual alone must take responsibility for and overcome his or her addiction 
by him or herself. 
 When pathology and its treatment become individualized, it not only creates a 
sense of isolation but also perpetuates the idea that the individual is alone responsible for 
both the cause and the cure (Wilkerson 1998).  In the case of addiction, this sense of 
blame and responsibility is compounded by the persistent belief (co-existing with the 
interiorizing neuroscientific ideas) that one‘s moral character or will power is also to 
blame for addiction.  As we saw in the earlier chapters, addiction scientists, government 
regulators, nor individuals taking bup could let go of a construction of addiction that 
included both a biochemical and a behavioral component.  As Galvin says: ―if we can 
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choose to be healthy by acting in accordance with the lesson given to us by epidemiology 
and behavioral research, then surely we are culpable if we do become ill‖ (2002: 119).   
 Ironically, proponents of bup often use an analogy to diabetes in their efforts to 
medicalize addiction and reduce blame and stigma.  But medicalization seems to have 
done little reduce the blame or the responsibility focused on people with diabetes.  Even 
though public health increasingly recognizes the role of environmental factors in causing 
―risk factors‖ for chronic illness, like obesity (e.g., lack of access to healthy foods), the 
cure for these conditions still rests on changes in individual choices and behavior (see 
LeBesco 2010; McNaughton, Salmon & Bell 2011).  Similarly, far from removing the 
responsibility and blame for addiction from drug users, bup seems to add a layer of new 
responsibility on top of the old one, while further embedding the cause of addiction 
within the individual.   
 As suggested above, this project of individualism and holding individuals 
responsible for their own health and the health of the public ties ―the scientific project… 
to a specific societal project‖ (Marcuse 1964/2002: 159).  It turns general unhappiness, 
systemic injustice, and social problems into personal discontent.  Lewis writing about 
Prozac explains how such biomedical models fundamentally undermine projects to 
transform the external environment: 
If we plug human suffering, misery and sadness into the calculus of 
bioscience, there is no need to make changes in the social order, instead, 
we only need to jump start some neurotransmitters (2003: 56) 
 
Given this framework, it is perhaps not surprising that the role of environmental factors 
in causing or helping cure drug use are infrequent in the scientific, regulatory and 
marketing materials that construct our understandings of bup.  At best, there is some 
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limited acknowledgment that peers and family play an important role.  At worst, 
environmental stress is reduced to its impact on the mesocorticolimbic dopamine system.  
For those taking bup, there is a much broader understanding of the importance of external 
factors (like housing, poverty, and exposure to crimes and drugs) and an 
acknowledgement that there are problems ―besides heroin‖ that the medical system 
cannot address.  And although they do turn to family, friends and the tattered remains of 
the welfare state for help, they also hold themselves responsible for changing their lives 
and for ―acting normal‖ regardless of their social circumstances.  Walker says:   
[I]f people serious, they going to always be there when they supposed to 
be.  Ain‘t going to be no excuses…. I don‘t care if you‘re 10-years old or 
10 hundred years old, if you ain‘t trying to improve yourself, then you 
ain‘t doing nothing. 
 
This ―no excuses,‖ self-improvement dictum is emblematic of the neoliberal subject who, 




 In addition to individualism and a self-reliance that undermines communitarian 
responses to social problems, neoliberal capitalism is marked by an emphasis on 
consumption and consumer choice.  Bup, as it has been socially constructed, fosters 
consumption in two ways.  First, by returning drug users to the world of legitimate work 
and normal conduct, it helps reinsert them into the capitalist economy.  Part of ―being 
normal‖ in a capitalist society is earning, spending and consuming.  Second, bup is itself 
a commodity, one that replaces reliance on illegal drugs obtained through the black 
market economy with a legitimate medication obtained through the biomedical industrial 
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complex.  In this way, bup also generates ―biovalue,‖ that is, it creates surplus value and 
profit from the imperative of health (Rose 2003).   To the extent that those taking bup are 
transformed from addicts to patients, they become both consumers and commodities of 
the biomedical industrial complex (Clarke et al. 2003). 
 Marcuse (1964/2002) argues that the way social control operates in modern 
society is through the creation and fulfillment of needs.  By convincing us that pleasure 
and fulfillment are ours to be had through consumption, capitalism leads us away from 
critical thinking and understandings of social inequity; to use Marcuse words, ―the 
Pleasure Principle absorbs the Reality Principle‖ (1964/2002: 72).  He goes on to say: 
[I]f individuals are pre-conditioned so that the satisfying goods also 
include thoughts, feelings, aspirations, why should they wish to think, feel 
and imagine for themselves (1964/2002: 51). 
 
 
By undermining critical thinking and sapping us of our impetus for reform, consumption 
works in concert with the degradation of welfare state described above.  Freedom is 
exercised through consumption (Reith 2004: 285).  We are free to choose among the 
options presented to us in the marketplace, and the marketplace is where we are also to 
find the solutions to problems --  once understood as social – that are now our 
responsibility to resolve.   
 Lakoff argues that neoliberalism ―substitutes ‗consumer‘ for ‗citizen‘‖ (2005: 70).  
However, drug users, like many of those in the BHIVES study, whose lives revolve 
around acquiring and using illicit drugs are only partially fulfilling their roles as 
consumer-citizens.  Lenson (1995) suggests that drug users disrupt consumer capitalism 
because ―the desire for the drug itself supersedes all other desires, including the desire for 
acquiring materials objects other than the drug itself‖ (28).  Drug users are not only 
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failing to meet the requirements of being controlled, rational and responsible; they are 
failing to be appropriately consumptive. 
 Only 25% of participants in my sample were employed.  The lives they describe 
are not ones of earning and spending in the formal economy.  Rather they describe 
acquiring cash off-the-books (generally through piecework, borrowing, pan-handling, 
petty theft, dealing drugs and/or prostitution) and spending the bulk on that money on 
illicit or prescribed drugs purchased on the street.  Responding to a question about what 
he did to pay for his illicit drugs, Walker says: 
Pretty much damn near anything I can do to get my hands on a couple 
dollars, when I was in the street. Selling drugs, stealing, doing everything, 
if I'm going to be honest about it, yeah. No, but now, I don't do none of 
that. 
 
Walker, like several others in the study, goes on to describe how bup allowed him to 
leave the informal economy and become a consumer in the formal economy by both 
removing the desire for drugs and obviating the need to engage in criminal activity to pay 
for drugs.  As Terry explains: ―I know now I'm on that Suboxone, that Suboxone's in my 
system, and I'm not gonna waste the money on a bag of dope, 'cause I'm not gonna get 
high.‖  Without having to spend money on drugs, several people described having cash in 
their pockets for the time in years. 
 Most people in the study also had experiences transforming their drug use into a 
commodity by entering the service economy of drug treatment programs.  Carl notes how 
methadone providers want to keep people coming back to their program for profit: ―You 
know, they still want to make their money off their methadone.‖  Several other people in 
the BHIVES study reflected on themselves as service consumers and clearly understood 
that they were playing a key role in the drug treatment industry.  Speaking about her 
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methadone program, Nancy notes that the counselors there treat the clients like objects: 
―Yeah, they check the boxes. They just didn't care; they're there for their paycheck, you 
know?‖  Bup is clearly the latest entrant into the drug treatment economy.   
 Bup treatment provides a smooth redirection of profit as it transforms illicit drug 
use into ―medication-assisted treatment.‖  Simply put, as individuals enter bup treatment, 
the replace an illicit opioid purchased on the street with legal opioid purchased through a 
pharmacy.  Both cause physical dependence, but in the latter case, profit is produced and 
benefits Reckitt Benckiser as well as the physicians involved in the bup treatment. 
Physically reliant on medication, the buprenorphine ―patient‖ consumes and becomes 
part of the multi-national corporation that produces it.  The prescribing doctor can be 
seen benignly in the role of salesman/distributor (Lewis 2003) or as playing a more 
nefarious role as medical colonizer (Sharp 2000).   This form of consumption, as the 
earlier chapters suggest, bring individuals into contact with new ―expert knowledges and 
political rationalities‖ (Galvin 2002: 128).  The message is clear -- through consumption 
(albeit to a physically addictive opioid), you can reenter the legitimate world, take 
responsibility for yourself, and better manage your neurochemically risky self. 
 Scholars have noted the role of the pharmaceutical industry in ―selling sickness‖ 
to produce a market for their products (Moynihan et al. 2002).  Through expanding the 
definitions of ―illness,‖ encouraging the desire for self-enhancement through medication, 
and fostering anxieties about the body and the self, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
able to harness the ethos of self-care and consumerism into tremendous profits.  Moncrief 
(2008) points out the synergy between medicalization, pharmaceutical logic, and 
neoliberal thought: 
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As well as medicalizing discontent, the pathological self-dissatisfaction 
suggested by the idea that our behavior and problems are due to a brain 
disorder helps produce a state of mind that accepts the changing nature of 
work [and] life wrought by neoliberal policies …  people are more likely 
to locate the source of their troubles in themselves, and see their doctors, 
than look to their … environment (249). 
 
 
In some ways, however, bup troubles this narrative of transforming a problem previously 
understood as a social into one that is treated through and generates profits for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Specifically, the ambiguity between the world of legal 
medications and illicit drugs confounds this linear logic.  As the data presented earlier 
make clear, there is an active street market for bup.  Many people are using bup in 
creative ways that profit themselves – rather than profit doctors or Reckitt Benckiser.  In 
addition, many individuals continued to participate in the illicit drug market.  The 
preoccupation by researchers, government regulators and the manufacturer over the 
diversion of bup make clear its ambivalent status as both a medication and an illicit drug.  
Moreover, much of the problem that bup purports to solve stem not from heroin or the 
criminal world that supposedly surrounds it, but from the over-prescription of pain 
medications. 
 The real profit to be made from bup is from iatrogenic medicine, not heroin 
addiction.  In 2002, people in the U.S. consumed more than 200 tons of opium-derived 
and synthetic opioids (Fischer, Gittens & Rhem 2008).  According to the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, the primary source of pharmaceuticals sold on the street are 
physicians and pharmacists (Fischer, Gittens & Rhem 2008).  And as we saw from the 
analysis of Reckitt Benckiser‘s materials, the market they are truly going after is the 
white, affluent abuser of pain medications.  In a nice circle of profit that benefits doctors 
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and the pharmaceutical industry, medicine is causing a problem that medicine can now 
treat.  Whether one is overcoming addiction to heroin or Oxycodone, bup stills provides a 
neoliberal response  -- through the right kind of kind of consumption (i.e., one that does 
not disrupt your capacity to be a responsible, consuming citizen and that generates profit 
for industry), you can manage your own health.   The persistence of will power and 
morality in constructions of addiction does little to disrupt this.  You may need to exert 
your will (to ―really want to change‖), you may need to reform your conduct, you may 
even need Reckitt Benckiser‘s Here to Help program, or some counseling.  Whatever you 
need, it is still up to you to overcome your addiction and reenter legitimate society. 
 
Segmented Governance and Race 
 I have argued the buprenorphine offers new forms of regulation and helps shape a 
neoliberal subject.  But bup is not alone in making meaning of addiction.  Rather, it 
continues to co-exist with a host of other paradigms and strategies for overcoming 
addiction.  New forms of self-regulation that psychopharmaceuticals like bup make 
possible do not necessarily diminish the force of more punitive forms of external control 
(Tiger 2011), and we should be cautious about assuming that this latest push towards the 
medicalization of addiction will replace more overtly punitive responses.  In their study 
of methadone, Fraser and Valentine note that we have established a system with ―self-
regulation for some, brute repression for others‖ (2008: 60).  Those who fail to govern 
themselves may be incarcerated or engage with ―medicolegal hybrids,‖ like the use of 
naltrexone in drunk driving courts (Vrecko 2009).   
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 Rather than making drug users blameless, neuroscience has provided tools 
(speculative and theoretical though they remain) to identify ―addicts‖ and hold them 
accountable for correcting their own behavior through the use of neuroscientific 
interventions.  Rose, looking at court decisions, points out that neuroscience makes 
authorities believe that they can be preemptive in protecting public safety by making it 
possible to ―identify and exclude those who are incorrigibly risky and monstrous -  
incarceration without reform‖ (2010: 88).  The uncertainty within addiction neuroscience 
about the role of genetics, biology, environment and personality means that we are all 
susceptible or at risk, reinforcing the ―emerging logic for the conduct of conduct – to 
screen and intervene‖ (Rose 2010: 97).  While this has not yet happened in the case of 
addiction, one can imagine neuroscientific arguments that a ―predisposition‖ to addiction 
or ―drug-induced brain damage‖ requires, not only civilizing and self-governance, but 
also aggressive intervention and containment.  Addiction neuroscience reveals the 
dilemmas inherent in contemporary regulatory projects:  how will we manage those who 
fail to meet the considerable demands of a liberal society of ―free‖ individuals?  
 Both more punitive forms of social control and the exercise of autonomy and self-
narration are contained with a larger sociopolitical context that is highly stratified, 
particularly by race and class.  Racism, which has played a central role in our responses 
to drug use, works hand in hand with neoliberalism.  Davis (2007) argues that 
neoliberalism relies on the myths of individualism and meritocracy so that ―race is 
disallowed as a legitimate political grievance‖ (249).  In my data, references to race or 
racism were few and far between.  This absence or ―muted racism,‖ asserts Davis, is also 
emblematic of neoliberalism: 
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Muted racism can also exist in the form omission.  In this case racism is 
represented in terms of inequality that is neither acknowledged nor 
analyzed and racial disparity is frequently explained using almost any 
other explanation (2007: 351). 
 
One is reminded here of the addiction neuroscientists suggesting that the association 
between drug use and poverty had to do with the release cortisone in the brain.  Similarly, 
government regulators failed to mention race, though they did use the code words of 
―urban‖ and ―suburban‖ and ―hard-core user‖ and ―new user‖ to suggest it.  This too, 
Davis says is a paradigmatic example of how racism work in neoliberal societies: ―When 
used indexically, code words or phrases are deployed to create racial meaning that 
generates a sort of pathological profiling of groups without direct reference to race‖ 
(2007: 251).  
 I would suggest that ―heroin,‖ ―methadone,‖ and ―prescription drugs‖ are other 
code words that signal race.  For the government proponents of bup, methadone was 
reserved for the urban, hard-core user, while bup was for young, suburban users.  
―Prescription drug abuse‖ and images of white middle class actors were the codes that 
Reckitt Benckiser relied on to market to white people and to absent African Americans 
from any conversation about bup.  Taken together, these absences and codes suggest a 
social construction of bup as a medical treatment for whites, leaving intact the punitive 
methadone system and prison as the appropriate response for drug use among Blacks.  
What appears to be developing are ―two tiers of treatment‖ (Hansen 2011a) stratified by 
race --  bup for white, middle and upper class users of prescription opioids and 
methadone (or prison) for Black and Latino users of heroin. 
 Demographic data about who uses bup are extremely scarce.  But some 
preliminary data suggest that, compared to those admitted for methadone treatment, 
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people taking bup are more likely to be white, employed and better educated (WESTAT 
2006; Moore et al. 2007).   As Figure 20 shows, in a national sample of those entering 
bup treatment, 91% were white compared to 53% of those entering methadone treatment 
(WESTAT 2006). 
 
Figure 20: Demographic Characteristics of Bup & Methadone Patients   
 
Source: WESTAT 2006 
 
The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), which surveys reports of drugs from 
emergency room admissions, is believed to provide early data on emerging drug use 
trends.  DAWN reports that 75% of people making emergency room visit involving bup 
were white and 6% were Black (SAMHSA 2006).  The researchers conclude: ―These 
findings seem to suggest that persons who are minorities and/or of lower economic status 
are not accessing this treatment [bup], at least for the present‖ (SAMHSA 2006: 3).  
There is additional evidence to suggest that those addicted to prescription medications 
   249 
 
(who are more likely to be white) are less likely to enter the publicly funded treatment 
systems, which include methadone and an array of behavioral treatment modalities.  An 
estimated 82% of all people addicted opioids are addicted to prescription medications, 
not heroin; and the numbers of people misusing prescription opioids far exceed those 
misusing heroin.  However, prescription opioid users make up less than 10% of public 
treatment admissions (SAMHSA 2006).  Finally, in unpublished data, Hansen (2011b) 
recently mapped bup prescription rates in New York City against methadone prescription 
rates.  She found that the highest income zip codes with the highest percentage of white 
residents also had the highest rates of bup use; lower income zip codes with 
predominantly Black and Latino populations had higher rates of methadone use. 
 It appears that bup is being deployed in ways that reflect existing racial and class 
inequities.  One BHIVES participant, Clarence, observes what others have wondered --  
will bup treatment be reserved for more affluent, presumably white drug user?  He says: 
I have found that usually the only people that I know that do know and 
have access to it [bup] have been people who are less hard-core, people in 
the suburbs.  But the hard-core people in the city - the doctors aren't there, 
the drug isn't there, anything. You know, at least not at home. 
 
Clarence notes that access to the drug for the ―hard core people in the city‖ appears to be 
limited, especially if they want to take it home.  He is referring here to some public drug 
treatment programs that provide bup but do it using the same restrictions that apply to 
methadone (i.e., observed treatment through daily attendance at a clinic).  Although 
anecdotal, this comment by Clarence suggests that bup can and will be used differently in 
different circumstances. As Mackenzie notes: ―Jurisdictions exercise governance through 
these alternative models in varying fashions, which impact on different groups in 
different ways, often commensurate with social stratification‖ (2006: 97).  In his book 
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Protest Psychosis, Metzl (2010) details how the diagnosis of schizophrenia (and mental 
illness more broadly) is function of culture, ideology and politics that reflect deeply 
embedded systems of institutionalized racism that result in schizophrenia becoming a 
―Black disease.‖  He argues persuasively that racism permeates diagnostic criteria, health 
care policies, and medical and popular accounts of illness.  My analysis suggests that 
over time, bup will remain primarily a treatment for white, middle class prescription 
medication users who are not seen as warranting the same kind of carceral responses as 
their Black counterparts.  
Some, like Alexander (2010), have suggested that criminal justice responses to 
drug use are central to shoring up American racism.  In an era where racial discrimination 
is no longer legal, the mass incarceration of African Americans has become the new 
system of racial control or ―the new Jim Crow‖ (Alexander 2010).  Drug use plays a 
central role in these systems of racial control and oppression.  The rapid increase in 
addiction to prescription medications among whites has propelled new efforts, like bup, 
to find a medical solution --  at least for some addicts. 
Who gets bup and who does not is only part of what is at issue.  I have argued that 
new forms of medical control offers subjects new means for the exercise of autonomy 
and real material benefits associated with being able to perform the responsibilities of 
neoliberal personhood.  Many of the people interviewed for this study were filled with 
the hope and the expectation that bup would confer upon them a new life of prosperity, 
health, and freedom.  I am, however, skeptical that bup, even when accompanied by the 
diligent exertion of the will, desire to be ―clean,‖ and the performance of ―normal‖ can 
overcome the profound social fissures that characterized our society.  The reclamation of 
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neoliberal personhood through bup may be possible for Jennifer, the woman on the 
Reckitt Benckiser website.  This white middle class suburban mother perhaps can trade 
her addiction to pain medications for a medical treatment and re-enter the realm of 
responsible, productive citizenship.  But I am less optimistic about the people in the 
BHIVES study whom by their own admission have ―problems besides heroin,‖ including 
racism and poverty.  
  Bup can help create embodied states and encourage the enactment of behavior 
that are consistent with the neoliberal subject.  What it cannot do is overcome the stigma, 
social circumstances, and systemic racism that many of the people in my study 
experienced.  Long before they were diagnosed as having a chronic, relapsing brain 
disease, they were labeled as addicts and criminals. Seventy-nine percent of the BHIVES 
participants had been involved in the criminal justice system, which means they are not 
only marked with stigma but face legal discrimination that will make it extraordinarily 
difficult to obtain employment and housing and to meet the obligations of neoliberalism. 
Bup will allow some to reclaim their status as people, as ―responsible members of 
society;‖ and it will allow the failure of others to help justify the continuation of more 
repressive forms of control. 
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Conclusion and Implications 
 
 I have argued throughout this dissertation that buprenorphine, addiction and 
addicts are constructed in different ways, depending on the actors and the context.  
Sometimes and in some contexts, bup is a medication, just like insulin; other times it is a 
dangerous drug that can be abused and diverted.  Sometimes addiction is a disease; other 
times it is a crime.  And sometimes drug users are addicts or criminals; other times 
patients.  When and how these different constructions are used is not arbitrary, but 
strategic.   
 The social construction of buprenorphine reveals that the differences we have 
created around different substances are largely artificial, having more to do with political 
aims, professional turf wars, and social control than pharmacological differences.  Bup, 
before it was even available for use an addiction treatment, was used by opportunistically 
government advocates to profoundly change U.S. drug policy in a way meant bolster a 
medical model and the role of physicians.  Bup was also used to build the legitimacy and 
funding of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, which had invested heavily in a 
neuroscientific model and in its medication development program with no real success 
until it become legal to prescribe bup.  Addiction neuroscientists were able to use bup to 
further their explicit political aim of medicalizing addiction and moving it into medical 
mainstream.  For Reckitt Bencikser, the pharmaceutical manufacturer of bup, bup was the 
cure for the prescription opioid epidemic and access to a lucrative market of white, 
middle class addicts.  Each of these actors, in employing their own strategic construction 
of bup, had to wrestle with bup‘s similarities to heroin, methadone and prescription 
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opioids.  And depending on their interests, each constructed bup in ways to emphasize 
either its sameness or its difference from these other substances.  This struggle to situate 
bup in relation to other opioids reflects the long and troubled history between medicine 
and addiction as well as the irrationality of the U.S.‘s current drug scheduling scheme.   
 I have also suggested that bup is constructed and materialized through the bodies 
of those taking it in ways that enfold, adapt and resist regulatory, marketing and scientific 
discourses.  Individuals taking bup share some interests with these other actors; they want 
to reenter lives of productive citizenship by leaving illicit drugs behind.  However, their 
understandings of addiction differ in important ways.  They widely acknowledge the role 
that their social circumstances and external factors play in causing their drug use and in 
supporting their recovery – factors largely absent in the discourse of others.  They almost 
uniformly resist the idea that addiction is a chronic, relapsing disease in whose grips they 
will be forever.  For them, addiction – even though it includes a physiological component 
--  is their responsibility and can only be overcome through desire to change one‘s life 
and the assertion of will power.  Those taking bup are also ambivalent about it status as 
medicine or a drug.  Though they experience it as creating less euphoria or sedation than 
methadone or heroin, they recognize that at its core bup is an opioid that causes physical 
dependence, and in that way, it remains a drug that most wished to eventually ―kick.‖  
While individuals in my sample wrestled with identifying the line between medicines and 
drugs, they were less concerned with these distinctions than other actors and moved 
fluidly between substances prescribed by doctors and substances purchased on the street.  
Their main interest was not whether a substance was a medicine or a drug but how they 
could use a given substance to achieve a particular embodied state. 
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 The many different buprenorphines constructed also lend insight into the 
processes of medicalization.  Bup has all the hallmarks of classic medicalization – a 
biomedical technology that can help transform a social problem into a medical one.  
Indeed, bup was constructed by and the in the context of what other scholars have 
identified as drivers of medicalization --  increased role of medical professionals, delivery 
in a medical setting, the culturally resonant language of neuroscience, the rise of 
pharmaceuticalization.  However, I conclude that bup has not yet and is unlikely to ever 
achieve the full medicalization of addiction because of several confounding factors.   
 First is the coexistence of other strong and deeply rooted understandings of 
addiction as a crime, a behavioral problem, and a moral failing.  In every one of the 
sources I examined, the specter of addiction as a crime or as moral failure remained.  
While these frameworks are not necessarily incompatible with a medical one, the 
persistence of other responses to addiction, like methadone and incarceration, undermine 
the claims of the medical model that addiction is a disease that erodes volition and will 
power.  Not even the addiction neuroscientists could explain away the role of individual 
behavior and choice in using drugs, and as long as an element of choice remains, so too 
does individual responsibility, blame, and the possibility of non-medical (criminal 
justice) responses.   
 Second, the medicalization of addiction is confounded by the historical and 
current problematic relationship between medicine and addiction treatment.  The 
Harrison Act of 1914 was meant to end the role of doctors as drug peddlers almost a 
hundred years ago.  The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 was meant to end the 
Harrison Act‘s prohibition on doctors prescribing narcotics for the treatment of addiction.  
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It was also intended to help medicine reclaim its role as the appropriate purveyors of 
addiction treatment.  But the intervening 100 years seem to have done little to restore the 
reputation of doctors as the solution to addiction.  Instead, they continue to face the 
stigma associated with addiction treatment, lack credibility as being knowledgeable and 
effective at treating addiction, confront the persistent notion that addiction is not a ―real‖ 
disease, and deal with accusations of creating, rather than curing, addiction.   
 Third and related, the medicalization of addiction through medication treatment is 
undermined by the continual slippage between medicines and drugs.  When addiction to 
opioids is treated by prescribing another addictive opioid, the discursive lines between 
addiction and its cure are blurred.  As my interviews with people taking bup 
demonstrated, many ―medicines‖ are used ―recreationally,‖ while many ―illicit drugs‖ are 
used to treat a host of psychological and physical problems, especially opioid withdrawal.  
With the rise of prescription drug abuse, the differences between therapeutic and 
addictive opioids have only become more confounded.  The Controlled Substances Act, 
which structures the scheduling of drugs in the U.S., does little to help clarify the 
distinctions between drugs and medicines.  The slippage between medicines and drugs 
has important implications beyond the medicalization of addiction.  As we continue to 
become a ―pharmaceutical culture,‖ coming to terms with what is a drug and what is a 
medicine is increasingly important.  Moreover, while the pharmaceuticalization of society 
supported the development and promotion of bup, big pharma was not the main driver.  
Intensive government involvement was needed to overcome the many barriers to the 
market-driven development of an anti-addiction medication.   
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 Finally, the lived experiences of those taking bup challenge the medicalization of 
addiction.  Bup has important material effects, but overall, individuals rejected a purely 
medical construction of addiction and remained ambivalent about bup‘s status as a 
medication.  They had little knowledge of or use for neuroscientific theories, and the role 
of doctors or the medical setting did little to shape their understandings of either bup or 
addiction.  They held tenaciously onto the centrality of their own choice and will power 
in overcoming addiction and used bup strategically in ways that undermined medical 
authority and demonstrated their acceptance of the fluidity between drugs and medicines.  
Holding on to this agency and volition, however, also meant holding on to the 
responsibility and blame for addiction. 
 This study also shows that even though individuals did not fully embrace a 
medical model of addiction, they did use bup in ways that reshaped their identities, 
allowed new opportunities for agency, and produced new systems of constraint.  Bup, 
both because of its embodied effects and because of the way in which it is regulated, 
allowed some people to ―become normal,‖ resume the activities of daily living and 
reenter ―productive citizenship.‖  Bup did, in fact, help several people leave drugs behind 
and rebuild their lives -  reconnecting with family, returning to school,  obtaining jobs.  
They entered into a system of control marked by physical dependence on a medication 
and medical monitoring --  but many did so willingly understanding that they were 
trading one constraint (typically heroin or methadone) for another that they found less 
burdensome.   
 The multiple meanings that inhere in bup in particular and addiction more 
generally mean that there is persistent ambiguity; and it is this ambiguity and multiple 
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valences that make possible the application of different forms and intensity of 
intervention into the lives of drug users.  Kaye (2006) argues ―the hybrid nature of 
addiction discourse enables a great deal of flexibility for governing authorities; a wide 
variety of regulatory options… can be variously mobilized‖ (31).  In many ways, the 
individuals in my sample are at the crossroads of different constructions of and responses 
to addiction.  Largely poor and predominantly people of color, most had been involved in 
the criminal justice system and in the methadone treatment system.  Bup treatment, made 
available to them through the BHIVES study, allowed them access to a medicalized  
treatment that many of their peers will never have.  As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, there is mounting evidence that bup will contribute to, not diminish, our system 
of segmented governance for drug users.  The ―young suburban heroin users‖ that the 
government regulators spoke about and the ―suburban young mothers addicted 
prescription medications‖ that are Reckitt Benckiser‘s primary market are likely to be the 
ones for whom addiction is a medical condition and buprenorphine its cure.  The ―hard 
core urban users‖ will likely require a different kind of governance, through the punitive 
methadone system or through incarceration.  There is no singular Truth about bup, and 
because there is not, it can --  and I believe will -- be deployed differentially in ways that 




 Elizabeth Pisani (2008) in The Wisdom of Whores argues that a substantial 
portion of the funding devoted to HIV/AIDS is wasted on ineffective programming 
because science and good public health policy are trumped by politics, ideology, and 
"morality."  The same is true for current U.S. drug policies.  As my analysis of the social 
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construction of bup has illustrated, the current classification of drugs as legal or illicit is 
at best irrational and at worst driven by racism (Mosher & Yanagaisako 1991).  In a 
culture that is increasingly medicalized and pharmaceuticalized, problematizing all ―non-
medical‖ use of substances will further exacerbate our already unjust and ineffective 
policy responses to drug use.   
 The use of illicit drugs is spread throughout society fairly evenly, but the harm 
that results from them and our responses to them are not.  Legal drugs, in fact, cause far 
more social and health problems than illicit ones (Mosher & Yanagaisako 1991), and our 
response to illicit drugs (arrest and incarceration) causes profound harm to individuals, 
families and communities (Global Commission on Drug Policy 2011).  One the face of it, 
medical approaches to drug use seem kinder and more benevolent than criminal justice 
approaches.  But, as I have argued, one does not preclude the other; both have and will 
continue to co-exist.  It seems increasingly likely that some drug users will be treated 
medically, and others will be locked up, escalating rather then diminishing the racial 
disparities that characterize U.S. drug policy.  Moreover, I have also argued that 
medicalized approaches do not necessarily reduce individual blame or stigma but rather 
merely cloak moralistic arguments in the language of science.  More perniciously, 
medicalized approaches, especially neuroscientific ones, radically individualize the 
problem of drugs and erase the effects of social factors, like racism and poverty. 
 We need a drug policy that recognizes the role that racism, poverty and the lack of 
opportunity play in fostering drug use and our responses to it and works to resolve them.  
Medicalization mutes racism and inequality and then blames individuals for not being 
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able to overcome them.  Instead of isolating and blaming those who use drugs, we need to 
restore communitarian responses that will help all people lead lives of dignity. 
 In addition to working towards building strong, vibrant communities where 
everyone has the opportunity to thrive, we need a drug policy that rationalizes our 
approach to substances, not arbitrarily judging them legal or illicit, but helping 
individuals understand the real risks and benefits each poses. To the extent that we want 
to control and limit the use of some substances, we should focus on the real harm they 
cause, not our irrational and/or racist fears about particular substances.  Imagine a drug 
policy where there are not arbitrary lines between bup, Oxycontin, methadone and heroin 
--  making some demon drugs that lead to incarceration and some cures to that same 
addiction.  Imagine a drug policy that does not draw a distinction between ―medical‖ 
marijuana and ―illicit‖ marijuana but simply explains the benefits and risk of marijuana 
use and trusts that people can make informed decisions about their own embodied 
experiences and health.  We believe that most people can moderately consume alcohol, 
Oxycontin, and Prozac without the threat of arrest.  Why not some opioids?  Imagine 
instead of stigma, fear, ambiguity and confusion, we offered information and support for 
whichever substance (or no substance at all) helps people. 
 The features of buprenorphine that helped people in my study the most were its 
legality and availability, the autonomy it gave it them over their own drug use and 
treatment, and its relative freedom from stigma.  These qualities can and should guide or 
drug policies.  But our drug policies must also include a commitment to understanding 
and dismantling systemic forms of oppression, racism, and inequality and to challenging 
neoliberal efforts to undermine communitarian responses to social problems. 
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